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Ben	Clapperton 
Ancient	Greek	Law	in	a	Near	Eastern	Context:	Comparative	Case	Studies	of	Homicide	Pollution	and	
Adultery	Law	in	Greece	and	the	Near	East	
 Abstract: This	thesis	comprises	two	case	studies	which	each	examine	a	point	of	Greek	law	in	the	context	of	the	Near	 East.	 Significant	work	 has	 been	 done	 in	 recognising	 that	 the	 Greeks	were	 in	 a	 network	 of	exchange	with	the	Near	East;	but	whilst	progress	has	been	made	in	areas	such	as	literature,	less	work	has	been	done	in	legal	history.	In	part,	this	 is	because	a	similarity	found	in	a	 law	cannot	point	to	influence	in	the	way	it	can	in	other	fields.	A	difference	in	constitutional	law	has	also	erected	a	barrier.	In	the	case	of	private	law,	however,	the	issues	facing	the	Greeks	were	the	same	as	the	ones	facing	their	 neighbours.	 The	 first	 case	 study	 focuses	 on	 Athenian	 homicide	 pollution;	 which	 has	 been	influenced	by	studies	such	as	that	of	Robert	Parker	who	believed	it	to	be	a	relic	of	an	earlier	period	that	had	no	place	in	Classical	Athens.		A	comparative	study	with	similar	beliefs	in	the	Hebrew	Bible	instead	demonstrates	that	in	each	society	it	represented	the	concerns	of	the	community,	who	could	not	otherwise	be	involved	in	what	was	legally	a	private	offence.	The	second	focuses	on	adultery	law.	The	 Greeks	 differed	 from	 their	 neighbours	 in	 subsuming	 adultery	 into	 the	 broader	 offence	 of	
moicheia,	and	a	comparative	study	with	Near	Eastern	adultery	law	demonstrates	that	this	created	an	important	difference	in	how	it	was	punished.	In	the	Near	East,	adultery	was	an	offence	committed	by	 the	wife	 and	her	 lover	 against	 the	 husband,	who	was	 required	 to	mete	 out	 an	 equal	 level	 of	punishment	to	each.	In	Athens	and	Gortyn,	the	offence	was	by	the	moichos,	and	no	punishment	was	imposed	on	the	woman.	Collectively,	these	case	studies	help	to	demonstrate	the	value	of	studying	Greek	legal	history	in	a	wider	regional	context.		
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
The overarching aim of this study is to help bring the discipline of 
Greek legal history into an increasing climate of openness in modern 
scholarship to studying Greek civilisation as both influenced by and in 
a network of exchange with the civilisations of the Near East. Fields 
such as art, literature, and philosophy have led the way in these kinds 
of studies, and in presenting parallels between Near Eastern and Greek 
works they have helped to demonstrate that the Greeks did not exist in 
isolation but were influenced by their neighbours. The focus of this 
study is, however, a purely comparative one, which is primarily 
because common legislation against offences such as adultery or 
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homicide by the Greeks and their neighbours is much less likely to 
demonstrate influence than a similarity in literary motifs.  
Instead of seeking influence, a comparison between the respective sets 
of legislation and legal documents can highlight similarities and 
differences which form the basis for exploring issues in Greek legal 
history from a different perspective. Examining these similarities and 
differences can provide insights which would go unnoticed in studies 
focused solely upon the Greeks, whether by adding additional context 
to a debate on a point of Greek law or bringing to light questions that 
would never otherwise have been asked if the differences between the 
Greeks and their neighbours were not examined.  
As may be obvious from the preceding discussion, whilst what follows 
is a comparison of Greek and Near Eastern legal history, the focus here 
is on what this comparison can tell us about Greek legal history, rather 
than what it can tell us about Near Eastern legal history. This should 
not be taken to mean that the study assumes the comparison can only 
be useful in one direction, but rather that it is simply the scope of this 
particular study.  
The method chosen for this comparison is the case study, which allows 
for specific areas of law to be examined in detail. The scope of this 
study allows for two case studies to be carried out. The first compares 
Classical Athenian homicide pollution with that found in the Hebrew 
Bible, whilst the second case study compares Near Eastern adultery law 
with Greek moicheia law. Between them, they demonstrate both the 
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value of introducing additional context to a debate within Greek legal 
scholarship and the ability of a comparative study to spotlight issues 
which would not otherwise have been considered without it. 
 
Scholarship on Greece and the Near East 
 
The influence of ‘the Near East’ upon the development of Greek 
culture and civilisation is not a new topic for modern scholarship, 
though it is one which has only recently gained wide acceptance. The 
Hellespont, a stretch of water sufficiently narrow that Xerxes was able 
to build a pontoon bridge across it, provided both the Greeks of the 
Classical period and modern scholarship with a conceptual boundary; 
one that separated the Persians, Asia, and the East on one side of it, 
from the Greeks, Europe, and the West on the other side.1 This 
conceptual divide has helped to create the homogenous area of the Near 
East in modern scholarship.2 Civilisations such as those of the 
Sumerians, Hittites, Egyptians, Assyrians, and Persians have fallen 
under the umbrella of ‘Near East’, and are studied as if they were a 
collective and coherent unit, even though some of these civilisations 
                                               
1 See Hauser (2001), 93-94; Wiesehöfer (2009), 162-163. 
2 The term itself is not a creation of modern scholarship, but rather emerged 
during the nineteenth century to define an area vaguely covered by the Ottoman 
Empire. Its use in modern scholarship is not entirely consistent either, with a 
geo-political usage that varies by era. Westbrook includes Egypt and the Hittites 
in his edited volume on Near Eastern law; a work that whilst it touches on the 
Hellenistic period, is primarily concerned with a chronological span covering the 
earliest Mesopotamian civilisations down to the start of the Classical period; 
Westbrook (2003b, 2003c). Conversely, Millar excludes both Egypt and much of 
Western Turkey from his work on the Roman Near East, regions which by the 
death of Augustus had been successively Hellenised and then fallen under direct 
Roman control; Millar (1993).  
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were chronologically and geographically closer to the Greeks than they 
were to each other.  
The roots of this dichotomy in modern scholarship between the Greeks 
and the Near East date back to the Enlightenment. The eighteenth 
century was a period in which a new humanism emerged in Germany 
focused on the study of Greek art and literature, as opposed to the 
previous Latin-focused study of the ancient world.3 The study of 
Classics subsequently emerged in this context as a distinct discipline 
within academia, with Greek culture as its fountainhead.4 At the time, 
much of Near Eastern history had been lost to European scholarship; 
with the Hebrew Bible representing a rare example of a surviving 
collection of Near Eastern texts. Along with the discovery of Indo-
European as the ancestor of most European languages, separate and 
distinct from the Semitic languages of the Near East, and the 
contemporary Romantic view that culture and literature were 
intimately connected to the civilisations that produced them, these three 
trends were presented by Burkert as foundational in the separation of 
Greek culture from its eastern neighbours in modern scholarship.5 The 
                                               
3 At the head of this movement was Johann Joachim Winckelmann, who was at 
the forefront of a renewal of Classical scholarship in Germany in the eighteenth 
century, and who placed a high value upon the emulation of earlier 
masterpieces. In this way, Roman culture, the focus of earlier European 
humanism, came increasingly to be seen as an approach to the Greek culture 
which it emulated. See Pfeiffer (1976), 167-170. 
4 Friedrich Wolf famously recorded his name as ‘studiosus philologiae’ in his 1777 
matriculation, later claiming to have invented the discipline of philology, 
although he may not have been the first person to identify himself as such; 
Schröder (1913) 168-171. Wolf concentrated on the study of Homer and Plato, 
but not the New Testament, helping to create a break with Theology in the 
creation of Classics as a discipline; Pfeiffer (1976), 173. 
5 Burkert went on to identify the decipherment of Egyptian hieroglyphics and 
Mesopotamian cuneiform which opened up the history of the Near East and 
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Greeks of the Archaic period were seen as pioneers in fields such as 
art, literature, philosophy, architecture, and politics; and for much of 
the next century, the view of a “pure, self-contained Hellenism” 
appearing for the first time in the works of Homer held sway.6 The 
Greeks of the Classical period further helped to contribute to the view 
that they were both separate from and superior to their neighbours with 
their stereotype of the eastern barbarian, constructed in the aftermath 
of the Persian Wars in works such as Aeschyles’ Persians.7 
Early inroads into the East/West dichotomy were made in the field of 
art. Discoveries of imported Near Eastern artwork in Greece, and the 
recognition that Greek art in the Archaic period had been influenced by 
techniques and characteristics of Near Eastern art, provided definite 
proof that Greece was in a network of both material and cultural 
exchange with the Near East.8 In the post-war period it would be 
primarily through literary comparisons that the influence of Near 
Eastern culture on Greek culture would begin to gain acceptance. The 
Hittite text of the [Song] of Kumarbi was published in 1946 and its tale 
                                               
demonstrated its greater antiquity, the discovery of the Mycenaean civilisation 
and the decipherment of Linear B to demonstrate a prehistory for the Archaic 
Greeks, and the decipherment of Hittite which demonstrated an Indo-European 
language spoken by a Near Eastern culture, as laying the groundwork in the 
nineteenth century for the gradual erosion of the separation between the Greeks 
and the Near East; Burkert (1992), 1-4. See also Bernal (1987), 224-227. 
6 Averintsev (1999), 1; Burkert (1992), 3; West (1969), 113. 
7 See Hall (1989) and Harrison (2001). See also Plato Epin. 987d-e for a Classical 
Athenian view of the superiority of the Greeks over their eastern neighbours. 
8 Frederik Poulsen published a general survey of Near Eastern influence on Greek 
art in 1912, and by 1966, Akurgal could speak of the work of several generations 
of scholars when publishing his own survey on the influence of the Near East in 
the areas of art, literature, and fashion; Poulsen (1912); Akurgal (1966). See also 
Dunbabin (1957) for another survey on Near Eastern influence on Greek art; and 
Burkert (1992), 4; Crielaard (1995), 215. 
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of generational strife amongst the gods and the castration of Anu by 
Kumarbi bears a striking resemblance to Hesiod’s Theogony and its 
story of the castration of Ouranos by Kronos.9 Kumarbi pre-dates 
Theogony by around five hundred years, and is likely based upon an 
even older Hurrian version, which meant that if the striking similarities 
between them were evidence of influence, then it must have been the 
Greek text which was influenced by the Near Eastern.10  
Twenty years later, in his commentary on the Theogony, Martin West 
made the claim that “Greece is part of Asia. Greek literature is a Near 
Eastern literature”.11 Despite the obvious parallels which were 
emerging between Greek and Near Eastern literature, the claim was 
still a controversial one, and did little to change the traditional view of 
Archaic Greek civilisation.12 In 1993, Knox reiterated the traditional 
view that the Greeks invented fields such as philosophy, political 
theory, many of the sciences, and the concept of a national literature.13 
Knox emphasised what he felt to be Greek literature’s originality as 
well as its superiority to its predecessors.14 If the Greeks could no 
longer be seen as having invented every aspect of their civilisation, then 
                                               
9 Theog. 154-182. See West (1997), 278-280 for a summary of the [Song] of 
Kumarbi. 
10 West (1997), 103,  
11 West (1966), 31. In addition to literature, West also argued that Greek 
philosophy had been heavily influenced by the Near East, especially in the period 
between 550-480 during which time West claimed that displaced Magi were the 
source of this transmission; West (1971). 
12 “…a remarkable claim when everyone knew that Greece is part of Europe and 
its literature unlike anything that appeared in the Near East”; Powell (2000), 662. 
13 Knox (1993). 
14 Knox (1993), 31. See also Bernal (1987), 225; “the predominant view has been 
maintained that although the Egyptians were technically proficient they were not 
‘truly civilised’.”  
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any precursors to them could be dismissed as deeply inferior.15 Three 
years later, Osborne minimised any sense of cultural contact between 
Archaic Greece and the Near East.16 Osborne not only dismissed any 
Near Eastern influence on the works of Hesiod by ascribing the 
similarities to the traditional nature of the poetry, but he also denied 
that there was any cultural influence at all between the Greeks and the 
Near East during the eighth century.17 In place of influence, Osborne 
restricted cultural contacts between Archaic Greece and the Near East 
to small portable trade items such as jewellery, and a fad for exotic 
Oriental motifs in Greek art.18 However, the tide was beginning to turn, 
and two books published either side of Knox and Osborne, Burkert’s 
The Orientalizing Revolution, and West’s The East Face of the 
Helicon, took decisive steps forward in establishing the Archaic Greeks 
as part of a network of cultural exchange with their neighbours.19 
Burkert demonstrated that Near Eastern influence on the Greeks went 
beyond the reception of simple goods to encompass areas such as myth 
and religion. West’s book presented an avalanche of parallels between 
Greek and Near Eastern literature, not all of them convincing, but more 
than sufficient to make his case.  
Challenges to traditional scholarly views on the Near East and its 
relationship with the ancient Greeks also came from two authors 
                                               
15 A similar claim for mathematics is made by Todd; Todd (1993), 3. 
16 Osborne (1996). 
17 Osborne (1996), 142. 
18 Osborne (1996), 41, 167-168. 
19 Burkert (1992); West (1997). The Orientalizing Revolution was translated from 
Burkert’s Die orientalisierende Epoche in griechischen Religion und Literatur; 
Burkert (1984). See Moyer (2006), for criticism of Burkert. 
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outside the field of Classics, each of which generated considerable 
discussion within the discipline. Edward Said’s Orientalism attacked 
what he saw as the construction of an ‘Orient’ by Western 
scholarship.20 As a coherent cultural, geographic, and ethnic whole, 
Said claimed that the Orient existed only as a construct of the western 
discourse, one which was reduced to a few stereotypes that formed its 
underlying assumptions. He argued that Orientalism was a political 
doctrine that was enforced upon the Orient by the West due to its 
relative weakness, and that the things that made the Orient different 
from the West were then equated in the Western outlook with Oriental 
weakness.21 Similarly to Burkert, albeit for slightly different reasons 
which stem from a colonial rather than a strictly academic starting 
point, Said also identified the late eighteenth century as the 
fountainhead for modern Orientalism. Whilst the scope of the Orient 
covered a large area, Said argued that the area of the Near East, and the 
shared dominance of it by Britain and France in the nineteenth century, 
was the primary source of modern Orientalism; one that helped to 
create a shared European intellectual power over the area, that in turn 
informed the understanding of it and the people who lived there.22 
In Black Athena, Martin Bernal argued that concerns over the threat 
posed by ancient Egypt to the primacy of Greek culture and of 
Christianity, coupled with emerging ideas on race, caused Western 
scholarship from the end of the eighteenth century onwards to overturn 
                                               
20 Said (1989). 
21 Said (1989), 204. 
22 Said (1989), 40-42. 
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what he claimed was until then a widely accepted view of significant 
Egyptian and Phoenician influence on the development of Greek 
culture in the second millennium; a view that Bernal claimed dated all 
the way back to the Greeks themselves.23 Bernal argued that black 
slavery caused European thinkers to keep black Africans as far away 
from the roots of European civilisation as possible, whilst rising anti-
Semitism accounted for the Phoenicians. In their place, an Aryan race 
of northern conquerors came to be seen as the progenitors of Greek 
culture.24 Both Orientalism and particularly Black Athena have faced 
criticism. Said for the polemical nature of his work, his lack of rigour, 
a focus on the discourse about the region but not the region itself, and 
a selective use of evidence.25 Bernal has come under significant 
criticism for his methodology and few of his claims have gained 
acceptance, but between them, Said and Bernal contributed to the 
climate fostered by the likes of Burkert and West and helped Classicists 
to question the ideologies which underpinned their work.26 
In this atmosphere of ideological awareness, and with the evidence that 
the likes of Burkert and West had brought to bear, Haubold was 
                                               
23 Bernal (1987, 1991, 2001).  
24 Bernal (1987). 
25 For examples, see Behdad (1994); Halliday (1996), 200-201; Majeed (1992), 4; 
Makiya (1993), 317-318; Sardar (1999), 76; Varisco (2007), 270-273. 
26 “Response to Martin Bernal's Black Athena volumes has generated an 
overwhelming bibliography. Most authors have written about a particular 
argument canvassed in the volumes and why they agree or, as in most cases, 
disagree”, Lederman (2000). “One can disagree with specific points in Bernal's 
book, but the obligation to educate oneself about the political and social history 
of classicism cannot be ignored.”; Morris (1989), 51. 
 For criticism of Black Athena see Lefkowitz and MacLean Rogers (1996); 
Lefkowitz (1996); Kristeller (1995), 125-127. 
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prepared to call the debate on influence over in 2002.27 Recent 
scholarship of the Archaic period has come to recognise that Near 
Eastern cultural influence was both real and widespread, and it is now 
in the early stages of a major reassessment of the period.28 However, 
despite the new openness to the study of Near Eastern influence on the 
Greeks of the Archaic period, comparatively little work has been 
carried out on Greek legal development.29 Studies focusing on the 
direct transmission of Near Eastern laws to the Greeks date as far back 
as Mühl in 1933, though his claim that Near Eastern influence can be 
detected in a wide number of Greek laws based upon their similarities 
found little acceptance.30 Subsequent to Mühl there have been more 
narrowly focused studies, such as that of Pounder who claimed that 
some Cretan inscriptions are influenced by apotropaic curses from the 
Near East, and a recent collection of essays examined the interplay of 
law and religion in the societies of the eastern Mediterranean.31 As 
                                               
27 “Most Homerists would probably now agree with Burkert that the issue of 
Near Eastern connections can no longer be ignored.”; Haubold (2002), 2. 
28 “Near Eastern influence cannot be put down as a marginal phenomenon to be 
invoked occasionally in explanations of isolated peculiarities. It was pervasive at 
many levels and at most times.”; West (1997), 59. “…the older cultures of the 
Ancient Near East had a profound impact on the formative period of Greek 
civilisation (which has) opened up new approaches that were barely 
acknowledged a generation ago; Shapiro (2007), 4. See Burkert (2004); 
Dougherty (2001); Haubold (2002), 1-19; Louden (2010); and Lopez-Ruiz (2010); 
for a selection of recent works which focus upon the relationship between 
Archaic Greece and the Near East. There is still a little way to go, however. 
Roisman’s recent “inclusive and integrated” history of ancient Greece gives a 
token two-paragraph adjunct to its chapter on Hesiodic society, which does little 
more than note that there was a Near Eastern influence on the Greeks at this 
time; Roisman (2011), 45-47. 
29 Naiden (2013), 80. Shapiro’s recent edited volume on Archaic Greece, one 
which acknowledges Near Eastern influence and takes it as a starting point for a 
reassessment of the period, does not include a chapter on legal history; Shapiro 
(2007).  
30 Mühl (1933); Gagarin (1989), 128. 
31 Pounder (1984), 243-250; Hagedorn and Kratz (2013). 
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written law codes in the Near East pre-date written laws in Archaic 
Greece, it has been argued that the Greeks picked up the practice of 
writing laws from the east.32 Gagarin has observed that even if this 
were true, it would tell us little about the development of written laws 
in Greece.33 Though he intends to disprove Near Eastern influence on 
Greek written laws, Gagarin’s observation touches upon an important 
point missing from studies such as Mühl’s, which is that proof of 
influence should not be an end in itself, but the starting point for 
gaining greater understanding of the legal history of Greece and the 
Near East.  
 
Archaic Greek and Near Eastern Law 
 
In his introduction to a major edited volume on the legal history of the 
Near East, Raymond Westbrook defined what he saw as the common 
features of Near Eastern law.34 Though he did not discuss them in the 
context of Greek law, he spelled out what is often seen as a demarcation 
point between the two when he discussed the role of autocratic rulers.35 
The view of Near Eastern judicial development holds that the 
civilisations of the Near East were ruled by kings. These kings were 
believed to be, or at least presented as, appointed to their position by 
the gods, which provided them with a divine mandate to rule, and their 
                                               
32 Boardman (1970), 23; Jeffery (1976), 189. For an opposing viewpoint, see 
Gagarin (1989), 126-129. 
33 Gagarin (1989), 129. 
34 Westbrook (2003b), 1-92. 
35 Harris (2006), 6-9; Westbrook (2003b), 25-27. 
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office tended to be hereditary.36 The most important aspect of this 
divine mandate was the imperative placed upon the king to ensure that 
there was justice in the land, and especially for the vulnerable members 
of his society.37 Due to their divine mandate they were not strictly 
speaking autocratic rulers, they could in theory be removed by the gods 
if they did not rule well, but the king was not answerable to any 
mundane judicial institutions and had full legislative powers.38    
By contrast, the Greeks are often seen as having developed the notion 
of the rule of law.39 No-one in the polis was above the law, no matter 
how powerful they were, and all were held accountable to it. Although 
some poleis, such as Sparta, did have hereditary monarchs, they did not 
have full legislative powers and were subject to the law in the same 
way as any other citizen of the polis. Even during the period of Homeric 
kings, Gagarin sees the Greek legal process as being open and non-
authoritarian, with a place always reserved for public participation in 
Archaic Greece.40 Sealey made explicit the perceived difference 
between the Greeks and their eastern neighbours when he wrote: 
“…the rule of law contrasts with arbitrary government. Arbitrary 
regimes of centralized type have ruled much of the world in most of its 
                                               
36 This divine mandate to kingship can be most famously seen in the stories of 
Saul and David in 1 and 2 Sam., and the Bisitun Inscription of Darius I. The Bisitun 
Inscription also demonstrates the importance of heredity for Near Eastern 
monarchs. Even before announcing his divine mandate, Darius seeks to legitimise 
his rule by presenting himself as ninth in the line of Achaemenid kings. 
37 Westbrook (2003b), 26. 
38 Westbrook (2003b), 26-27, 363-364. 
39 See Harris (2006), 4-5. 
40 Gagarin (2008a), 174-175, 244.  
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recorded history. In them the central power is the sole focus of loyalty 
and therefore the sole source of authority. It may confer rights on its 
subjects, but their rights are derivative and precarious; they cannot 
withstand the central power. Such regimes are often classified under 
the heading, ‘oriental despotism’.”41 
The Archaic period is remembered in the sources as a time in which 
lawgivers established political reforms and set down bodies of laws.42 
Although they seem to have been given sweeping powers to carry out 
their task, Greek lawgivers are not presented as using their position to 
take power within a polis. Telling in this respect are fragments of 
poetry which are attributed to Solon.43 In them he denounces the rule 
of a single person as the path which leads to the downfall of the people, 
and describes how he distributed power evenly between the common 
people and the wealthier members of the polis.44 Herodotus records 
Solon as having left Athens for ten years once he had completed his 
project, so that the Athenians could not force him to repeal any of the 
laws he had made.45 The story is anachronistic, at least in how 
Herodotus presents it, as several decades separated Solon’s reforms and 
                                               
41 Sealey (1994), 155. Sealey’s determination to see the Greeks as distinct from 
their neighbours leads him to deny any similarity between epikleros, and the 
Hebrew levirate. Each law was intended to prevent a familial line from dying out, 
but as the epikleros was intended to provide a daughter with a husband when 
her father died without a male heir, and the levirate provided a husband to a 
widow with no sons, then this is sufficient for Sealey to ignore their obvious 
similarities and conclude the two have nothing in common; Sealey (1994), 83-87. 
42 Lewis (2007), 53-76. 
43 For the issues in taking the fragments we have as the exact compositions of 
Solon; see Lardinois (2006), 15-35. 
44 Solon fr. 9. 
45 Hdt. 1.29. 
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the reign of Croesus, but at the very least it offers insight into the way 
in which the Greeks of the fifth century viewed the role of the lawgiver 
as one in which the intention was to establish the rule of law, not to 
take power. By the same token, Herodotus’ story of how Deioces came 
to power in Medea demonstrates a Classical Greek view of how the 
role of the Near Eastern lawgiver was tied up with the establishment of 
autocratic rule.46 
The legendary Spartan lawgiver, Lycurgus, is said to have formed a 
conspiracy, but instead of using it to take power for himself, he used it 
to institute major reforms. Chief among them was the institution of the 
Gerousia, a body of twenty-eight men, equal in power to the two royal 
houses, designed to create a balance between the kings and the Spartan 
people, much as Solon had claimed to have balanced power between 
the Athenians. Much as Solon had left Athens for ten years so he would 
not be forced to repeal his laws, Lycurgus also swore the Spartans to 
an oath that they would not change his.47 There is considerable doubt 
as to whether there was a real Lycurgus who reformed Sparta, but 
again, his legend tells us a lot about what the Greeks thought of their 
lawgivers and their legal system. 
In the case of Demonax at Cyrene, he was not even a member of the 
polis which he reformed, and many other Archaic lawgivers were 
outsiders invited in to reform a polis and they continued to be outsiders 
                                               
46 Hdt. 1.96-101. 
47 Plut. Lycurgus; and see Buckley (1996), 69-80. 
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afterwards.48 The Greeks also recorded stories of their lawgivers falling 
foul of their own laws. Diodorus Siculus tells the story of Charondas, 
who wrote many wise laws for his native city of Catina.49 One day, 
Charondas mistakenly took a dagger into a meeting of the assembly, 
something he had passed a law against. When his enemies in the 
assembly discovered this, they accused Charondas of annulling his own 
law, in reply to which, Charondas took out his dagger and committed 
suicide, thus proving his willingness to uphold his laws, even at the 
cost of his life.  
By contrast, Herodotus tells of Cambyses’ desire to marry his sister, 
which was not the custom of the Persians. Cambyses called together 
the royal judges, who were responsible for administering the law in 
Persia, and asked them if it was permissible under Persian law for him 
to marry his sister. The judges told him they could find no law which 
allowed for a brother to marry a sister, but they did find a law that 
allowed the king to do whatever he pleased.50 That the Greeks of the 
Classical period regarded rule by monarch and by law as a demarcation 
point between Greece and Persia is made explicit when Herodotus 
quotes the exiled Spartan king, Demaratus, telling Xerxes that the 
                                               
48 “Laws were given… by Charondas of Catana to his fellow-citizens and to the 
other Chalcidic cities on the coasts of Italy and Sicily…. Philolaus of Corinth also 
arose as lawgiver at Thebes. Philolaus belonged by birth to the Bacchiad family”; 
Aris. Politics 1274a. For Demonax, see Hdt. 4.161. 
49 Diod. 12.11-19. 
50 Hdt. 2.31. 
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Spartans’ “master is the law, and they’re far more afraid of this than 
your men are of you”.51 
The evidence suggests that the role of the lawgiver in Greece and the 
Near East did differ markedly. Near Eastern kings were responsible for 
making and enforcing the law, whilst Archaic Greek lawgivers 
attempted to balance the interests of the various factions within a polis, 
and they gave up their power once their task was completed.52 
Furthermore, the Greek sources record an array of magistracies with 
specific powers, specific procedures for bringing a case for arbitration 
and for rendering a decision, and in some cases, specific penalties 
also.53 The Near Eastern law codes tend only to record the laws 
promulgated by the king with no instruction as how they are to be 
implemented, who is to implement them, or how those responsible for 
implementing them will be held to account.54  
However, despite this, the distinction is not quite so clear cut.55 There 
are examples of collective decision making and corporate polities in 
the Near East that are overlooked due to a focus in modern scholarship 
on the autocratic rulers and centres of power.56 Greek lawgivers share 
a close similarity to those of the Near East in the form of a divine 
                                               
51 Hdt. 1.104, tr.Waterfield. 
52 There is also the question as to extent the Near Eastern king was actually 
involved in the creation of laws; see Jackson (2008), 69-113, 257-276. 
53 Harris (2006), 14-25; Rhodes (1997), 528-529. 
54 Harris (2006), 15-16. 
55 Naiden goes as far as to suggest that an uncritical acceptance of Herodotus has 
misled modern scholarship to an understanding of an East/West, 
despostism/democracy paradigm; Naiden (2013), 80. 
56 See Jacobsen (1943), 159-172; Fleming (2004). 
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mandate for the dissemination of justice via the laws. Although the 
most famous of the Near Eastern lawgivers, Moses, received the laws 
directly from his god, the typical practice was for the monarch to hold 
a divine mandate by virtue of his position.57 This was also true of the 
Greek lawgiver, who also held a divine mandate, most often in the 
manner of an approval by the oracle at Delphi.58 
The Archaic Greeks did also know their fair share of autocratic rulers, 
to the extent that one epithet sometimes given to the Archaic period is 
the ‘age of tyrants’.59 A tyrant was an autocratic ruler, and the role was 
one which carried with it the idea of absolute, personal power.60 A 
tyrant was not beholden to the law, it was his choice whether to obey 
the law or not, and tyrants emerged during the period that many poleis 
were still developing their legal institutions and magistracies.61 
Consequently, many Archaic poleis experienced rule by autocrats who 
                                               
57 See the prologue to LH, which lays out the divine mandate given to 
Hammurabi by Marduk. Likewise, the prologue to LL lays out the divine mandate 
given to Lipit-Ishtar by Enlil. 
58 This was a point noted as far back as Mühl (1933), though when discussed by 
later scholars it was often to dismiss its importance. That the oracle was given 
after the lawgiver had completed his task is sufficient for Finley to disregard it. 
For him, the lawgiver was self-reliant and held no divine mandate with any oracle 
being window dressing; Finley (1981), 101. Meanwhile, Gagarin dismissed it on 
the grounds that legal development in Greece occurred separately from the Near 
East, so any comparison would be misleading; Gagarin (2008a), 146-151. 
Conversely, Naiden has recently restated the similarities between the divine 
mandates received by Greek lawgivers and Near Eastern kings; Naiden (2013), 
81-88. Contra to Finley and Gagarin, it is clear that the Greeks were no different 
from their eastern neighbours in seeking divine sanction for the laws 
promulgated by their lawgiver, even if it differed slightly in the presentation due 
to differences in context.  
59 See Andrewes (1956), 8; Ogden (1997), 87-130. 
60 Andrewes (1956), 7, 20-31; Lewis (2009), 2. 
61 Hawke (2011), 151; Lewis (2009), 2. 
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were not subject to the rule of law, something which is more associated 
with Sealey’s ‘oriental monarchies’.62  
Unlike the lawgiver, the tyrant did not voluntarily lay down power and 
his reign ended in either his death, murder, or forced removal from 
power.63 At least one Archaic tyrant, Pittacus of Mytilene, is also 
remembered as a wise lawgiver, and both he and Periander are listed 
alongside Solon among the Seven Sages of ancient Greece, blurring the 
lines between the two roles.64 As democracy did not emerge until the 
very end of the period, the Archaic Greek polis was subjected to one of 
two forms of government, either oligarchy or autocratic rule.65  
For all this, even if a fundamental difference is acknowledged between 
the autocratic rule of a Near Eastern king and the rule of law which 
governed ancient Greek poleis, there remain good grounds for 
considering them in the light of each of other. A legal idea could travel 
and adapt to its local circumstances, so influence in the field of law 
should not be dismissed simply because of constitutional differences. 
                                               
62 According to Lewis, the tyrant may even exceed the monarch in his power as 
kings could be bounded by constitutional laws; Lewis (2009), 2. If there is any 
truth to Herodotus’ story of Cambyses asking the royal judges whether the law 
allowed him to marry his sister, then it demonstrates that even the Persian king 
was not inherently conceived of as above the law. If there is not, then at the very 
least it demonstrates that the Greeks, and perhaps even non-Greeks responsible 
for the dissemination of the story, saw the king as being theoretically beholden 
to the law. 
63 In turn the manner in which the Athenian tyrants Peisistratus, Hipparchus, and 
Hippias, ceased to rule. 
64 Parker demonstrates the ways in which the offices of lawgiver and tyrant 
overlapped, though in regarding Solon as a tyrant because of the absolute power 
given to him, he overlooks the important distinction that once his task was 
completed, Solon laid down his powers; Parker (2007), 13-39. See also Lewis 
(2009), 21-27. 
65 Andrewes (1956), 14-16; Hansen and Neilsen (2004), 80-85; Lewis (2009), 3. 
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However, the difficulty faced by the legal historian investigating Greek 
and Near Eastern cultural exchange is that whereas a motif found in 
pottery or literature can point towards influence, that the Greeks 
punished intentional homicide with death, and so did the civilisations 
of the Near East, does not allow for the same type of claims to be made.  
As significant evidence proving influence of the kind found in literature 
does not exist for legal development, then studies which have been 
carried out in this area have inevitably been speculative and contributed 
little to the understanding of Greek law. As a consequence, and in the 
current climate of openness to eastern influence, the tendency amongst 
legal scholars who are open to seeing the Greeks in a network with the 
Near East has been to see a form of ‘legal koine’ at work in the region, 
rather than a diffusion of laws across it.66 
Even if influence cannot be detected, then in whatever way Greek and 
Near Eastern societies chose to construct the legal framework within 
which they operated, the problems facing them were essentially the 
same. They each used the law to regulate the same kinds of conflicts 
and disputes, whether it was determining who owned what, how 
possessions are to be transmitted, or how to protect people from 
physical harm. These are areas that Westbrook and Wells term as 
‘everyday law’, being that which regulates the relationships between 
people who are members of a society.67 As the Greeks faced the same 
issues as their neighbours, then a study of how the Greeks approached 
                                               
66 Hagedorn and Kratz (2013), 5. 
67 Westbrook and Wells (2009), 1-5. 
24 
 
the law in the context of one or more of their Near Eastern neighbours 
can be instructive in gaining a better understanding of each.  
This legal koine and the principle of everyday law provide the context 
of the case studies presented in this thesis. They take as their starting 
point the idea that the Greeks were one culture amongst many in the 
region of the ancient Mediterranean and Mesopotamia. They were part 
of the same network as that of their eastern neighbours, and regardless 
of the way their legal systems developed in the Archaic period, they 
faced the same issues in regulating their day to day lives. As the study 
of Greek legal history has tended to be one which is a topic in and of 
itself rather than part of a wider study of the legal history of the region, 
then it means important context for understanding Greek legal history 
can be missed. This is not to say that differences did not exist between 
Greek legal development and that of the Near East, but that these 
differences should not isolate them when studying their legal history, 
much as the important differences that the theological motivation of the 
Hebrew texts offer in contrast to the rest of the Near East, does not 
remove them from the study of Near Eastern legal history. Rather, the 
differences, and the similarities, become highlighted when studied in a 
wider context, and point towards the specific societal circumstances 
which occasioned them. 
This principle is applied in the two case studies which follow, the first 
of which focuses on a point of similarity found in Classical Athens and 
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in the Hebrew Bible, but distinct from the rest of the Near East.68 The 
extent and role of homicide pollution beliefs in Classical Athens has 
had a tendency to be played down in modern scholarship due to 
influential works such as Robert Parker’s Miasma, whose argument in 
part depends upon his assumptions about the function of homicide 
pollution beliefs in a society. The Hebrew Bible presents an example 
of a contemporary neighbouring society for which these beliefs are also 
found, and it provides an important point of comparison for testing 
those assumptions. The second case study addresses adultery law, an 
area in which the Greeks differed from their neighbours by 
incorporating it into a broader offence of moicheia. Although this 
difference has been recognised by most Greek legal historians, 
comparative work on these differences has usually stopped there.69 A 
fuller comparison highlights important differences in the way in which 
the offences were punished, and these differences help to underline that 
moicheia was not simply adultery with some additional areas, but a 
different offence which encompassed what in the Near East would be 
treated as adultery. 
                                               
68 Comparisons between Greece and Israel are not new. As long ago as the 
1960’s, de Ste. Croix wrote of the remarkable parallels in the contemporary 
social situations of Solonic Attica and Nehemiah; de Ste. Croix (2004), 118-123. 
Hagedorn has published comparative studies of the relationship between the 
individual and the state, and of the characterisation of foreigners in Greece and 
Israel; Hagedorn (2004, 2007). Whilst Lewis has studied the solutions that each 
state devised to deal with social inequalities; Lewis (2017), 28-49. Studies such as 
these are not common. Not only does the comparative study of ancient Greece 
and Israel require crossing the divide between Greek and Near Eastern 
scholarship, but as the Hebrew texts have primarily been the domain of 
theologians in modern scholarship, a disciplinary divide has existed also. 
69 David Cohen did go further, but only to make the argument that moicheia was 
in fact adultery. A fuller discussion of which can be found in the case study. 
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Use of the Texts and Sources 
 
Before moving onto the case studies, some notes on the use of the texts 
should be addressed. All translations of the Hebrew Bible are from the 
NSRV unless otherwise noted. Equally, all translations of the Near 
Eastern law codes are by Martha T. Roth unless otherwise noted.  
The use of the Hebrew Bible as a historical source for ancient Israel 
and Judah is problematic to say the least. It is not known when many 
of the books of the Hebrew Bible were composed nor by whom they 
were composed. Many of the books, especially those from Genesis to 
Numbers, are almost certainly the result of the compilation and 
redaction of multiple other sources spread across several centuries. 
Compounding these issues, a theological rather than a historical agenda 
underpins the composition of all of the books in the Hebrew Bible.  
Consequently, an enormous amount of discussion and disagreement 
over how to use the texts has been generated in both textual and 
archaeological scholarship. The documentary hypothesis and the 
Deuteronomistic history represent dominant paradigms for 
approaching the books from Genesis to 2 Kings, and even though the 
former in particular has received much criticism, no alternative has 
been able to replace it.70 An extreme minority ‘minimalist’ view holds 
                                               
70 “New interpretations of narrative and law are constantly being proposed in 
journal articles, and large tomes keep appearing which challenge or reaffirm 
conventional hypotheses about the composition of the Pentateuch. But this only 
underlines the fact that no new paradigm or scholarly consensus has emerged to 
displace the old theories… I suspect that if a poll of contemporary OT scholars 
were conducted, only a minority would endorse one of the modern models.”; 
Wenham (1996), 3. For the documentary hypothesis see Wellhausen (1885); 
whilst for the Deuteronomistic history see Noth (1981). For a selection of 
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that the Hebrew Bible has no value as a historical source for anything 
prior to the Hellenistic period, whereas the most optimistic, 
‘maximalist’ view accepts the historicity of everything from the time 
of the United Monarchy in the tenth century onwards.71  
Prior to the ninth century, reconstructions of Israelite history are 
dependent on the Biblical texts themselves, as no contemporary 
external evidence attests to the existence of a large Israelite kingdom 
in the tenth century.72 Whilst very little written evidence survives from 
the Iron Age II period in either Israel and Judah, correspondence and 
inscriptions from neighbouring civilisations do survive, and these help 
to build a framework independent of the texts which lends significant 
support to the account of 2 Kings.  
An Aramaic inscription from either the ninth or eighth century makes 
explicit mention of the killing a king of Israel, and also makes mention 
of a BYTDWD, a ‘House of David’, or Judah, which finds parallel in 2 
Kings 8.28-10.33 and speaks to the existence of both Israel and Judah 
in this time.73 Neo-Assyrian inscriptions from the same period make 
                                               
criticisms and alternatives to the documentary hypothesis, see Alter (2011); Van 
Seters (1975), 123-308; Rentdorff (1990); Whybray (1987), 20-120, 221-242.  
71 See Davies (1992), 16-74, and (2004), 148-150; Dever (1993), 706-722; (2001), 
44-45; Finkelstein (1988), 295-314; (1999), 36; Lemche (1998), 155; Lyman et al 
(2005) 222; Rainey (2001), 140-149; and Thompson (2000), 80. The minimalist 
approach is flawed on two main grounds. The first is that they do not adequately 
grapple with the archaeological evidence, whilst the second is that in their 
assumption that the texts cannot recover the history of the period, they deny the 
application of the historical method to them; see Dever (2001), 29, 45; Faust 
(2006), 25. 
72 See Faust (2010), 122-128, for an example of the maximalist reliance upon the 
Biblical texts to interpret archaeological evidence from prior to the ninth century.  
73 See Lemaire (1998), 3-10; Athas (2005), 175-191, 217-244. 
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references to several Israelite kings.74 The first explicit reference to 
Judah is found in an eighth century Neo-Assyrian inscription that has 
a parallel in 2 Kings 16.7.75 The destruction of Samaria and the mass 
deportation of much of the population of Israel is recounted in Neo-
Assyrian inscriptions and 2 Kings 17.5-6, and the siege of Jerusalem is 
likewise found in Neo-Assyrian inscriptions and 2 Kings 18.9-10.76 
Two Neo-Assyrian kings both mention Manasseh, whose reign is 
recounted in 2 Kings 21.1-18.77 2 Kings ends with Jehoiachin in 
Babylonian exile, from where a Neo-Babylonian administrative 
document survives which refers to the amount of oil which is to be 
provided to him and his sons.78 
Whilst these correspondences do not mean that 2 Kings or any other 
text of the Hebrew Bible should be taken as reliable historical witnesses 
to all they recount, they do offer confidence that Israel and Judah did 
exist in this time in the manner that the Hebrew Bible presents them. 
Even with all of the issues the texts present, they can be used as long 
as care is taken to use them with their deficiencies as historical sources 
in mind. Specific narrative accounts may be suspect, but the 
background material they capture need not be. For example, the story 
of Ruth may not be an actual historical account, but its presentation of 
the levirate must reflect an actual practice for the story to make sense 
to its intended audience. Likewise, whilst identifying the exact 
                                               
74 ANET 279, 280b; Elat (1975), 25-35; Pitard (1987), 145-150. 
75 ANET 282a. 
76 ANET 284b-285, 288. 
77 ANET 291-294. 
78 ANET 308c. 
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provenance of legal material such as the Covenant Code is difficult to 
the point of impossible, that Exodus has captured actual legal material 
from some point in Israelite history is a reasonable assumption.  
The Hebrew Bible has been used in these case studies with these 
limitations in mind, with further discussion where necessary. 
Reference is made to the sources of the documentary hypothesis when 
discussing the texts, though that should not be taken as a tacit 
endorsement of all aspects of the hypothesis, but rather the recognition 
that some of the material can be identified as originating from a 
common source.  
The Greek sources tend to be less problematic in comparison, although 
that is not to say there are no issues in using them. Authorship is not 
always clear, nor when a text was written nor the exact circumstances 
which occasioned it. The text of laws and witness testimony is often 
preserved in an Attic legal speech. Some of these instances are 
undoubtedly not original to the text but are later insertions, casting 
doubt over the validity of many others. Much as with the Hebrew Bible, 
some legal material is captured in a non-legal context, such as that of 
the Constitution of the Athenians or Attic comedies. Where this is 
relevant to the use of a source it is noted and discussed. 
It is not clear the extent to which the Near Eastern law codes represent 
actual legal practice. Where they overlap, there is often not 
correspondence between other Near Eastern legal documents and the 
law codes, and these documents in turn rarely make any reference to 
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the law codes.79 This is less of a concern for the homicide pollution 
case study, where the Hebrew Bible forms the core of the comparative 
material. The law codes are, however, a major source for Near Eastern 
adultery law. They are used in the case study in conjunction with legal 
documents, and the resultant picture is sufficiently coherent to offer 
confidence in using them. Finally, all dates are B.C.E. unless stated 
otherwise or clear from context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
79 See Roth (1995), 4-7. 
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A Comparison of Homicide Pollution Beliefs in 
Classical Athens and the Hebrew Bible 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The societies of the ancient Mediterranean and the Near East often 
reflect a belief in what is usually termed ‘pollution’ by modern 
scholarship. This was a state of spiritual uncleanliness that certain acts 
or deeds could impose upon a person if he or she either carried them 
out or was subjected to them. For the duration in which a person was 
in this state, they posed a risk to those around them, able to pass on or 
otherwise infect that which they came into contact with, and they were 
often separated from society in some manner until they were purified. 
This pollution could often be the result of circumstances which were 
not secular offences, and often they were ones over which the polluted 
person had no control. Bodily emissions, such as menstruation, 
32 
 
childbirth, or ejaculation, could be a common source of pollution, and 
bring on an unclean state that the person was neither morally 
responsible for, nor capable of avoiding. These forms of pollution 
created a state of uncleanliness which was temporary, with the person 
returning to society after a fixed period of time, and after performing 
the appropriate purification rituals. 
It was also possible for a person to incur a ‘moral’ pollution if they 
committed certain types of offences, and exactly which offences caused 
a person to become polluted could vary from society to society. In 
Classical Athens, many sources there reflect the belief that as well as 
being a secular offence, homicide was also one which caused the 
perpetrator to become polluted. So severe and lasting was this pollution 
that in the case of intentional homicide, simply being removed from the 
polis for a set period of time was not sufficient to deal with it. The 
perpetrator had to be permanently removed, either by death or by exile, 
to remove their pollution from the polis, and with it the risk it posed to 
the community.  
Despite the abundance of sources for homicide pollution beliefs in 
Classical Athens, there has been a tendency in ancient Greek 
scholarship to de-emphasise them as reliable evidence for the existence 
of any actual belief in it by the Athenians due to influential studies such 
as Robert Parker’s Miasma. Parker in turn was himself heavily 
influenced by the work of Mary Douglas, who in her own monograph, 
Purity and Danger, had established a functionalist interpretation of 
pollution beliefs as a system created by a society to express its unease 
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over areas which fell outside of social classifications. Parker applied 
this functionalist understanding of pollution to ancient Greece, and in 
his search for a function for homicide pollution in Classical Athens, he 
concluded that the sophisticated Athenian judicial system meant that 
by the fourth century at the latest it could have had no place there. 
Instead, where it was found in the Classical sources, Parker argued that 
it was a relic of an earlier period, and one which was in the process of 
being evolved out of Athenian discourse. Parker placed the actual 
context for Greek homicide pollution beliefs back several centuries to 
the time of the Homeric epics; and, despite the lack of any evidence for 
it in them, he speculated that it was in fact to be found there.  
Homicide was an offence of the utmost seriousness in the ancient 
world, and the intentional and unlawful killing of another person was 
almost always considered a capital offence. Even where there were 
mitigating circumstances such as lack of intent, the perpetrator could 
still expect to at least be punished by exile. Yet despite the seriousness 
with which all Near Eastern societies regarded homicide, at least where 
sufficient legal evidence survives to demonstrate, they did not reflect 
the same belief as the Athenians that carrying out an unlawful killing 
caused the perpetrator to become polluted. It is not that moral pollution 
that corresponds with secular offences is not found in Near Eastern 
societies, but where it is, it is usually in instances where the offence 
was sexual in nature. Whatever concern existed in Classical Athens that 
drove them to attribute pollution to the act of homicide, did not exist in 
the Near East.  
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There is, however, one notable exception to this. Studies of Classical 
Athenian homicide pollution, such as that of Parker, have been largely 
contained to the Greek evidence. It was not his intention to produce a 
comparative study of homicide pollution beliefs and so his conclusions 
were drawn almost solely from the Classical Athenian evidence. The 
Hebrew Bible contains an extensive doctrine of pollution that covers 
many different circumstances, and pollution incurred for homicide is 
found within it in multiple places. This makes the Hebrew Bible a 
useful point of comparison for examining the homicide pollution 
beliefs found in Classical Athens, and conclusions drawn about the 
function of homicide pollution in Classical Athens should be able to be 
tested against the function of homicide pollution in the Hebrew Bible.  
In both Classical Athens and the Near East, homicide was usually seen 
as a private offence. It was regarded as being an offence to the victim, 
and thus the right of redress also fell to the victim. As they could not 
exercise this right, it instead devolved down to the next of kin to carry 
out for them. This stands in obvious contrast to modern legal systems, 
which usually regard homicide as a public offence, one that is to be 
prosecuted by the state, not by the next of kin. In line with their 
neighbours, the homicide legislation of both the Classical Athenians 
and that found in the Hebrew Bible did also regard the killing as a 
private offence to the victim, with the right of redress falling to the next 
of kin. What separated these from other societies in the Near East, and 
the one envisaged in the Homeric epics, which also betray no belief in 
pollution for homicide, was their communal concern over the offence.  
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This case study aims to examine the evidence for homicide pollution 
in Classical Athens with the aid of the evidence for homicide pollution 
in the Hebrew Bible. In so doing, it challenges the view that homicide 
pollution beliefs have little to no place in the Classical Athenian 
imagination or its homicide legislation. It will show that rather than 
having no function in the society of fifth and fourth-century Athens, 
the way homicide pollution is presented in the sources fits precisely 
into this context as the conflict between a private legal wrong, and the 
communal concern it caused. This was a concern not shared by other 
societies outside that of the Hebrew Bible, which in the same way, but 
for different reasons and expressed in a different way, used homicide 
pollution as the imaginative expression of the concerns of a community 
towards what was usually a private offence. 
Before delving into the Athenian and Hebrew evidence, the first part 
of this case study comprises a review of the scholarship on pollution 
beliefs. The work of Mary Douglas informs the work done by Parker 
to such an extent, that to understand Parker’s arguments on Classical 
Athenian homicide pollution requires an understanding of Douglas’ 
ideas on pollution. Douglas herself was reacting to and building upon 
previous scholarship on pollution, and this is briefly touched on to give 
the context for her work. Then, the criticisms that her work has 
subsequently attracted are examined, which provide important context 
for examining scholarship on Classical Athenian pollution beliefs.  
The following two parts examine Athenian and Hebrew homicide 
pollution beliefs respectively. As their homicide pollution beliefs 
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correspond closely with their legislation on homicide, each part begins 
with a survey of their homicide laws. Both societies recognised 
different degrees of homicide in their legal system, and the degree of 
pollution incurred by the killer corresponded to this. The more severely 
each society regarded the killing, the more severe the degree of 
pollution the killer incurred. There then follows an examination of the 
beliefs themselves and the ways in which they were expressed. The 
final part builds upon all of this to reconstruct the exact function of 
homicide pollution in Classical Athens.  
 
Review of the Scholarship on Pollution 
 
The study of pollution beliefs is dominated by the work of the 
anthropologist, Mary Douglas, and her monograph, Purity and 
Danger.80 Although many of its arguments have been challenged since 
its publication in 1966, and Douglas herself has refined a number of 
her conclusions, its central ideas have remained the cornerstone of all 
subsequent debate on taboos and pollution. In the book, Douglas 
challenged a number of prevailing scholarly opinions on the origins 
and purpose of pollution beliefs.81 In the late-nineteenth century, the 
theory of the history of religions had produced an understanding of 
pollution as the by-product of the primitive desire to avoid danger. This 
theory was championed by the anthropologist, James Frazer, who had 
                                               
80 “Since its publication… (it) has remained the single most important work in the 
study of impurity across human culture”; Lennon (2014), 4. 
81 Douglas (2002), 8-35. 
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argued that there were three phases of philosophical evolution; the first 
was primitive magic, this was followed by religion, and then the final 
stage was science.82 Frazer argued that the primitive mind was capable 
of reason, but without science to aid it, it instead appealed to magic.83 
With regard to taboos and pollution, Frazer stated that as the rules for 
ceremonial purity found amongst primitive societies did not vary much 
whether they related to divine kings and priests, or to homicides and 
childbirth, then the primitive mind made no distinction between what 
would now be considered the separate categories of holy and unclean.84 
These concepts were not yet differentiated in the primitive mind, and 
instead, what defined these elements was danger.85 All persons or 
objects under taboo presented the primitive mind with a spiritual 
danger, and the taboo served as a negative magic designed to separate 
the primitive from the source of the danger.86   
Douglas thoroughly rejected Frazer’s theories, and although she also 
took issue with some elements of another of Frazer’s contemporaries, 
Emile Durkheim, her approach owes a lot to his work.87 Durkheim had 
argued that religion is a natural product of social life, and that all known 
religious beliefs presupposed a classification of all things into two 
categories, defined by him as the sacred and the profane.88 According 
                                               
82 Douglas (1978), 10-11. 
83 Douglas (1978), 11-12. 
84 Frazer (1911), 224. 
85 Frazer (1911), 224. 
86 Frazer (1911), 224. See also Frazer’s contemporary, William Robertson Smith, 
who similarly argued that taboo took the place of what religion would consider 
holiness and uncleanness; Smith (1901), 152-153. 
87 Douglas (2002), 23-29. 
88 Durkheim (1995), 34, 418-448. 
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to Durkheim, the religious mind imagined these two categories as 
completely separate, and it experienced repugnance at the thought of 
them mingling.89 Sacred things are isolated and protected by 
prohibitions, and these are applied to profane things to ensure that the 
two are kept separate.90 Durkheim dealt with taboos and the 
punishments derived from transgressing them in a monograph on incest 
taboos.91 In it, he argued that taboos had both a functional and a 
symbolic purpose; they were the expression of the beliefs of the 
societies that produced them, and they complemented or even replaced 
the physical manifestation of a society’s power.92 In the case of incest, 
blood symbolised the relationship between members of a clan. 
Consequently, powerful taboos attached to avoiding spilling or 
contacting it, even indirectly, and this extended to a ban on sexual 
relations between members of a clan.93 Unlike with the theory of 
Frazer, blood itself as a substance held no inherent danger. In the 
correct circumstances, it could even be seen as beneficial, and it was 
only in certain contexts, such as incest, where it posed a threat.94 The 
taboo on blood fitted what Durkheim saw as the sacred, and the taboos 
were the prohibitions which prevent it mingling with the profane. 
                                               
89 Durkheim (1995), 37. Durkheim argued that the whole universe could be 
divided into these categories, and that these were profoundly differentiated and 
radically opposed each other. The two could not approach each other and keep 
their own natures; Durkheim (1995), 39-42. See also Lukes (1973), 24-28 for a 
discussion of Durkheim’s ideas on the sacred and the profane, and the criticism 
of them. 
90 Durkheim (1995), 38. 
91 Durkheim (1963). 
92 Durkheim (1963), 18-19. 
93 Durkheim (1963), 77, 88-89. 
94 Durkheim (1963), 94-95. 
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Douglas is indebted to Durkheim for the idea that religion demonstrates 
and reaffirms the values of society, but she took issue with his 
separation of ‘magic’ from ‘religion’.95 For Durkheim, although magic 
was superficially similar, it was differentiated from religion because it 
actively profaned the sacred.96 Durkheim argued that the demarcation 
point between the two was that religion represented the expression of 
a society, and served to bind it together, whereas magic did not.97 For 
Douglas, this was an inadequate explanation for the similarities 
between the two, and as a result it led to an inadequate definition of the 
sacred, and of its relationship to the profane.98 It could not account for 
all the circumstances in which a given society classified something as 
impure, and so Douglas sought in her work on pollution to provide a 
comprehensive explanation that was capable of doing this.  
Douglas focused her theories around a structure of social classifications 
and of transgressions between these classifications. Douglas described 
‘dirt’ – by which she meant something which is polluted - as “matter 
out of place”.99 According to Douglas, nothing could inherently be 
classed as dirt, but rather, it only became dirt under certain 
circumstances in which it was seen as being out of place. Dirt signalled 
a “systematic ordering and classification of matter”, as it demonstrated 
                                               
95 Durkheim (1963), 39; Douglas (2002), 27. Durkheim was indebted to Robertson 
Smith, who saw ‘religion’ as communal and with the good of the community at 
heart, and magic as outside this; Lukes (1973), 450. 
96 Durkheim (1963), 40.  
97 “There is no Church of magic… the magician has a clientele”; Durkheim (1963), 
42. 
98 Douglas (2002), 27. 
99 Douglas (2002), 44. In Purity and Danger, Douglas does not conceptually 
distinguish between dirt and pollution; Meigs (1978), 310. 
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which elements were considered inappropriate when they were out of 
place.100 Douglas retained Durkheim’s idea that the sacred and profane 
were projections of society, but by casting prohibitions and pollution 
in these terms, she was able to do away with the problematic distinction 
between religion and magic in favour of a method which had the 
flexibility to be applied meaningfully to any society or culture. Further, 
it also did away with the idea that taboos were manifestations of the 
fears of the primitive mind.101 Douglas’ views on pollution are 
primarily both functionalist and symbolic. For her, pollution beliefs 
served as the function for a society to define what it regarded as dirt, to 
define what is out of place, and then the rituals that surrounded this 
were symbolic of social processes.102 
A major source of pollution in Douglas’ view was that caused by 
boundary transgressions. In this she was influenced by a study by 
Gennep in which he had argued that social relationships occurred 
within defined boundaries. When a person crossed from one 
relationship state to another, such as with birth, coming of age, 
marriage, and death, it resulted in a period of separation from society, 
a liminal state, during which time the person was both at risk and a risk 
to those around them.103 Douglas built on this to argue that as dirt 
required a system of order and classification, then anything which 
could not be classified according to the system was in a liminal state, 
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and contact with it carried the risk of pollution.104 Douglas put this 
theory to the test with a case study of the animals regarded as clean and 
unclean in Leviticus.105 Rather than representative of primitive hygiene 
beliefs, she argued that the unclean animals were those which did not 
fit into Israelite classifications of animal types, and the prohibition on 
eating them served to maintain the symbolic boundaries.106 This same 
principle was applied by Douglas to a different form of pollution found 
in Leviticus, that of pollution caused by wicked deeds. To be holy 
required individuals to be in conformity with the class in which they 
belong, and that the classes also not be confused, so impurity which 
attached itself to deeds such as adultery and incest was an expression 
of the boundary transgression that the act implied.107 The other primary 
source of pollution that Douglas identified was the body, as the body 
itself was both a boundary and a symbol for society.108 Bodily 
emissions transgressed the body’s boundary, and rituals around 
emissions were a microcosm of the powers and dangers credited to the 
social structure.109  
Although Purity and Danger remains the defining study on pollution 
beliefs, it has attracted a number of criticisms. Douglas’ theories on 
unclean animals in Leviticus became a particular focus of criticism, to 
                                               
104 Douglas (2002), 51. 
105 Douglas (2002), 51-72. 
106 For example, a pig transgressed boundaries by having a cloven hoof but not 
chewing cud, so it did not fit into the cattle category. It was unclean for this 
reason, not because it was considered to be a dirty animal due to its scavenging 
habits; Douglas (2002), 68. 
107 Douglas (2002), 66-67. 
108 Douglas (2002), 142. 
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the extent that Douglas herself came to modify them.110 Aside from this 
specific area of weakness, the criticisms of her work have primarily 
revolved around two main areas. One was her attempt to offer an 
overarching theory of pollution, and the other her dismissal of non-
functionalist aspects of pollution. Valerio Valeri pointed out that 
Douglas’ theory of pollution did not account for the many examples in 
which the pollution came about via inappropriate contact, in which the 
subject became polluted through being temporarily in the wrong 
category, rather than outside the system altogether.111  He further 
identified two different ideas on pollution which Douglas expresses, 
rather than the single unified system she sought to present.112 The first 
idea places pollution in a secondary position in which it arises as a 
sanction that pre-supposes an offence, whereas the second gives 
pollution a primary position in which the sanction arises subsequently. 
Valeri saw this as a consequence of Douglas’ attempt to reconcile two 
different ideas of pollution, one based on misfortune and the other on 
dirt.113 Misfortune pollution is that in which an unfortunate event is tied 
to an earlier deed, and this is incompatible with dirt pollution as it arises 
after the fact, rather than from the transgression of a pre-existing 
structure, and so it undermined Douglas’ overarching system of dirt 
pollution as a unifying factor in all pollution beliefs. 
                                               
110 Valeri (2000), 74-76; Douglas (2002), xv-xvi. 
111 Valeri (2000), 70-71. 
112 Valeri (2000), 70. 
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In Purity and Danger, Douglas had rejected what she termed ‘medical 
materialism’, a theory which saw all pollution fears and cleansing 
rituals as being the result of underlying primitive hygiene.114 Although 
medical materialism was a product of the history of religions school, in 
which scientific medical understanding is seen as being preceded by 
irrational religious fears, some scholars have since argued that hygiene 
did play a greater part in pollution beliefs than Douglas had allowed 
for. Anna Meigs argued that the body was seen as possessing the life 
force of the individual, and thus it posed a potential threat if emissions 
from it gained access to the body of another.115 Meigs went as far as 
suggesting that every pollution taboo derived from a fear of death.116 
She tackled Douglas’ views on dirt to argue that although many things 
can be out of place, only some pose a threat when they are. Something 
which is merely out of place but carries no danger is not polluting, and 
for Meigs, this is better termed as ‘mess’ as opposed to dirt.117 An item 
out of place is only dirt, and consequently polluting, if it also carries a 
threat, and this threat is usually bound up with substances that can 
transgress and threaten the body’s boundary.118 
Arguments in favour of hygiene as an aspect of pollution have also 
come from outside the field of anthropology. From epidemiology, Val 
                                               
114 Douglas (2002), 36-40. It should be pointed out that Douglas did not reject the 
idea that pollution and cleansing rituals could be linked to hygiene. Rather that 
the overarching system which united them was matter out of place, dirt, 
whether this was related to hygiene or not; Douglas (2002), 40. 
115 Meigs (1978), 304-318. 
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Curtis argued that hygiene and disgust pre-date society, and that a 
biological capacity for disgust has informed culture, as opposed to 
cultures simply defining what they regard as disgusting, and by 
extension this biological capacity for disgust has informed what a 
culture regards as dirt.119 Curtis reconciled hygiene with dirt by arguing 
for a dialogue between inherent psychological feelings of disgust, 
scientific advances of understanding in hygiene, and the assimilation 
of these into local cultures.120 In a wide ranging study of disgust, 
William Ian Miller, similarly to Meigs, identified life and its correlates, 
death and decay, as major triggers of the disgust reaction.121 Although 
Miller accepts that Douglas’ definition of dirt as matter out of place has 
much truth to it, he argued that bodily substances in particular cut 
across all cultural boundaries as polluting substances.122 Against these 
studies, Lennon, has argued that too much emphasis is placed by them 
on feelings of disgust when discussing pollution, and too little on the 
social symbolism of the rituals attached to it.123 Whilst this may be true, 
it is in large part due to the focus of their studies, as well as their 
reaction to Douglas for whom these elements played no part.  
Douglas’ theories on pollution profoundly changed the study of the 
topic and moved it away from an approach based both on primitive fear 
and a distinction between magic and religion. Her own more 
functionalist approach based on boundary transgressions, and on dirt 
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as matter out of place, has served to greatly improve the understanding 
of pollution beliefs, and Purity and Danger has deservedly become the 
single most important study of the topic as a result. However, by 
focusing in so narrowly on this aspect, she failed to achieve her stated 
aim of providing an overarching theory of pollution that could be 
applied in all cases. Her theory on dirt pollution does not work in all 
cases, and as Miller pointed out, it is best suited to pollution belief 
systems wherein the rules are clearly spelled out.124 Similarly, Valeri 
noted that her theory works particularly well in the context of post-
exilic Judah as it was in large part inspired by a study of pollution in 
the Hebrew Bible.125 Though even then, the application of the theory 
to the food laws of Leviticus failed to account for all the ways an animal 
could be considered polluting. Douglas’ theory works less well in 
pollution systems which are less dependent on her classification of dirt, 
and by moving the focus away from areas such as hygiene and medical 
materialism, and towards structures and boundary transgression, 
however correctly, the result was that the element of disgust was totally 
abandoned as a source of pollution fears.  
 
Classical Athens 
 
The homicide pollution beliefs of the Athenians were intrinsically 
wound around their understanding of homicide as an offence, and the 
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expression of that offence in their legal system. Classical Athens had a 
relatively sophisticated system of homicide legislation which 
recognised different types of homicide depending on the circumstances 
of the killing, and with no fewer than five different courts handling 
different types of homicide case. This section begins with a review of 
Athenian homicide law to give the necessary context for understanding 
the evidence for homicide pollution. It then reviews the main sources 
on homicide pollution. These, coupled with the preceding review of 
scholarship on pollution beliefs, provide the necessary groundwork for 
a reconstruction of the function and purpose of Athenian homicide 
pollution. 
 
Classical Athenian Homicide Law 
 
Classical Athenian homicide law was relatively sophisticated in 
comparison to neighbouring societies in the Near East. Whilst Near 
Eastern legislation tended to distinguish between intentional, 
unintentional, and lawful killings, the Athenians went further than this, 
and had multiple procedures and punishments available that depended 
on the circumstances of the killing. The Athenians distinguished 
between public cases, graphe, which were seen as offences against the 
community, and thus open for any free adult male to bring a 
prosecution, and private cases, dike, which were seen as a private 
wrong to the victim, and thus the right of bringing the prosecution fell 
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to the victim.126 Classical Athenian legislation regarded homicide as 
the latter, and the killing was seen as an offence to the victim.127 If the 
victim forgave their killer before dying then no case for homicide could 
be brought against them, as there had been no offence to the victim.128 
Despite falling into the category of a private wrong, homicide 
legislation varied from other private cases in a number of ways.129 
Private cases in Athens were usually subject to a statute of limitations 
lasting five years, but this was waived in the case of homicide, 
presumably due to the seriousness with which the offence was 
regarded, and as the victim obviously could not prosecute, then the 
right to bring a case fell to the next of kin instead.130 Homicide was 
unique amongst private cases in having an unusually lengthy and 
complex procedure for bringing it to trial, again reflecting the 
seriousness with which it was taken. To begin the process, a 
pronouncement first had to be made against the defendant in the agora, 
and a proclamation was made barring the accused from entering certain 
public spaces which likely included the agora, the lawcourts, public 
meetings, temples, and public religious ceremonies, effectively 
                                               
126 See Tulin (1996), 3 n.5, for scholarship on the distinction between a graphe 
and a dike. 
127 The existence of a graphe for homicide was speculated on by MacDowell and 
Hansen; MacDowell (1963), 133-135; Hansen (1976), 108-112. MacDowell later 
abandoned this position in a review of Hansen’s work; MacDowell (1978b), 175. 
In arguing for the existence of a graphe traumatos on the possible grounds that a 
dike traumatos could not be brought by the victim’s family, Hansen 
acknowledged that it weakened his argument for a graphe phonou; Hansen 
(1983), 317 n.26. 
128 Dem. 37.59. 
129 Harris identifies eight differences between homicide legal procedure and 
regular private cases; Harris (2015), 11-13. 
130 Dem. 36.26-27, 43.57; Lys. 13.83. 
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removing the accused from the life of the polis until their trial was 
heard.131 Then, the case had to be brought to the basileus, who 
conducted three pre-trial procedures over a period of three months.132 
As the basileus only served for a year and these pre-trial meetings had 
to be conducted by the same person, it meant that a trial for homicide 
could not be brought in the final three months of a basileus’ term.133 
After the pre-trial hearings, the case was assigned to the relevant court 
for hearing on the following month, meaning that depending on when 
in the year the killing occurred, it could take as much as six months 
before the case came to trial.134  
There were five different courts for trying cases of homicide, with the 
location of a homicide trial chosen based upon either the circumstances 
under which the killing occurred or the defence that was offered by the 
accused.135 The Areopagus tried cases of intentional homicide 
perpetrated against Athenian citizens. If a plea of lawful killing was 
made by the defendant, then the case was tried at the Delphinion by a 
panel of fifty-one men known as the ephetai. The ephetai also heard 
cases at the Palladion if the homicide was involuntary, of a foreigner 
or slave, or if the homicide was planned but not successfully carried 
out. If a person accused of intentional homicide was in exile due to a 
previous conviction for involuntary homicide, then he had to make his 
                                               
131 Antiph. 6.35-40; Ath.Pol. 57.4; Dem. 20.158. 
132 Antiph. 6.42. 
133 Antiph. 6.42. 
134 Antiph. 6.42. 
135 These are laid out at Ath.Pol. 57.2-4; and Dem. 23.67-78. See also Carawan 
(1998), 84-175. 
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case offshore whilst standing on a boat. These trials were also carried 
out by the ephetai and took place at the Phreatto. If a homicide had 
been committed by an unknown person, animal, or inanimate object, 
then the trial was held at the Prytaneion, and overseen by the basileus 
with the four phylobasileis. 
The Athenian courts allowed for the prosecution of a person involved 
in a homicide even if they did not actually do the killing themselves, 
and for a person who planned a homicide but did not succeed in 
carrying it out.136 Killings were considered lawful if they occurred 
against an intruder into a home in the night, a person found on top of a 
wife, mother, sister, daughter, or concubine, accidental deaths in the 
course of an athletic contest, mistaking an ally for an enemy during 
war, dying whilst under the care of a doctor, preventing tyranny, and 
self-defence where proof could be shown that the victim struck the first 
blow.137 There was a distinction drawn between intentional and 
involuntary homicide, although if a person died from injuries that were 
not intended to kill, then it seems that the perpetrator could still be 
prosecuted for intentional homicide.138 
At the trial, the litigants had to swear an extraordinary oath that they 
were telling the truth, invoking destruction on themselves, their 
relatives, and their household if they were not.139 Both sides gave two 
speeches, witness testimony could be brought, and it may even have 
                                               
136 Antiph. 1, 6; Harris (2006), 391-404. 
137 Antiph. 4.2; Dem. 23.53-55; Lycurgus 1.125; Lysias 1.30; IG I³ 104. 
138 Dem. 54.25; Ps.Aristotle, Great Ethics 1188b. 
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been the case that women and children were allowed to give testimony, 
something not normally allowed.140 After the first set of speeches, the 
defendant had the option of either going into exile voluntarily or 
completing the trial.141 If the trial was completed, the appropriate panel, 
depending on where the trial was heard, voted on the defendant’s guilt, 
and the basileus pronounced the verdict.142 If the defendant was found 
guilty of intentional homicide the penalty was execution and loss of 
property, whilst for involuntary homicide it was exile whilst retaining 
property.143 An exile for involuntary homicide could return if he was 
pardoned by the victim’s family, but for any homicide there was a bar 
on accepting a ransom money from the killer in lieu of punishment.144 
In cases where the identity of the killer was not known, or the killing 
had not been carried out by a person, then an unknown homicide was 
pronounced as an exile, and an inanimate object was thrown across the 
Attic border.145 
                                               
140 Antiph. 5.13, 6.14; Dem. 23.69. The evidence for women and children as 
witnesses is found in Dem 47.70-73, where they are twice described as swearing 
oaths, though it is not clear what these oaths are for. Gagarin sees these as 
evidentiary oaths to the facts of the case; Gagarin (1979), 311. See also 
MacDowell (1963), 90-109. Tulin suggests the family would swear an oath in the 
capacity of oath-helpers, and would be supporting the main oath, rather than 
swearing to any facts; Tulin (1996), 31-32. 
141 Antiph. 5.13. 
142 Following MacDowell’s interpretation of the evidence for the role of the 
baslieus at the trial; MacDowell (1963), 37-38. 
143 Antiph. 6.42; Ath.Pol. 47.2; Dem. 21.43; Lys. 1.50. 
144 Dem. 23.35, 23.72, 37.59, 38.22. 
145 See Aeschin. 3.244 for the fate of an inanimate object. The symbolic exile of 
the unknown killer is implied by Andoc. 1.78, and Plu. Sol. 19.4, who each refer 
to the exile of those condemned at the Prytaneion. No firm evidence survives for 
the fate of animal. In Plato’s Laws, the animal is to be killed; 873e. Given the 
close dependence of the homicide legislation of the Laws to Classical Athenian 
homicide law (see below), this may mean that the same punishment was applied 
in Athens.  
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There was also a sixth procedure by which a homicide could be 
prosecuted, which also provides an appropriate starting point for 
understanding Classical Athenian homicide pollution. If the defendant 
was seen in a place of worship or the agora, both public spaces that a 
person accused of homicide was barred from attending, then he could 
be captured, imprisoned, and handed over for trial.146 Mention of a fine 
if the prosecutor does not get one-fifth of the votes indicates that this 
was a public action, and so open to any free adult male citizen to bring 
a prosecution.147  This strongly suggests that if an accused killer entered 
a public space, then their presence there placed the entire community 
at risk, and, consequently, the concerns of the polis would at that point 
begin to take precedence over the rights of the victim in ensuring that 
the crime was dealt with. Exactly how an accused killer placed the 
community at risk in these circumstances is key to understanding why 
a belief in pollution for homicide existed in Classical Athens, and the 
role it played as the imaginative expression of the concerns of the polis 
over a killer residing in its midst. The next section surveys the sources 
for homicide pollution in Classical Athens, to build up a picture of 
exactly how it operated. 
 
Classical Athenian Homicide Pollution 
 
Whilst there are references to homicide pollution spread across many 
sources, the two most complete expressions of a doctrine of homicide 
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147 Isoc. 18.12. See Harrison (1971), 227. 
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pollution are found in Plato’s Laws and in Antiphon’s Tetralogies. The 
Laws presents a discussion between three men, one of whom has been 
given the task of creating a set of laws for a new colony on Crete. The 
act of homicide and the pollution it creates are so intertwined in this 
text, that Plato lays down the principle that a killer is polluted right at 
the beginning of the discussion of the laws on homicide, and each 
secular penalty is accompanied by a purification requirement also.148 
In certain circumstances, such as a killing occurring in the course of 
war, or a doctor treating a patient, the person is to be regarded as 
entirely free from guilt, and they require little to no purification for 
them not to be considered polluted.149 Plato allows for the accidental 
killer to be free of pollution once they have purified themselves, with 
differing levels of purification required depending on the 
circumstances.150 Even when purified, however, the killer must still go 
into exile for a year, else the anger of the dead man at seeing his killer 
be turned on him, and this even extends to staying away from the 
victim’s native land as well as the colony on Crete if the victim did not 
originate from there.151 As will be seen in the Tetralogies, the anger of 
the victim is an important source of pollution in Classical Athens, 
suggesting that here, the purification rituals undertaken by the killer 
only remove his pollution if he stays away from the polis for the 
prescribed time. The secular punishment of one year’s exile is 
                                               
148 Plato, Laws 864e-865d. 
149 Plato, Laws 874b-d. 
150 Plato, Laws 865a-d. 
151 Plato, Laws 865d-e. 
53 
 
inextricably bound together with an understanding of the pollution that 
the deed incurs. 
If the killer enters temples and performs sacrifices whilst polluted, or 
does not stay away, then he is to be prosecuted for homicide by the 
victim’s relatives. If they fail to do so, this will result in the pollution 
extending to them as well as the killer.152 The man who kills in anger 
can also be purified, but in his polluted state he is excluded from the 
agora and athletic arena in addition to any holy places.153 If the victim 
was killed by his slave, then his relatives can kill the slave without 
incurring any pollution.154 Harsher penalties are laid down for kin-
killing in anger, but in the case of self-defence, even a brother who kills 
a brother is not considered to be polluted.155 The pollution of those who 
kill intentionally and with premeditation extends to their exclusion 
from any common place of assembly.156 Once again, failure to 
prosecute causes the pollution to also infect the victim’s next of kin.157 
The intentional homicide of kin allows for no purification of the 
pollution until the crime is repaid at the hands of their next of kin, even 
if this means the matricide must be reborn as a woman to be killed by 
her children.158 The person who intentionally kills a close family 
member cannot be buried, and nor can his corpse even remain in the 
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polis once he has been executed.159 Instead, his naked corpse must be 
cast out, and the archons must throw stones at its head in atonement 
for the entire polis, so severe is the pollution the killer’s deed has 
incurred. 
The doctrine of homicide pollution that is revealed by these passages 
is one in which the degree of the pollution is very much tied to the 
perception of the seriousness of the offence, making this 
unquestionably a ‘moral’ pollution. It is not an indiscriminate or 
unavoidable pollution such as those incurred by bodily emissions, and 
it directly expresses the feelings of the community towards the act 
which incurred it. Only those killings for which the perpetrator could 
be seen as no having no culpability at all, such as the doctor whose 
patient dies, carry with them no requirement of purification. If the 
killing is one which does allow for the killer to return to the community, 
they must first be made clean by the appropriate purification ritual.  
In the main, homicide pollution in the Laws is expressed in the negative 
by the amount of purification a killer requires to be able to return to the 
community. When it is expressed in the positive, it is either in the 
context of the anger of the victim, such as that of the man killed 
unintentionally and who sees his killer in the places he used to frequent, 
or it is in the polluting quality of the victim’s blood, such as when a 
killer is envisaged as having his hands stained with blood as he has not 
yet purified himself.160 The pollution a killer incurs is not presented in 
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the text as being indiscriminately contagious. Where contagion is 
overtly mentioned, it is in the context of the next of kin should they not 
bring a prosecution against the killer. However, a broader contagion is 
implied in the requirement to stay away from holy places, places of 
assembly, and in removing the most heinous of killers from the 
community in as full a manner as possible. Even if Plato does not 
present the killer as polluting everyone he comes into contact with, it 
is clear that his presence in the community does place at risk everyone 
within it. 
The concept of the victim’s anger as a source of pollution, and its 
ability to transfer to those who do not attempt to prosecute the killer, is 
a prominent feature of the Tetralogies. These are three pairs of 
speeches attributed to the orator, Antiphon, each of which presents a 
case for the prosecution and for the defence in a series of hypothetical 
homicide trials.161 In the first prosecution speech, the speaker states that 
the entire city is polluted by the presence of a killer until he is 
prosecuted, and that failing to prosecute, or prosecuting the wrong 
                                               
161 The authorship and providence of the Tetralogies has been debated in 
scholarship; see Gagarin (2002), 52-54, for a summary. See also Sealey for a 
summary of inconsistencies between the speeches and Classical Athenian law, 
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prohibiting any killings, which would be at odds with Classical Athenian law; 
Gagarin (1978), 291-306. See also Gagarin (2002), 54-62 for a defence of 
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Carawan (1993), 235. This case study retains the traditional attribution of 
Antiphon as the author of the Tetralogies, though it does not depend on it, nor 
on whether the speeches are fifth or fourth century.  
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person, will transfer the pollution to the ones responsible for 
prosecuting the killer.162 Holy places and communal tables are 
identified as places which the killer pollutes with his presence, and this 
pollution can cause crops to fail and things to go wrong.163 Removing 
his pollution from the city is identified here as one of the primary 
benefits of convicting a killer.164 Conversely, the defendant claims that 
it is the prosecution who will be responsible for any failed crops as they 
are failing to punish the real killer, and consequently they are failing to 
deal with the real killer’s pollution.165  
The second case involves a boy killed unintentionally when struck by 
a javelin, and that a killer brings a pollution to the city is here again 
stated by the prosecution.166 The defence rests on the claim that the boy 
was responsible for his own death by running into the path of the 
javelin; consequently, he leaves behind no avenging spirit.167 The 
avenging spirit is to the fore in the third case. The prosecution here 
states that the victim, deprived of the gift of life, leaves behind hostile 
spirits as a divine instrument of vengeance.168 These spirits are 
identified as a source of pollution which can pass to unjust prosecutors 
and witnesses.169 The defence further claims that prosecuting him, an 
innocent man, for homicide will cause the avenging spirits to be turned 
                                               
162 Antiph. 2.1.3. 
163 Antiph. 2.1.10. 
164 Antiph. 2.3.11. 
165 Antiph. 2.2.11. 
166 Antiph. 3.1.2. 
167 Antiph. 3.4.9. 
168 Antiph. 4.1.3. 
169 Antiph. 4.1.4. 
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onto the dikastai, and will bring double the pollution.170 Although the 
emphasis is on pollution in the form of the victim’s anger, which is 
designed primarily to bring a conviction against the killer, it is again 
stated that the killer’s pollution affects the entire city.171  
The focus of the Tetralogies is different from that of the Laws, and this 
accounts for some of the differences in their presentation of pollution. 
As these speeches are focused on convincing the dikastai to convict or 
acquit, then the purification rituals required of a polluted killer are not 
of concern. Nor are the varying degrees of pollution that different forms 
of killing can incur. Both the prosecution and the defence focus on the 
necessity of prosecuting the correct killer, and the dire consequences 
for failing to do so. Consequently, the threat to the dikastai from the 
victim’s avenging spirit is emphasised, as is the risk the killer’s 
pollution places the entire polis under. In common with the 
presentation of homicide pollution in the Laws, here it does not 
indiscriminately infect every person with whom it comes into contact, 
but it does risk infecting public spaces and those who fail to carry out 
their responsibility to prosecute the killer. Ultimately, in these texts it 
is the entire community that is placed at risk from the pollution of a 
killer within its midst. 
It should be noted that despite their presentation as legal material, 
neither the Laws nor the Tetralogies are first-hand evidence of actual 
legal practice in Athens. Plato’s Laws were for a hypothetical polis on 
                                               
170 Antiph. 4.2.8; 4.4.10. 
171 In two different places: Antiph. 4.1.5.; 4.3.7. 
58 
 
Crete rather than actual legislation from Athens, and the Tetralogies 
are for hypothetical homicide cases. However, this does not diminish 
their value as evidence for Classical Athenian homicide pollution 
beliefs, as they remain strong evidence both for its existence and the 
way in which it manifested in the Athenian imagination. Plato adopts 
contemporary Athenian law as the basis for his detailed legal 
provisions, and there are many parallels between homicide legislation 
in the Laws and in that of Classical Athens.172 Both recognise differing 
levels of culpability for a homicide, with some killings being entirely 
lawful. There is legislation to deal with killings caused by animals and 
inanimate objects, and unknown killers are symbolically exiled. Exile 
is also the punishment for unintentional killings, and both allow for the 
victim’s family to pardon the killer which allows him to return. A 
person could be prosecuted for homicide if they were involved in the 
planning of it but did not carry it out with their own hands. Finally, in 
cases of intentional homicide, both prescribed the death penalty. There 
are some differences; for example, in Athens, the accused in an 
intentional homicide trial could choose to go into exile before the 
verdict was returned, whereas exile was only available in the Laws if 
the killer absconded rather than face trial.173 These differences tend to 
                                               
172 See Saunders (2004), xxxvi. Gernet considers the section on homicide to be 
the part of the Laws in which Plato conforms most closely to the laws of Athens; 
Dies and Gernet (1951), cxcv-cc. 
173 Plato Laws, 871d. Plato also adds two categories of homicide not found in 
Athens, differentiating between the person who retaliates in anger and then 
feels remorse, and the person who becomes angry then later kills with intent, 
and feels no remorse; 866d-867e. Even these demonstrate a dependence on 
Classical Athens, as Harris identifies them as an attempt to remove an ambiguity 
in Athenian homicide law. This is part of a broader strategy on Plato’s part to 
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be minor, and the overall picture is of a well-developed set of homicide 
legislation very similar to the one in Athens. When coupled with the 
ample evidence for homicide pollution beliefs in Classical Athens, 
including the close correspondence between the Laws and Tetralogies 
with regards to the anger of victim and the risk posed to the next of kin 
if they do not prosecute, then there is good reason to assume that just 
as the homicide legislation of the Laws closely parallels that of Athens, 
so the expression of homicide pollution does also. 174 
The emphasis that the Tetralogies places on homicide pollution is not 
found to the same degree in speeches from actual homicide trials, 
making it reasonable to assume that actual litigants in these trials did 
not lean heavily upon it in trying to make their case, and for some 
scholars this is sufficient to dismiss them as evidence for actual 
homicide pollution beliefs.175 However, arguments that depend on a 
common belief in homicide pollution certainly are present in legal 
speeches, and the topic is brought up in some speeches as evidence in 
support of the speaker’s case. For example, the speaker in Antiph. 5.82-
84 states that he has caused neither ship to sink nor sacrifice to fail, and 
he presents this as proof that he could not have killed Herodes. The 
implication is clearly that had he been guilty, he would have been a 
polluted killer. Similarly, Demosthenes defends himself from a 
homicide charge by stating that if his accuser had genuinely believed 
                                               
reduce what Harris terms ‘open texture’ from Classical Athenian law; Harris 
(2013), 189, 206-208.  
174 Contra Eck, who sees defilement as grafted onto Athenian homicide laws by 
Plato; Eck (2012), 320-321. 
175 For example, see Parker (1983), 104; Eck (2012), 252-253. 
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him guilty, he would not have allowed him to preside over public 
sacrifices.176 As with the previous case, had he done so he would have 
risked the sacrifices failing due to his pollution. In Lys. 13.79, the 
speaker claims that no-one would share a table or tent with the accused 
because they knew him to be a polluted killer. Here, simple proximity 
to the accused places others at risk of being affected by the pollution. 
Purification language, which as has been noted in the case of the Laws 
presupposes the polluted state of the killer, is also used by speakers, 
such as at Dem. 9.44 and 20.158, where a lawfully allowed killing 
leaves the killer pure, and Dem. 23.52, where an exiled killer who 
returns with the permission of the victim’s kin must first sacrifice and 
purify himself before he can return.177 
Although the homicide laws themselves do not explicitly mention or 
discuss pollution, that is not to say that the legislation does not 
presuppose its existence. As has been seen in the case of the Laws, 
polluted killers are there required to stay away from certain communal 
spaces, and from certain holy places. Likewise, and as discussed in the 
preceding section, the homicide laws of Athens also required the 
accused to stay away from public spaces such as the agora and public 
sacrifices whilst they were waiting for trial. Due to the extended 
procedure for bringing a homicide case to trial, this would have been a 
period of time that would last at the minimum several months, and 
                                               
176 Dem. 21.115. 
177 See also Dem. 37.59 for another example of the involuntary killer in exile 
described as impure, and Lyc. 1.125 and SEG 12.87 for the killer of a tyrant or an 
attempted tyrant remaining pure. 
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during which the accused would have effectively been excluded from 
the public life of the polis. Although no reasons are given in the law as 
to why an accused homicide had to stay away from these spaces, the 
logical conclusion to draw based upon the other available evidence is 
that if guilty, the accused homicide carried a risk of polluting these 
public spaces, and by extension their presence in them would place the 
entire polis at risk. Far better to keep an innocent person out of public 
spaces for a few months than to risk a polluted killer entering them.  
This explanation is disputed by MacDowell, who draws upon passages 
found in Demosthenes and Lysias to argue that the sanction was a 
deterrent, and that the procedure which allowed for an accused killer to 
be immediately prosecuted if he entered these places was for occasions 
in which the defendant was manifestly guilty, and thus the prosecution 
could be expedited without need for the extended process usually 
required of homicide trials.178 MacDowell first uses Dem. 20.157-158 
to argue that rather than expressing any concerns over pollution, the 
restriction on entering certain spaces was instead seen by the Classical 
period as a deterrent, as in Dem. 20.158, the orator does claim that 
Drako passed the restriction on entering certain public spaces as a 
deterrent against homicide.179 MacDowell acknowledges that this may 
                                               
178 MacDowell (1963), 144-147. 
179 MacDowell (1963), 144-145. Eck also follows this Demosthenes passage to 
highlight a perceived difference between this and the similar legislation found in 
the Laws; Eck (2012), 319. As it was a deterrent in Athens but a mechanism to 
prevent the spread of pollution in the Laws, then this explains the latter’s 
emphasis on the polluting quality of homicide. In fact, and as will be seen, the 
Athenian legislation is also concerned with preventing the negative 
consequences of homicide pollution from impacting the community. Rather than 
62 
 
not have been the original intent of Drako, but claims that this is how 
it was understood in the fourth century by Demosthenes.  
Set in the broader context of the speech, it becomes clear that 
Demosthenes is making a rhetorical argument, and that he is very much 
aware of the polluting quality of homicide. Demosthenes is arguing for 
the repeal of a law introduced by Leptines, that removed all previous 
exemptions from liturgies that had been held by certain individuals, 
except for those granted to the descendants of Harmodius and 
Aristogeiton.180 In attempting to argue for the positive benefits that 
these exemptions bring the polis, Demosthenes claims that if good 
deeds are always rewarded and wrong-doing always deterred by legal 
penalties, then the polis will be great, and full of good people.181 In this 
context, he draws upon the most serious crime, homicide, to make his 
point, and it is for this reason he claims that the sanction on entering 
public spaces was a deterrent.182 That the killer would be polluted does 
not help Demosthenes make his argument, but in the same passage, 
which was excluded from MacDowell’s excerption of 20.158, 
Demosthenes clearly demonstrates that he was aware that a killer was 
polluted, as he declares the perpetrator of a lawful homicide to be 
katharos, or ritually clean. 
                                               
highlighting a difference, it highlights a similarity and underlines the presence of 
homicide pollution beliefs in Classical Athens. 
180 Dem. 20.18. 
181 Dem. 20.154. 
182 Dem. 20.157-158. 
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Dem. 23.80 and Lys. 13.85-87 are then read together by MacDowell to 
argue that the procedure did not reflect concerns over a polluted killer 
entering public spaces, but was instead for circumstances in which a 
killer was manifestly guilty of homicide.183 MacDowell speculates that 
this procedure may well have been introduced precisely because the 
usual procedure for prosecuting a homicide was so lengthy and 
complex, and thus ill-suited to circumstances in which a killer was 
‘manifestly’ guilty of homicide.184 In the case of Lysias 13, a man 
called Agoratus had been summarily arrested using the apagoge 
procedure, and had been taken to the Eleven on a charge of homicide. 
The prosecution alleges that some years previously, Agoratus 
denounced a number of men to the boule and the ekklesia, who were 
subsequently executed by the Thirty based upon this denunciation.185 
The Eleven allowed the arrest, but insisted that the phrase ep’ 
autophoroi, meaning that the guilt of the arrested person was in some 
way clear, be added to the plaint.186 This passage is read by MacDowell 
in conjunction with Dem. 23.80, in which the procedure is presented as 
being applicable in circumstances in which the killer has entered holy 
places or the agora, to reconstruct the law as being one which applies 
when a manifestly guilty killer enters one of the proscribed places.187 
                                               
183 MacDowell (1963), 146-147. 
184 MacDowell (1963), 146-147. 
185 Lys. 13.30-35. 
186 Lys. 13.85-86.  
187 MacDowell (1963), 146-147. The similarity of the circumstances presented in 
Dem. 23.80, and Dem. 24.105, is such that Demosthenes may be describing the 
same procedure in each instance; see Gagarin (1979), 315-316. However, 
Canevaro has convincingly argued that the law here is a later forgery. The 
apagoge procedure found in the law is not mentioned by Demosthenes in his 
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This argument is flawed in a number of ways. At no point in Lyisas 13 
is Agoratus described as being summarily arrested in one of the 
proscribed places. Nor does Demosthenes anywhere state that the 
procedure only applied when the killer was manifestly guilty. These 
two passages have been joined together by MacDowell to make a 
reconstruction that is supported by neither. It would seem far more 
likely that the Eleven insisted upon the phrase ep’ autophoroi being 
added to the plaint precisely because the arrest of Agoratus did not 
otherwise satisfy the requirement of the procedure. The phrase is 
elsewhere associated with apagoge procedures and likely meant the 
Eleven would not have accepted it as a valid arrest if the prosecutors 
did not in some way assert that the procedure was appropriate.188 The 
defendant of Antiphon 5, Euxitheus, was arrested on a homicide charge 
using an apagoge procedure, and in his speech, he complains that the 
incorrect procedure has been used, and that he should have been 
prosecuted using the normal procedure for homicide. In addressing the 
prosecution’s case, he reveals that they have justified the apagoge 
procedure on the grounds that Euxitheus would abscond if the usual 
three-month period before the trial was followed.189 Nowhere does he 
make his complaint on the use of apagoge on the grounds that he was 
                                               
discussion of it, nor does he make any reference to homicide, and there are 
important differences between it and Dem. 23.80; Canevaro (2013), 171-173. 
Once the text of the law found in 24.105 is discounted, there is nothing in the 
discussion of it which would aid in a reconstruction of apagoge homicide. 
188 The phrase ep’ autophoroi is also associated with the apagoge procedure at 
Isaeus 4.28. See Harris (2006), 373-390 for other examples, and a discussion of 
the exact meaning of this term. See also Todd (2000), 139.  
189 Antiph. 5.13. It also worth noting that despite the seemingly incorrect use of 
apagoge, the Eleven still allowed the prosecution to go ahead, presumably based 
upon the prosecution’s justification for why it was warranted. 
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not caught ep’ autophoroi, nor that this was usually a requirement for 
bringing an apagoge if an accused homicide entered a proscribed place. 
For Agoratus, ep’ autophoroi had to be added to the plaint because the 
procedure was not otherwise being used correctly to bring a trial for 
homicide. Likewise, for Euxitheus, his prosecutors needed a reason as 
to why they could bring him to trial for homicide using apagoge as it 
also was not otherwise being used correctly. Dem. 23.80 demonstrates 
that the correct use of the procedure was when the accused entered the 
places forbidden by Drako’s law on homicide. Had this been the case 
for Agoratus or Euxitheus, there would be no need to otherwise justify 
the use of the procedure. 
In addition to this, if it is accepted that these two elements could be 
presumed by both texts, even if they each only discuss one of them, 
then the resultant procedure would make little sense. If the purpose was 
to circumvent the long, drawn-out homicide procedure when the killer 
was manifestly guilty, why could he only be subject to it if he entered 
the proscribed places? Alternatively, to come at it from the other 
direction, why would his guilt only become manifestly obvious if he 
entered one of those places?  A law which was designed only to 
expedite a prosecution against a manifestly guilty killer would be 
undermined by a restriction on where it could be used.  
MacDowell’s argument also fails to address why the offence would 
only become one against the community if the killer entered these 
public spaces, and why it would remain a private offence to the victim 
as long as he stayed away from them.  If the reason for this law was 
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that it was designed to protect the community from the pollution of a 
potential killer, then it would make sense that a private obligation on 
the next of kin would become a public concern if the accused entered 
the public spaces of the polis. It makes little sense that the offence 
would become one against the polis only in the circumstances in which 
a manifestly guilty killer entered a public space. A manifestly guilty 
killer would carry the same risk whether he attended a sacrifice or not. 
Conversely, the possibility that an accused killer whose guilt or 
innocence had not yet been established could be polluted would carry 
a potential risk to the polis if he attended a public sacrifice that needed 
to be legislated against. 
Fifth century tragedies provide another set of sources in which 
homicide pollution is a prominent feature.190 There are many examples 
to be found in Aeschylus’ Oresteia. Clytemnestra is described as a 
miasma to her country and her country’s gods for killing 
Agamemnon.191 Orestes laments the pollution that killing his mother 
and her lover has brought him.192 The Erinyes reproach Apollo as one 
of the gods who rule a throne polluted with blood contrary to justice.193 
Orestes tells Athena that he did not sit at her image polluted with blood 
on his hands.194 The theme is also common in other works also. 
Oedipus describes the land as polluted following the murder of Laius, 
                                               
190 See (Harris) forthcoming, for an examination of the similarities between 
homicide pollution in tragedy, and Athenian homicide law. 
191 Aesch. Ag. 1420. She is also later referred to as polluted by Orestes; Ag. Lib. 
1028.  
192 Aesch. Lib. 1017. 
193 Aesch. Eum. 162-169. 
194 Aesch. Eum. 444. 
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and Creon attributes a plague to the same pollution.195 Herakles 
describes himself as polluted for killing his children.196 Pelasgus 
describes how the land had become so polluted from bloody deeds that 
it threw up plagues and monsters.197 Theseus fled Athens to escape the 
blood-pollution he incurred from killing the Pallantidae.198 Aside from 
specific pollution-incurring deeds, Sophocles writes that a killer is 
banned from houses and religious observances on account of his 
pollution.199 Reminiscent of Antiph. 5.82-84, Aeschylus states that the 
righteous man goes down with the ship when the presence of evil 
company causes it to sink.200  
 
Much as with the Laws and Tetralogies, these plays are not legal 
documents, but they share sufficient similarities with other Classical 
Athenian sources to be able use them to aid in a reconstruction of 
homicide pollution belief. The imagery of the blood of the victim is to 
the fore in these works, to a greater extent than is found elsewhere. 
However, the blood of the victim clinging to the killer’s hands has 
already been seen in Plato’s Laws, and it is alluded to in the instance of 
the polluted killers who can bring down a ship by their presence on it 
found in Antiph. 5.82. Here, Antiphon describes the hands of the killer 
as being me katharoi, or not clean, with the use of katharos denoting 
                                               
195 Soph. OT 138-139 and 97. 
196 Eur. Her. 1155. 
197 Aesch. Supp. 264-265. 
198 Eur. Hypp. 35. 
199 Soph. OT 241. 
200 Aesch. Seven 597-609. 
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the polluted state. Although Antiphon does not state that it is 
specifically the blood of the victim that is causing the hands to be 
unclean, that the pollution attaches to the hands suggests the 
imaginative understanding of it is in the same territory as the blood that 
pollutes the hands of a killer in Aeschylus and Plato.201 The anger of 
the victim that drives the next of kin to bring a prosecution, which is so 
prominent in the Tetralogies, is also found in the Oresteia, strongly 
suggesting that each is reflecting an actual expression of Classical 
Athenian homicide pollution belief.202 The Oresteia also provides a 
further point of comparison, wherein the innocence or guilt of Orestes 
directly impacts upon whether he is to be considered polluted or not.203 
That pollution infects the killer, that it can have a negative impact on 
both him and those around him, that it can cause him to be kept out of 
communal and religious spaces, and that pollution can manifest in the 
form of the blood of the victim clinging to the killer, are all in line with 
homicide pollution as it is presented in other Classical Athenian 
sources.204 This strongly suggests that if even the exact way in which 
it was presented on the fifth century stage could have been a trope of 
                                               
201 Aesch. Eum. 444. 
202 Aesch. Lib. 269-296. See Harris (Forthcoming). 
203 The Erinyes consider him to be polluted, whereas Orestes claims he is not; 
Aesch. Eum. 235-240, 276-289, 313-320, 443-453. See Harris (forthcoming).  
204 See Harris (Forthcoming) for a comparison of homicide pollution in fifth 
century tragedies with Classical Athenian legal sources. These include Orestes’ 
claim that he will be polluted if he does not avenge his father’s murder, pollution 
accruing to Aegisthus for his role in planning the murder of Agamemnon, and a 
proclamation made by Oedipus banning the killer of Laius from participating in 
sacrifices; Aesch. Lib. 269.296, 944; Soph. OT 236-243. 
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the genre, this trope was based upon and dependent upon the actual 
beliefs of the audience. 
This survey of the sources presents what is on the face of it, a largely 
unproblematic reconstruction of an actual belief in homicide pollution 
by the Classical Athenians. The sources for it cut across several 
different genres, including legal speeches and the law on homicide. 
They collectively are largely consistent in presenting a doctrine of 
homicide pollution that regarded a killer as polluted, with the degree of 
pollution varying in close correspondence to the degree of severity with 
which the killing was dealt with in law. They present a polluted killer 
as posing a threat to others if they share the same house, ship, table, or 
other public space such as the agora. Likewise, there is also a threat to 
holy places and to sacrifices if a killer enters them whilst in a polluted 
state. The next of kin and the dikastai, collectively being those 
responsible for bringing a successful prosecution against a killer, have 
a specific risk of pollution accruing to them if they fail in their duty. 
Finally, where the pollution is given an imaginative expression, it is 
either in the form of the blood of the victim, or the anger of the victim, 
with the latter particularly associated with a failure to adequately deal 
with the victim’s killer. Yet despite this, much scholarship on homicide 
pollution in Classical Athens either disregards it or downplays it as an 
actual part of the Athenian imagination or a concern of Athenian 
legislation. 
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Scholarship on Classical Athenian Homicide Pollution 
 
Earlier scholarship on homicide pollution largely accepted both its 
existence in the Classical Athenian imagination and its expression in 
Athenian homicide legislation.205 In the 1950s, E.R. Dodds presented 
a model of the ancient Greek mind based on a theory that societies are 
capable of being classified as either a ‘shame culture’ or as a ‘guilt 
culture’; a theory which was current at the time Dodds wrote.206 
According to this theory, in a shame culture, social control is exerted 
externally, with the shame acting as an external sanction derived from 
the perceptions of other members of the community.207 As the Homeric 
hero was motivated by what others would think of his deeds, Dodds 
argued that he was representative of a shame culture.208  By contrast, a 
guilt culture exerts control internally, and here the deeds that would 
have brought shame, now bring an internal feeling of guilt instead. A 
guilt culture imposes a standard of morality to which individuals hold 
themselves, and from which a religious unease arises on the part of the 
person who is feeling guilt.209  
                                               
205 For example, see Adkins (1960), 112 n.22; Moulinier (1952), 82; Treston 
(1923), 247. 
206 Dodds (1951), 17-18. Dodds was drawing on Ruth Benedict who popularised 
the terminology in the 1940s to describe the differences between Japanese and 
American culture; Benedict (1946), 222-223. Margaret Visser followed Dodds in a 
paper on Athenian homicide pollution; Visser (1984), 193-206. 
207 Benedict (1946), 223. 
208 Dodds (1951), 17-18. 
209 Dodds (1951), 47. 
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According to Dodds, Greece moved away from shame and towards 
guilt during the Archaic period, and one consequence of this transition 
was the emergence in Greek society of a fear of pollution.210 Whereas 
the Homeric hero had only his peers to fear, the Archaic and Classical 
Greek feared a supernatural sanction for his or her misdeeds due to the 
internal and religiously motivated feeling of guilt that those misdeeds 
brought about. Dodds further argued that this pollution was considered 
to be both contagious and capable of being inherited.211 Consequently, 
a Greek could ‘catch’ pollution via contact with a polluted person, or 
be caught up in a misfortune brought about by the presence of a 
polluted person.212 This meant that a Greek individual, and by 
extension the community, could be negatively affected by the presence 
of a polluted person, regardless of the quality of their own deeds.  
The inadequacies of the shame-guilt dichotomy were later addressed 
by Douglas Cairns.213 He noted that rather than a simple external 
sanction, shame corresponds to internalised standards. Rather than 
requiring an external audience, shame is ultimately felt via an 
internalised standard of oneself.214 Cairns further concluded that shame 
and guilt are very difficult to distinguish from one another, and in usage 
they are more or less interchangeable.215 Consequently, the 
                                               
210 Dodds (1951), 35-37. 
211 Dodds (1951), 36. See also Rohde (1925), 295. 
212 Antiph. 5.82. 
213 Lloyd-Jones had earlier also taken issue with them, though he accepted that 
the labels could be applied in more relative terms; Lloyd-Jones (1971), 24-26. 
214 Cairns (1993), 16-18. 
215 Cairns (1193), 24-25.  
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applications of ‘shame culture’ and ‘guilt culture’ were rejected by him 
as being untenable.216 
In an examination of Classical Athenian homicide legislation published 
a little over a decade after Dodds, Douglas MacDowell argued that it 
was very difficult to detect any concerns over pollution in Athenian 
homicide laws. Identifying only a single instance of any clear form of 
purification language in them, MacDowell argued that at least some of 
the laws must have been composed before pollution became part of the 
Athenian imagination.217 The emphasis that he placed on deterrent as 
being the motivating factor behind the proclamation against a killer to 
stay away from certain public spaces and its inadequacies has already 
been discussed, and it is emblematic of MacDowell’s reading of the 
sources in which he focuses on only what is explicitly stated by 
them.218 
A much stronger challenge to the existence of homicide pollution 
beliefs in Classical Athens came in Robert Parker’s Miasma. The 
monograph is a wide-ranging work that addresses pollution in many 
contexts, and it incorporated the theories of Mary Douglas to present 
an understanding of Greek pollution that challenged previous 
scholarship on the topic.219 An entire chapter of Miasma was dedicated 
                                               
216 He further notes that the distinction between shame and guilt cultures 
ultimately rests upon twentieth century assumptions about Western Christian 
society; Cairns (1993), 27-47.  
217 MacDowell (1963), 141-150. Gagarin also sees pollution beliefs as emerging in 
Athens after the drafting of Drako’s law on homicide; Gagarin (1981), 164-167. 
218 See Saunders (1965), 225. 
219 Parker mentions Douglas’ theories openly when he discusses birth and death 
pollution as deriving from their betwixt and between state. He follows her when 
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to examining Classical Athenian homicide pollution and in it, Parker 
placed a heavy emphasis on the anger of the victim directed at the next 
of kin and the dikastai as the source of homicide pollution; 
undermining the depiction of it as indiscriminate, contagious, and a risk 
to the entire community and replacing it with a strictly functionalist 
interpretation in which it serves only as a mechanism to motivate the 
victim’s relatives to prosecute.220  
Parker succeeded in demonstrating that pollution was not simply an 
indiscriminate consequence of a killing. As it was adaptable to the 
specific circumstances of the killing and matched closely the laws on 
homicide, then it expressed the disruption felt by Athenian society. 
Most of the remainder of Parker’s arguments on homicide pollution, 
however, were flawed. Evidence that homicide pollution did place the 
entire community at risk was glossed over, ignored, or not adequately 
dealt with.221 When citing a lack of instances in which misfortunes are 
                                               
he rejects a direct link between disgust and pollution, in rejecting the theory that 
purity rituals have their basis in hygiene, rejecting medical materialism and 
scientific reasoning, when he identifies the liminal state of the pregnant woman 
as the source of the danger to her, rather than her physiological condition, and 
when he argues that “pollution is the product of the urge for order and control”; 
Parker (1983), 54-57, 61. 
220 Parker (1983), 106-108, 110. 
221 The examples in the Tetralogies discussed above of homicide pollution as an 
indiscriminate threat to the community are also glossed over in Parker’s 
summary of them, whilst Euxitheus’ argument that he cannot be a killer because 
he did not cause ships to sink or sacrifices to fail leads to Parker speculating that 
the anger of the victim can be so powerful that it can carry an indiscriminate 
threat to a ship full of people with no link at all to the killing. This and other 
forms of pollution, such as that derived by kin killings, are by his own admission 
arbitrarily placed by him as derivative from the victim’s anger; Parker (1983), 
109-110. Meanwhile, the Laws are dismissed on the grounds that they are 
religiously conservative. See Harris (2015), 17-18, for many examples which 
contradict this. 
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blamed upon the presence of a polluted killer, Parker mistook 
misfortune pollution for the dirt pollution system that he otherwise 
argued for and which is broadly supported by the evidence.222 
Dodds had identified a primitive horror of spilt blood as a source of 
pollution fears for the ancient Greek, an aspect which was heavily 
played down by Parker.223 It has been noted earlier that one of the main 
ways in which later studies have built upon and criticised Douglas is 
on the topic of disgust. As much of Douglas’ theory of pollution was 
focused on establishing it as the expression of a culture’s concerns, as 
opposed to the individual expression of the primitive mind, it meant 
there was no place for disgust in her scheme. Miasma did depart 
somewhat from Douglas in the area of bodily emissions as though they 
are occasionally mentioned as a source of dirt, there is no attempt to 
produce a system of pollution based upon them, and when they are 
discussed it is often in the context of the social significance of the act 
which the dirt expresses, rather than as the body as a system for 
pollution.224 Parker did, however, identify an embarrassment over 
bodily emissions in Greek society, and suggested that in the case of 
                                               
222 Parker (1983), 129-130. Parker likely inherits here the flaw identified by Valeri 
in Douglas’ work, in which she conflates one type of pollution system as being all 
types. A system of dirt pollution requires that the killer always be considered as 
polluted from the moment of the killing, whereas in misfortunate pollution, it is 
only due to an unfortunate event that a person is then regarded as polluted. Nor 
can misfortune pollution make the fine distinctions between offences that 
characterise Athenian homicide pollution. This is not to say the Athenians did not 
fear the consequences of the presence of a polluted killer, but that it was the risk 
of what it may do, rather than what it has done, which is primary. 
223 Dodds (1951), 154; Parker (1983), 107. 
224 Parker (1983), 76-77. 
75 
 
menstruation, the subject was so shameful that it was rarely 
discussed.225  
The presence of blood in homicides is sufficient to trigger a disgust 
reaction even in societies which lack any form of pollution beliefs. In 
a discussion of disgust in modern homicide law, Martha Nussbaum 
identifies actual US cases in which the jury have been directed to 
consult their reactions of disgust to the crime when making a 
decision.226 In other cases, homicides which are especially bloody or in 
some other way vile are noted as causing a disgust reaction in the 
jury.227 In many ways, the disgust reaction is comparable to pollution 
in other societies, and disgust and societal expression can go hand-in-
hand, as what the jury finds disgusting is often informed by the values 
of the society. For example, Nussbaum notes that the amount of disgust 
at the crime elicited from a jury can vary depending on the race of the 
defendant, but also, that among the deeds that are likely to illicit a 
disgust response are those which are especially bloody.228 The disgust 
response here is affected by both the presence of blood and societal 
values.  Whilst Parker was correct to argue that a fear of the blood of 
the victim cannot explain the variations in the amount of pollution that 
killings in different circumstances incur, it goes to too far to regard it 
simply as the mechanical expression of a society’s values. The blood 
and the expression are rather engaged in a dialogue. The unease at 
                                               
225 Parker (1983), 101-102. 
226 Nussbaum (2004), 163-164. 
227 Nussbaum (2004), 164-165. 
228 Nussbaum (2004), 165. 
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bodily emissions, the deep reluctance to broach the topic of 
menstruation, and the close association of homicide and blood suggests 
that to present the blood of the victim merely as a mechanical symbol 
does not do the idea justice. Just as for Douglas to say that bodily 
emissions pollute because they transgress the body’s boundary does not 
do the idea justice.  
As Meigs points out, what makes the emissions polluted and/or 
disgusting is that they are dangerous.229  Which is not to hark back to 
ideas of medical materialism and scientific rationalism, it is not the case 
that the ancient Greek feared contacting a physical infection from the 
emission in the manner of modern scientific understanding; rather, they 
are associated with decay, and, specifically in the case of homicide, the 
blood is associated with death.230 To quote Meigs on bodily emissions: 
“(they are) things which are dying, separated from that which can make 
them live. Being actually or potentially contaminated, these emissions 
are feared as contaminating, as having the power to cause an ill-defined 
sickening.”231 Valeri also identifies the polluting power of shed blood 
to be an expression of the violation of the social rule to not kill, but 
points out that for the blood to work as a symbol, it has to become 
material and literal enough to generate concern for bodily well-
being.232 So powerful is the concern that blood generates, that it is the 
                                               
229 Meigs (1978), 310-312. 
230 Meigs (1978), 312. 
231 Meigs (1978), 312. 
232 Valeri (2000), 49. 
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symbol that most often characterises homicide across cultures, and the 
association of it with death pre-dates history.233 
When these ideas, along with those of Curtis, are applied to the 
Classical Athenian conception of homicide pollution, it becomes clear 
that neither Dodds’ fear of shed blood nor Parker’s purely functional 
vehicle through which social disruption is expressed is entirely an 
adequate explanation. The differing amount of purification required 
depending on the circumstances of the killing, even extending to none 
needed at all, mean a fear of blood alone cannot have been the reason 
that blood was seen as polluting. The close ties with the corresponding 
legal sanctions against killings does demonstrate that homicide 
pollution beliefs were in line with Athenian views on killing, so it is 
reasonable to suppose that the expression of societal disruption created 
by the killing was a major factor in shaping Classical Athenian 
pollution belief. Consequently, it is fair to accept that Parker’s view is 
superior to Dodds’. However, as Parker was arguing against Dodds’ 
conception of pollution, it caused him to discount the threat that the 
shed blood presents. The substance is not necessarily the cause of the 
pollution beliefs, but where pollution beliefs are present, the concern 
that the substance generates forms an integral part of the imaginative 
expression of them due to its close association with death and the 
disgust response that it can generate.  
                                               
233 Meyer (2005), 2; Valeri (2000), 48. 
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Alongside the downplaying of homicide pollution as a feature of 
Classical Athenian belief, Parker also turned on its head the traditional 
understanding of pollution beliefs emerging in post-Homeric Greece, 
which was fundamental to the shame-guilt schema of Dodds. Even 
MacDowell, with whom Parker shares an understanding on homicide 
pollution beliefs as being secondary and not essential to Athenian 
homicide law, saw the traces of homicide pollution he did identify as 
being a later development, not an earlier one.  
Parker argued that a misleading impression had been left by the sources 
due to fifth century tragedy’s preoccupation with kin killings which 
was not shared by Homeric epic.234 This was the product of Parker’s 
attempt to locate the function of homicide pollution, which led him to 
conclude that its natural setting was a society that lacked formal legal 
institutions.235 Once the Athenian court system was established, Parker 
could no longer see a function for it in Athenian society. He posited 
that it initially underwent a temporary transformation as the anger of 
the victim threatening the next of kin and the dikastai, and by the time 
of the fourth century the court system had entrenched itself and 
homicide pollution beliefs had consequently all but disappeared.236  
It is a theory which has a number of flaws.237 As has been discussed 
already, evidence for pollution beliefs are frequently found in fourth-
                                               
234 Parker (1983), 16. 
235 In identifying the lack of a police force to arrest Orestes as creating the 
necessity for the Erinyes, Parker echoes a similar point made by Douglas. See 
Douglas (1975) 53-54; Parker (1983), 125.  
236 Parker (1983), 126. 
237 See also Harris (Forthcoming), 13-19. 
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century sources; they are found in laws, legal speeches, and 
philosophy, cover many different types of homicide, not just kin-
killing, and many do present homicide pollution both as a contagious 
threat to the polis and not as deriving from the anger of the victim.238 
In addition to these, the Nuer, a tribe in South Sudan whom Parker 
discusses in the chapter, have a system of homicide pollution expressed 
as the anger of the victim’s ghost which affects the kin of victim and 
killer until they reach a settlement.239 This is precisely the sort of 
pollution which Parker sees as a temporary evolution whilst the court 
system embeds, yet it is found in a society with no formal legal 
institutions.240  
Parker also makes a leap from ‘more formal legal institutions’ when 
discussing the appropriate setting for homicide pollution beliefs, to 
‘courts’ when discussing Classical Athens. It is worth noting that the 
specific example of a more formal legal institution that Parker gives is 
a police force, which would have circumvented the need for the Erinyes 
by arresting Orestes, rather than a court. Classical Athens did have 
public magistrates whose responsibility was to enforce the law in a 
manner similar to a modern police force, but it did not have a public 
prosecutor who would bring a case against the accused homicide on 
                                               
238 See Harris (forthcoming) for numerous examples of homicide pollution in 
Greek sources dating to the fourth century and later. These include a fourth 
century law declaring tyrannicides free from pollution, a decree by Alexander 
allowing exiles to return to their cities except for thieves of sacred property and 
homicides, as these two categories of people were polluted, and the purification 
of the Ten Thousand following the killing of three Colchian elders by some of the 
soldiers; SEG 12.987; D.S. 17.109.1, 18.8.4; Xen. An. 5.7.13-19, 35. 
239 Evans-Pritchard (1956), 294. 
240 Evans-Pritchard (1940), 151. 
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behalf of the polis.241 For a homicide trial to come to court it required 
the victim’s family to bring a prosecution. Even in the case of public 
offences, it was necessary for someone to initiate a charge and bring 
the defendant to court. Thus, the role played by the Erinyes was not 
superseded by the Classical Athenian court system. Rather, the Erinyes 
in the Eumenides take on the role of the victim’s relatives under the 
Athenian court system, not the police.  
The placement of homicide pollution beliefs to Homeric Greece is by 
Parker’s admission speculative. It is also as problematic as his theories 
on Classical Athenian homicide pollution for two main reasons.242 The 
first is that there are courts for homicide in Homeric society. The Shield 
of Achilles displays a trial in which two men are in dispute over the 
payment of blood money following a homicide.243 A formal system is 
depicted wherein each man presents his case in a public court to a group 
of elders for a decision. The second is the lack of any evidence for 
homicide pollution in either the Iliad or the Odyssey, even though there 
are many occasions where it could have been mentioned had it been 
present in Homeric society.244 
Such has been the impact of Miasma that the Oxford Classical 
Dictionary contains an entry on ‘pollution, the Greek concept of’, 
written by Parker which briefly summarises its arguments.245 That there 
                                               
241 See Harris (2013), 21-59, for the evidence on the policing role of Athenian 
public magistrates. 
242 Parker (1983), 130.  
243 Hom. Il. 18.497-508. 
244 See Harris (2015), 15-16, 28-30. 
245 Hornblower and Spawforth (2012), 1173.  
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is no comparable entry for the Roman concept of pollution 
demonstrates the extent to which Miasma helped define the topic as an 
area of interest. The studies of both MacDowell and Parker have proved 
enduring in Greek legal scholarship. They were followed by Tulin, who 
repeated many of Miasma’s arguments.246 By Carawan, who saw the 
Tetralogies and Laws as reflective of an ‘archaizing piety’.247 
Arnaoutoglou repeated MacDowell’s erroneous assertion that the ban 
on entering certain places was only a deterrent, and followed Parker in 
asserting that pollution had little role in Athenian homicide law.248 
Sealey openly acknowledged a debt to Parker and Arnaoutoglou when 
he asserted that pollution could only be found on the stage and not in 
the lawcourt.249 Such has been the persistence of Parker’s claim that 
homicide pollution exists in a society without formal legal institutions 
and gradually evolves out in an altered form once they are introduced, 
that it was later repeated in a Roman context by Lennon.250 
Subsequent scholars have also built upon and challenged the work of 
Parker. Petrovic and Petrovic convincingly argued that inner purity was 
not a concept that gradually entered Greek religious belief, but that it 
                                               
246 Tulin (1996), 85-87. 
247 Carawan (1998), 197. 
248 Arnaoutoglou (2000), 125, 134. 
249 Sealey (2006), 479-481. 
250 “By the late Republic, the Roman legal system had developed significantly. 
Pollution naturally does not vanish with the emergence of law but remains for a 
period after its instigation, although with an altered objective, serving ‘as a 
threat directed by the original avengers against the surrogate avengers, the 
jurors, and through them against the city they represented’.  Much as with 
Greece, the situation is again one in which no evidence exists for pollution in the 
earlier period, whilst there is much evidence in the Late Republic; Lennon (2014), 
93-94. 
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existed at least from the time of Hesiod, and that it possessed a moral 
dimension based on the belief that the gods can see into human 
minds.251 They considered Parker’s theory on the function of Classical 
Athenian homicide pollution ‘attractive’, though their concern was 
primarily over what pollution says about the mental state and 
motivations of the killer and the importance that both the laws and 
pollution belief placed upon it.252 
Much as with MacDowell, Eck saw no evidence of pollution concerns 
in the Athenian homicide laws and lawcourts, preferring instead to 
emphasise the element of deterrent.253 He argued that pollution could 
not make the fine distinctions between types of homicide characteristic 
of Athenian homicide law, and he called upon Antiph. 6.4 to argue that 
as an innocent man must stay away from the proscribed places then 
pollution cannot be the concern as he is not polluted.254 As has been 
noted, it is in fact this doubt over whether the accused is innocent or 
guilty which results in this temporary procedure until a trial can be 
held. A convicted and therefore polluted killer is not simply banned 
from entering these places, he is removed from the polis altogether. 
                                               
251 Petrovic and Petrovic (2016). 
252 Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), 153-165. 
253 Eck (2012), 227-231, 309-310, 385.  
254 Eck (2012), 255, 306-307, 386. It has already been noted that Demosthenes 
considered the lawful killer to be ritually pure, which is in line with Athenian 
homicide law that imposed no punishment on the lawful killer. For the 
importance of the mental state and motivations of the killer with regards to the 
pollution the act incurs see Harris (2010), 133-34; and Petrovic and Petrovic 
(2016), 132-182. 
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Whilst Eck accepted that there was no pollution for homicide to be 
found in Homer, he instead argued that there was a much milder 
pollution caused by killings in warfare.255 Much is made of the use of 
thambos, Ares miaphonos, and four passages in the Iliad, not all of 
which are convincing, but in the case of Hektor at least, there is 
certainly a purification required following battle before he can 
approach the divine.256 This mild pollution creates a stain on the 
Homeric hero, and Eck further argued that having started out in the 
sphere of warfare, this stain will have gradually crossed into the private 
sphere in the form of pollution for homicide. 
Eck also reintroduced the concept of guilt as fundamental to the 
existence of homicide pollution beliefs.257 Like Dodds, he saw the lack 
of guilt felt by the Homeric hero as being the reason that homicide 
pollution cannot be found in Homer, though he side-stepped some of 
the problems of Dodds’ scheme by also arguing that Homeric Greek 
was not a shame culture. The argument largely rests on an assumption 
by Eck that guilt is a requirement for defilement, which may or not be 
true but is not proven. It is also at least called into question by the very 
clear external manifestation of Classical Athenian homicide pollution 
in its drive to motivate the next of kin and dikastai to prosecute, to keep 
the potentially polluted killer away from public spaces, to remove the 
polluted killer from the community altogether, and to tie the degree of 
                                               
255 Eck is opposed to Parker and other Greek scholars who see no pollution as a 
result of killing in warfare; Eck (2012), 55. 
256 Eck (2012), 106-116. 
257 Eck (2012), 123-129.  
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pollution to the communal disapproval of the circumstances of the 
killing. As Irene Salvo points out, homicide pollution works alongside 
the laws on homicide to control the public order.258    
The absence of specific mentions of homicides as among the polluted 
persons excluded from temples was also addressed by Salvo. She 
argued that homicide purification rites were part of a Panhellenic ritual 
norm, in which a ban on accused and convicted homicides, such as the 
one in Classical Athens, would have prevented them from entering 
sacred spaces.259  
An alternate source of homicide pollution other than one which derived 
directly from the act itself was proposed by Bendlin.260 He accepted 
that the proclamation made against a killer that he must stay away from 
certain public spaces was due to concerns over homicide pollution but 
argued that it was this act which created the homicide pollution, and 
that it did not exist before the proclamation was made.261 Ironically, 
this caused him to also downplay the evidence of the Tetralogies and 
the Laws for which it is a prominent feature of both, and to also 
                                               
258 Salvo (2012a), 150-152. 
259 Salvo (2012b), 319-323. 
260 Bendlin also took issue with Douglas’ structuralist approach and the 
dichotomy of pure and polluted, with purity regulations maintaining the social 
order by presenting those areas which fall outside of the social classifications as 
polluted. Rather than seeing pollution and purity as opposites, Bendlin argued 
that for each, their opposite is ‘normalcy’, and he consequently disregarded the 
application of the concept of ‘taboo’ to Greek notions of purity and pollution. 
Whilst Bendlin does acknowledge that structuralist interpretations have value in 
some instances, he cites other instances of misfortune pollution, such as the 
purification of Delos by the Athenians in response to an outbreak of plague; 
Bendlin (2010), 178-189. For a discussion of the problems with Bendlin’s views 
on pollution and purity see Petrovic and Petrovic (2016), 23. 
261 Bendlin (2010), 185-186. 
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emphasise the perceived lack of reference to homicide pollution in 
actual Athenian legal speeches.262  
This is a theory which is fundamentally flawed. The proclamation 
could not bring the pollution into existence because at this point no 
verdict had been rendered and the accused could very well be either 
innocent or have carried out a lawful killing. In either case this would 
mean that the killer was never polluted regardless of any proclamation. 
The purpose of the ban in these circumstances was purely one of 
precaution, as opposed to the accused killer becoming polluted upon 
the proclamation and then ceasing to be upon the verdict. As support 
for his argument, Bendlin cited a similar proclamation made by 
Oedipus against the unknown killer of Laius in Sophocles’ Oedipus 
Tyrannus, despite the fact that the motivation for finding Laius’ killer 
is the miasma which is already afflicting Thebes, something which 
Bendlin himself had pointed out.263  
Against the argument that Classical Athenian homicide pollution is a 
relic from an earlier time, Harris argued that the evidence fits exactly 
into its context.264 Classical Athenian homicide legislation, with its 
many different courts, lengthy procedures, and ban on the accused 
entering public spaces, demonstrates the utmost seriousness with which 
the community regarded the offence whilst simultaneously recognising 
it as a private wrong to the victim and his family. Homicide pollution 
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existed alongside this as the expression of the community’s views 
about homicide, and placed pressure on the community as a whole to 
deal with the offence. As the obligation to prosecute a homicide fell to 
the next of kin, homicide pollution served to encourage the victim’s kin 
and the courts to bring a conviction against the killer.265 
 
The Hebrew Bible 
 
Evidence for homicide pollution belief is also found in the Hebrew 
Bible, and along with Classical Athens, these two societies provide 
some of the fullest expressions of a doctrine of homicide pollution 
found in the ancient world. Although the Hebrew Bible almost 
certainly contains material drawn from across a period of several 
centuries, the composition of much of it is roughly contemporary with 
the Archaic and Classical periods, and thus roughly contemporary with 
the Athenian evidence. Similarly, whilst Hebrew society did not have 
as sophisticated a legal system as the Athenians, nor was it primitive 
either.  
This makes the Hebrew Bible a valuable point of comparison for 
examining the function of homicide pollution in Classical Athens, as 
the conclusions which are drawn about it should hold up for both 
societies. For example, if Parker is correct about the appropriate 
context for homicide pollution, then what should be found in the 
Hebrew Bible is a legal system lacking in any formal institutions, and 
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thus requiring homicide pollution to stand in their place so that the 
offence can be adequately dealt with. If pollution is found with regards 
to killing in warfare, then it would lend credence to Eck’s argument 
that it can be found in Greece and could even be the original source of 
what later became homicide pollution belief. If the degree of pollution 
is tied to the circumstances of the killing, then it would suggest that 
pollution beliefs are capable of making the kind of fine distinctions 
found in homicide law. 
As discussed in the introduction, using the Hebrew Bible to reconstruct 
either homicide legislation or homicide pollution beliefs in ancient 
Israel and Judah is more problematic than using the Classical Athenian 
sources for Classical Athens. The exact dates and authorship of the 
texts are unknown, and the extent to which they reflected actual 
practice and belief is difficult to determine. However, sufficient 
consistency is found across the homicide material that a coherent set of 
Hebrew homicide legislation can be found which can at the least be 
considered as belonging to a society reflected by the Hebrew Bible. 
The best evidence for Hebrew homicide pollution beliefs is found in 
two places. The first is in Numbers, and is usually attributed to the 
Priestly source, and the second is in Deuteronomy. These two sources 
do not agree completely on how pollution works, but they do have more 
than sufficient overlap with each other, and with other material on 
homicide in the Hebrew Bible, to be able to speak of a Hebrew 
homicide pollution belief system. 
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As with the section on Classical Athens, this section will begin with a 
survey of homicide legislation in the Hebrew Bible, as this provides the 
same important context for the imaginative expression of Hebrew 
homicide pollution belief. This is followed by a survey of the evidence 
for homicide pollution in the Hebrew Bible. No study comparable to 
Miasma exists for Hebrew pollution beliefs, and it is not the intention 
of this section to challenge prevailing scholarly opinion on the topic; 
rather, the focus of the discussion is a comparative one. A reasonably 
comprehensive survey of homicide legislation and homicide pollution 
in the Hebrew Bible is presented so as to allow for an adequate 
comparison with the Classical Athenian evidence.  
  
Homicide legislation in the Hebrew Bible 
 
Homicide legislation is presented both directly and indirectly in the 
Hebrew Bible. Homicide is prohibited in the Decalogue, and passages 
in Exodus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy explicitly lay out laws which 
both define the offence and prescribe the punishments for it. These are 
complemented by a number of narrative passages that recount incidents 
which involve homicides. Broadly speaking, the Hebrew Bible divides 
homicides into those which are intentional and those which are 
involuntary. For the former the penalty is death, and the latter the 
penalty is effectively exile. Two other elements can further be found in 
Hebrew homicide legislation. The first is the figure of the go’el 
haddam, whose responsibility it may have been to carry out the 
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execution of the killer, though it may just have been the case that their 
role required them to bring the killer to trial. The second is the 
establishment of cities of refuge to which a killer could flee to in order 
to escape the go’el haddam and make their case for the killing to have 
been unintentional. If successful, they would be protected from the 
go’el haddam as long as they remained inside the city of refuge. 
The first account of a homicide in the Hebrew Bible is also one of the 
most famous homicides of all. At Gen. 4, Cain, the eldest son of the 
first man and woman, kills his younger brother, Abel, in a fit of 
jealousy after God gives more regard to Abel’s sacrifice than to Cain’s. 
As an insight into homicide legislation the passage has little to offer. It 
is a legendary account in which there is no formal legal context within 
which the offence can be addressed, though that it is a serious offence 
seems taken for granted. The punishment for Cain is exile, which is out 
of keeping with the homicide legislation that follows later in the 
Hebrew Bible in which death would be the appropriate punishment.266 
God even tries to ensure that Cain is not killed by cursing anyone who 
does kill him with a sevenfold vengeance. Another famous homicide 
occurs early in Exodus. Here, Moses kills an Egyptian that he sees 
beating a Hebrew.267 When Pharaoh hears of the murder he seeks to 
kill Moses as retribution for the crime, and Moses in turn flees Egypt 
                                               
266 Cain complains that God has driven him from the land and away from God’s 
face, which harkens to Gen. 3.24 in which Adam and Eve are driven from the 
garden. Rather than reflecting any actual legal practice, when taken with the 
earlier passage it seems as if being driven away by God is a punishment for sin. 
For parallels between the punishments of Adam and Eve and of Cain, see 
Westermann, (1984), 285-286, 303; Wenham (1987), 100, 117. 
267 Exod. 2.11-12. 
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for an effective exile in Midian.268 Much as with Cain and Abel, it is 
difficult to read much into this legendary account. Execution is here 
presented as the punishment, though by fleeing from Egypt and 
entering voluntary exile, it seems as if this constitutes a sufficient 
punishment for Moses as there is no sense that he is pursued. This 
voluntary exile is much more in keeping with the situation found in 
Athens than in the homicide legislation found in the Hebrew Bible.  
After these two legendary accounts, the evidence for homicide law 
becomes fuller, and Exod. 21-22 contains the first of three sets of 
homicide legislation found in the Pentateuch: 
21.12-14: Whoever strikes a person mortally shall be put to death. If it 
was not pre-meditated, but came about by an act of God, then I will 
appoint for you a place to which the killer may flee. But if someone 
wilfully attacks and kills another by treachery you shall take the killer 
from my altar for execution. 
21.20-21: When a slave-owner strikes a male or female slave with a 
rod and the slave dies immediately, the owner shall be punished. But if 
a slave survives for a day or two, there is no punishment, for the slave 
is the owner’s property. 
21.28-32: When an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall 
be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall 
not be liable. If the ox has been accustomed to gore in the past, and its 
owner has been warned but has not restrained it, and it kills a man or 
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woman, the ox shall be stoned and its owner shall also be put to death. 
If a ransom is imposed on the owner, then the owner shall pay whatever 
is imposed for the redemption of the victim’s life. If it gores a boy or 
girl, the owner shall be dealt with according to this same rule. If the ox 
gores a male or female slave, the owner shall pay to the slave-owner 
thirty shekels of silver, and the ox shall be stoned.  
22.2-3: If a thief is found breaking in, and is beaten to death, no blood-
guilt is incurred; but if it happens after sunrise, blood-guilt is incurred. 
 
These passages are contained in what is usually termed the Covenant 
Code, consisting of Exod. 20.22-23.33. It was identified by Wellhausen 
as the oldest of the law codes in the Hebrew Bible, and by Noth as an 
originally independent law code that was inserted into Exodus.269 The 
laws on homicide are spread out amongst the code, and some do not 
deal with homicide directly, but taken together they allow for a set of 
principles from which homicide cases can be judged. The first of the 
laws does deal directly with homicide, and just as found in Athens, this 
law draws a distinction between intentional homicide and involuntary 
homicide. If the killing is intentional, then the killer is to be put to 
death. If the killing was not intentional, then a place is appointed to 
which the killer can flee. The location of the appointed place is not 
specified, but the final part of the law suggests that the place is an altar. 
                                               
269 Wellhausen (1885) 29-30, 83-89; Noth (1962), 173. Unsurprisingly, this section 
has been subject to diverse theories as to its provenance and composition. For a 
summary of scholarship, see Van Seters (2003), 8-46. 
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If that is the case, then what happens after the involuntary killer reaches 
the altar is not discussed. The altar did not provide the intentional killer 
with any refuge, however, as the fate of Joab at 1 Kgs. 28-34 shows.  
The remaining laws which deal with one person killing another add 
some layers of granularity to homicide law. Justifiable homicide is 
found in the passage discussing the thief who breaks into another 
person’s home, and the allowance for lawfully killing a thief caught 
before sunrise has a parallel in an Athenian source in Dem. 24.113. 
Exactly why the killing is lawful if it occurs at night is not discussed, 
though presumably it is either because a person found in another’s 
home during the night could reasonably be presumed a thief, whilst 
during the day they could not, or because the home owner would have 
help he could call on during the day, but not at night, or perhaps both.270 
Regardless of the exact reason, this law lays down the same principle 
                                               
270 Barmash suggests that the reason is because the homeowner could not be 
sure whether the intruder intended to kill him if he entered the home at night, 
whereas during the day the homeowner could be sure the intruder was just a 
thief; Barmash (2005), 124. If this is true, then the killing is justifiable only if is 
self-defence, and never if it is in defence of property. A comparison with the 
Athenian evidence is helpful in this regard, as in Dem. 24.133, a thief caught 
during the day stealing more than fifty drachmas is liable to he handed over to 
the Eleven, whereas a thief caught during the night stealing any amount can be 
lawfully killed. There is no suggestion here that the killing at night is lawful 
because the person who catches the thief cannot be sure of the thief’s 
intentions. In fact, even if handed over to the Eleven, the daytime thief can still 
be liable to the death penalty. The difference between them is that the daytime 
thief needs to be handed over to a magistrate for punishment, whilst the night-
time thief can be dealt with on the spot. The defence of property is at stake in 
either case and the allowance for justifiable homicide likely reflects the 
practicalities of self-help against a person caught during the night. 
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as found in Athens, that in certain circumstances it is entirely lawful to 
kill another.271  
Negligent homicide is found in the law on the goring ox. The owner of 
the ox is not held liable for the killing unless the ox had been 
accustomed to gore in the past. If it had been, then the owner is culpable 
for not preventing it. Whilst execution is given as the sentence in this 
case, unlike homicide derived from striking another, a ransom payment 
is offered as an alternative penalty. As with the thief, whilst this law 
deals with one specific instance of negligible homicide, a general 
principle could presumably be drawn from it. The remaining passage 
deals with the killing of a slave by its owner who has struck the slave 
with a rod. Here a distinction is drawn based on whether the slave dies 
immediately. If the slave dies, the owner is punished. In this case it is 
presumably because an immediate death means the owner was too 
severe in his use of the rod. Unlike in the other instances of homicide 
legislation in the Covenant Code, the punishment here is not specified, 
and nor is it clear who would bring the prosecution on behalf of the 
deceased slave. The right to prosecute the killer of a murdered slave in 
Athens would fall to the slave’s owner, and both Antiphon and Plato 
                                               
271 No law exists which explicitly states killing unwittingly in battle is justifiable 
homicide, as found in Dem. 23.53, but it can be inferred from the death of Uriah 
the Hittite whose death is staged by David to appear as if it occurred naturally in 
battle; 2 Sam. 11.14-21. For a comparison of legislation on catching an adulterer 
or moichos in the act and killing them, see the case following case study.  
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suggest that if a slave was killed by their owner, there would be no-one 
to bring a prosecution on their behalf.272 
The second set of homicide legislation in the Pentateuch is found at 
Num. 35. This legislation follows a section in which the Israelites are 
informed as to how Canaan will be divided between them once they 
have conquered it. As part of this, six cities are to be designated as 
cities of refuge to which a person who kills without intent can flee.273 
As the killer can only legitimately claim refuge at one of these cities if 
the killing was unintentional, then Num. 35 seeks to define what is 
considered intentional and what is considered unintentional: 
35.16-18: But anyone who strikes another with an iron object, and 
death ensues, is a murderer; the murderer shall be put to death. Or 
anyone who strikes another with a stone in hand that could cause death, 
and death ensues, is a murderer; the murderer shall be put to death. 
35.20-21: Likewise, if someone pushes another from hatred, or hurls 
something at another, lying in wait, and death ensues, then the one who 
struck the blow shall be put to death; that person is a murderer; 
35.22-25: But if someone pushes another without enmity, or hurls any 
object without lying in wait, or while handling any stone that could 
cause death, unintentionally drops it on another and death ensues, 
though they were not enemies, and no harm was intended, then the 
                                               
272 Antiph. 6.4; Plato Grg. 483b. In the Laws, the only punishment laid down for 
the killing of one’s own slave is a purification ritual, which is echoed in Antiph. 
6.4 also; Plato Laws 868a. 
273 Num. 35.6-11. 
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congregation shall judge between the slayer and the avenger of blood, 
in accordance with these ordinances; and the congregation shall rescue 
the slayer from the avenger of blood. 
 
Most of the situations found in the first two passages are then paralleled 
in the third, so as to provide guidance over which circumstances should 
be considered intentional and which should not. Unlike with Exodus, 
there is no effort to distinguish and deal with other circumstances. 
These passages expand upon Exod. 21.12-14 in describing exactly 
what constitutes intentional and involuntary homicide, and to where the 
killer can flee to claim refuge. Num. 35 goes on to discuss two 
procedural aspects of homicide law. The first is that the killer is only 
to be convicted on the testimony of two or more witnesses as no-one 
can be put to death on the testimony of a single witness, and the second 
that the death penalty cannot be ransomed off by a payment, but the 
killer must be put to death.274 Whilst the first of these differs from 
Athenian practice due to the way the court system operated in Athens, 
the second does have a parallel in Athens. In Dem. 58.28-29, 
Theocrines is condemned for accepting a bribe from his brother’s 
killers so as not to bring a prosecution against them. 
The third collection of homicide legislation is found in Deut. 19: 
19.5: Suppose someone goes into the forest with another to cut wood, 
and when one of them swings the axe to cut down a tree, the head slips 
                                               
274 Num. 35.30-32. 
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from the handle and strikes the other person who then dies; the killer 
may flee to one of these cities and live.  
19.11-12: But if someone at enmity with another lies in wait and attacks 
and takes the life of that person, and flees into one of these cities, then 
the elders of the killer’s city shall send to have the culprit taken from 
there and handed over to the avenger of blood to be put to death.  
 
The context in which the laws are introduced is again a discussion on 
the establishment of cities of refuge. This legislation is not as detailed 
as in those Num. 35, but they cover the same territory in attempting to 
establish whether a killing should be considered as intentional or 
involuntary homicide. Deut. 19.5 is immediately preceded by an 
explanation that the cities of refuge are a place for the unintentional 
killer to flee. It is not clear whether 19.5 is an example of the person 
who kills another person unintentionally when there had been no 
enmity between them before, or whether it is a separate example of an 
accidental death as opposed to involuntary homicide.275 If 19.4 and 
19.5 are drawing a distinction between involuntary homicide and 
accidental death then in both cases the killer would have to go into 
exile, though even if they are not, it would seem that the key factor in 
determining whether a killing is involuntary homicide is simply that 
death occurs where it was not intended by the killer. Whether the killer 
was negligent or not does not matter.  
                                               
275 Lundbom (2013), 567. 
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Negligent homicide can be seen, however, at Deut. 22.8, in which the 
person who builds a new house is instructed to build a parapet around 
it lest someone fall from it, but outside of this and the example of the 
goring ox, the Hebrew homicide legislation is entirely focused upon 
the act of killing being one in which the killer is physically responsible 
for the death of the victim. Neither planning nor attempted homicide 
are covered by it. The more sophisticated understanding of the offence 
in Athens, in which prosecutions could be brought for these offences 
as in the case of Agoratus, is not found in the Hebrew Bible. 
In addition to the substantive element of homicide legislation, the 
Hebrew Bible discusses two main procedural aspects. One is the cities 
of refuge, which have been touched upon in the preceding section, and 
the other is the go’el haddam. The title of go’el haddam, meaning the 
redeemer, restorer, or avenger of blood, was given to the person 
responsible for punishing the killer. Following the list of killings which 
are to be regarded as murder, Num. 35.19 states that the go’el haddam 
has the responsibility of putting the killer to death and is the person 
who must execute the sentence when they meet the killer. Deut. 19.6 
makes mention of the go’el haddam in the context of being responsible 
for pursuing and killing the murderer. The exact identification of who 
is the go’el haddam is not given, and some scholars have argued that it 
is the title of a magistrate or an official.276 Where it used elsewhere in 
                                               
276 Sulzberger sees the go’el hadddam as an official magistrate introduced by the 
Deuteronomic reforms, Phillips argues that the position was filled by a 
representative of the elders from the killer’s city, who would travel to the killer’s 
place of refuge and carry out the sentence if found guilty; Sulzberger (1915), 55-
56; Phillips (1970), 103-104. 
98 
 
the Hebrew Bible, go’el on its own refers to a next of kin. It appears at 
Lev. 25.25, where the go’el is responsible for redeeming property sold 
by a kinsman who has fallen into financial difficulty, at Num. 3.8 where 
they are the next of kin of a wronged party to whom a restitution is 
made for a wrong committed against a person, and several times in 
Ruth it is used to refer to a next of kin with the obligation to marry a 
relative’s widow.277 In all cases the sense is of a familial obligation on 
the part of the go’el, and Lev. 25.48-49 suggests that the right would 
belong to the brother in the first instance and then progress from there 
to the uncle, then the uncle’s son, and ultimately to anyone who is 
related to them.  
For the go’el haddam in particular, at 2 Sam. 14.7-11 there is a strong 
hint that it is a kinsman. In this passage, David is approached by the 
mother of two sons who fought each other in a field, with the result that 
one delivered a killing blow to the other. The whole family 
subsequently demanded that the surviving son be handed over to them 
by the mother, so they could kill him for his crime. The incident did 
not actually occur, and the story was fabricated to persuade David to 
recall Absalom from banishment, but for the story to have any force it 
likely reflects actual practice.278 Go’el haddam is used by the mother 
                                               
277 Ruth 3.9-4.6. 
278In the course of this narrative, which takes place in 2 Sam. 23-29, no attempt is 
made to subject Absalom to a go’el haddam, the right of which may well have been 
David’s, as the father of the victim. As the murder was committed to avenge the 
rape of his sister, Absalom may have been carrying out a lawful killing. In Gen. 38, 
Judah is able to order the execution of Tamar for falling pregnant to another man 
whilst married to his son. This story is set in the patriarchal period, and Genesis 
betrays no concept of a developed legal system within which Judah could operate, 
so the comparison may not be apt. 
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in this passage in the context of the family’s desire to kill the son to 
avenge his brother’s death, and there is no sense of any officials or 
magistrates being involved. Given the usual use of go’el as a next of 
kin with an obligation to another family member, and the 2 Samuel 
passage, it seems very likely that in the case of a homicide, Hebrew law 
envisaged the go’el hadaam as the victim’s next of kin.279 This would 
make Hebrew homicide legislation identical to Classical Athenian 
homicide legislation in a fundamental procedural aspect. Just as in 
Athens, the next of kin was obliged to bring a prosecution, and whilst 
Hebrew legislation lacks the distinction between public and private 
cases found in Athenian law, the title of go’el haddam indicates that 
the reason for this was essentially the same. The offence was one 
against the victim, and in the absence of the ability of the victim to 
bring their own prosecution their next of kin stood in their place. 
Exactly how the obligation of go’el haddam devolved down the family 
line is unclear. In 2 Sam. 14, the entire family is presented as 
collectively seeking retribution, with no individual identified as having 
responsibility. There is evidence for the obligation of go’el falling on 
the nearest kin first. Although Boaz is Ruth’s go’el, a closer male 
relative exists who must first repudiate his right to buy Naomi’s field 
and marry Ruth before Boaz can exercise his own right as the next 
closest go’el. Prosecution speeches for homicide cases in Classical 
Athens tend to be from a close male relative to the deceased. Antiphon 
                                               
279 Levine (2000), 554; Lundbom (2013), 568. 
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1, 3, and 6 are given by a son, father, and brother respectively, whilst 
Lysias brings a prosecution for the killing of his own brother.280 It is 
likely to be the case that Hebrew homicide legislation envisaged the 
right of go’el haddam as belonging to the closest male relatives in the 
first instance, and devolving down the line in a similar way to that 
found in Ruth; though as Barmash has pointed out, given that the role 
may have involved pursuing and possibly executing the killer, then it 
may not always have been practical to follow a strict hierarchy of 
obligation, and so it could just have been the collective responsibility 
of the family group as suggested by 2 Sam. 14.281 
The distinction between intentional and involuntary homicide was to 
determine whether a killer was able to claim asylum. As noted, Exodus 
does not specify a place to which the killer may flee, though the 
implication there is that it was an altar; whilst Numbers, Deuteronomy, 
and Joshua all list cities in which a killer may flee if he wishes to claim 
the killing was involuntary.282 In Numbers and Joshua, there are six 
cities given, three in Canaan and three across the Jordan. Deuteronomy 
only mentions three, but God tells the Israelites that if he enlarges their 
territory then they are to add three more cities.283 It is difficult to know 
for certain whether these asylum cities ever existed, or whether they 
were a literary creation of the Hebrew Bible. Wellhausen argued for 
the primacy of the Covenant Code and its homicide laws over 
                                               
280 Lysias 12. 
281 Barmash (2005), 52. 
282 Num. 35.13-15; Deut.19.2-3; Josh. 20.1-6. 
283 Deut. 19.8-10. 
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Deuteronomy, and for sanctuary at an altar as the original place of 
asylum. As the centralising agenda of Deuteronomy left no place for 
local altars, these sites of asylum would have been lost; therefore, 
Deuteronomy recast the Covenant Code material to replace them with 
the cities of refuge, and in turn it was followed by Numbers.284  
The schema of a transition of asylum from altars to cities was 
subsequently accepted by many scholars, though some attempted to 
push the date back from Deuteronomy to the period of David and 
Solomon.285 The lack of a specific place of asylum given in Exodus, 
the impracticality of the altar as a permanent place of asylum, and 
evidence of both systems existing side-by-side in other parts of the 
ancient Near East, led some others to argue that altar asylum and the 
cities of refuge must have been independent from each other, and did 
not evolve from one into the other.286 Greenberg argued that the cities 
replicated the function of a punishment of exile, as actual exile was not 
possible and is never given as a punishment in the Hebrew Bible as it 
would involve being cut off from God.287 Most recently, Barmash 
challenged the schema by arguing against any dependence of Deut. 
19.1-13 on the Covenant Code, and against the association of the place 
specified by Exod. 21.13 with the altar in the next passage.288 Barmash 
                                               
284 Wellhausen (1885), 33, 150. 
285 de Vaux (1961), 162-163; Löhr (1930), 35; McKeating (1975), 64-66; Milgrom 
(1989), 506-507. 
286 Greenberg (1959), 126; Weinfeld (1995), 124. 
287 Greenberg also gives primacy to Numbers over D. in dating the cities to an 
early age of Israel; Greenberg (1959), 128, 131-132. Similarly, Van Seters argues 
for the primacy of D. over the Covenant Code; Van Seters (2003), 106-108. 
288 Barmash (2005), 71-93. 
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rejected the concept of any altar asylum for homicide, and 
consequently there could have been no development from altar to the 
cities of asylum as the place of refuge.289 The dependency of Deut 19.1-
13 on the Covenant Code and the location of the asylum at Exod. 21.13 
as the altar was then subsequently restated by Stackert in opposition to 
Barmash.290 
Although the historical existence of the cities of refuge may have been 
a concern, the question of whether the cities developed from altars or 
not is ultimately a literary question; one which depends upon the 
reading of the respective texts, and it does not help to establish whether 
the cities ever actually existed as places of refuge. In an attempt to 
locate support for the existence of cities of refuge, Weinfeld drew upon 
a survey of temple cities in the ancient Near East and Greece, and he 
argued that these sites presented ample historical parallels with the 
cities of refuge.291 These temple cities offered protection to the people 
who resided either in them or in the temples within them, though the 
specific rights varied from place to place, and it is only in the Hebrew 
Bible that asylum is given to the involuntary killer.292 Conversely, 
Westbrook and Wells saw the cities as a unique institution not found 
anywhere outside of the Hebrew Bible, and the problem of the 
                                               
289 Barmash (2005), 72-73. 
290 Stackert (2006), 23-49.  
291 Weinfeld (1995), 97-132. 
292 Weinfled (1995), 122. 
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involuntary killer is highlighted as one not paralleled in any ancient 
Near Eastern source.293  
The question of whether cities of refuge evolved from altar asylum is 
ultimately not one which bears too greatly on the historical existence 
of the cities, though if the concept was developed by D. as a 
consequence of centralising the cult, which resulted in the removal of 
all bar one of the altars, then this could mean they were just a literary 
creation of D. For the reasons cited by Greenberg and Weinfeld, there 
is no compelling reason to assume that city and altar refuge would not 
have existed side-by-side prior to any centralising agenda by D., and 
whilst the temple cities surveyed by Weinfeld do not provide an exact 
parallel, they at least establish the principle that a city could serve as a 
place of asylum. The number of cities may suggest a literary 
dependence between Numbers, Deuteronomy, and Joshua, more than 
the historical existence of six specific cities as places of asylum, but 
the principle of a city of refuge as a place of asylum for a killer, 
especially in response to the role of the go’el haddam, is not 
problematic, as go’el haddam and the laws relating to accidental killing 
presuppose a permanent place of residence that the killer could flee to 
and remain safe. If this was not an altar and living out an extended 
period of time at an altar would seem problematic, then a specified set 
of cities would have been an appropriate place of refuge. 
                                               
293 Westbrook and Wells (2009), 75. It should be noted that Westbrook and Wells 
are not engaging with Weinfeld’s argument, but simply state as fact that they are 
not found elsewhere. 
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In all of the homicide legislation in the Hebrew Bible, the assumption 
is that the identity of the killer is known, and that only the 
circumstances of the killing are at stake. No guidance is given on 
procedure in the instance of an accused killer claiming their innocence. 
The rare instance of lawful killing cited in Exod. 22.2-3 seems to 
require only that the killing took place at night and in the killer’s home, 
with the likelihood being that the presence of the intruder at night is 
itself sufficient evidence of guilt. It may be that a trial procedure could 
be required if the facts of a lawful killing, or the innocence of the 
accused were at stake, but the homicide legislation in the Hebrew Bible 
does not concern itself with these instances if that was the case. A trial 
procedure is laid out when the defence is that the killing was 
involuntary, though two slightly different versions are given. In Deut. 
19.12, an intentional killer who reaches a city of refuge is summoned 
by the elders of his city to be handed over to the go’el haddam. This 
passage assumes the killing was intentional, and that these elders have 
determined this. In Josh. 20.4-6, a killer who flees to the city of refuge 
makes his case to the elders of that city, who will take him in and 
protect him from the go’el haddam until a trial is held before the 
congregation to determine whether the killing was intentional.294 A trial 
before the congregation is also mentioned at Num. 35.12. If the defence 
                                               
294 The term ‘congregation’ has a broad application which can refer to the 
entirety of the Israelite nation, adult males, or tribal leaders. The latter would 
seem most appropriate here; Milgrom (1978), 70. 
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is accepted, then the killer remains in the city of refuge either until their 
death, or until the death of the high priest.295 
Unlike in an Athenian homicide case, in which a homicide prosecution 
could be brought without a single witness, Deut. 19.15 lays down the 
principle that a single witness is not sufficient to convict a person of 
any crime, but that two or three witnesses are required.296 Num. 35.30 
cites this procedural requirement specifically in the instance of 
homicide. Num. 35.31-32 builds on this by prohibiting the ransoming 
of a homicide conviction via a payment in lieu of sentence. This is at 
odds with the presentation of the go’el haddam as one who may catch 
and slay the killer with impunity, even the involuntary killer if they can 
catch him before he reaches a city of refuge. It raises the question as to 
whether a trial procedure would in fact have been necessary before the 
go’el haddam would be allowed to carry out the sentence. It may even 
be the case that the go’el haddam was primarily responsible for 
ensuring that the accused killer came to trial, much as in Athens, at 
which point the witness testimony would become relevant.  
One area which may have helped the elders or the congregation to 
determine whether the killing was intentional is the presence of any 
existing enmity between the parties. This is identified as a key 
distinguishing feature of intentional and involuntary homicide at Num. 
                                               
295 Num. 35.28; Josh. 20.6. 
296 Antiph. 1. It should be noted that the prosecutor here had a case lacking in 
evidence, and in the absence of witness testimony could well have failed to 
secure a conviction. What is clear, though, is that testimony from multiple 
witnesses could not have been a requirement, else the case would never have 
been brought at all. 
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35.21 and 35.22, and at Deut. 19.4 and 19.11. The method of killing is 
another way of distinguishing intentional and involuntary homicide in 
Num. 35.16-23, where striking a person with an object made of wood, 
stone, or iron, or whilst unarmed, and which results in the death of the 
victim of the strike, is considered as intentional homicide, whilst 
pushing the victim or dropping something on him is considered 
involuntary. One final procedural element is found in Deut. 21.1-9, 
which legislates for the instance in which a body is found but the killer 
is not known. The elders of the town nearest to where the body was 
found are to take a heifer that has never been worked to a wadi with 
running water, and there break the neck of the heifer whilst priests 
pronounce blessings and the elders wash their hands and proclaim that 
they did not shed blood nor were witness to it. This ritual has a clear 
comparison with the trial of the unknown killer at the Prytaneion. 
Whilst in the case of Deuteronomy, the ritual of the heifer was designed 
to purge the blood-guilt from a community who could otherwise not do 
so, in Athens it was bound up with homicides caused by animals and 
inanimate objects in cases in which the death of a person could not 
result in a regular defendant being placed on trial. Whilst there is no 
overt sense given that convicting an unknown killer in absentia was 
related to removing the polluting threat the killer’s presence could pose 
to the polis, given its otherwise useless purpose, it is likely that it served 
a similar function to the ritual of the heifer in an Athenian context. 
The comparison of the heifer ritual with cases heard at the Prytaneion 
serves as something of a microcosm for a broader comparison between 
107 
 
homicide legislation in Classical Athens and in the Hebrew Bible. 
Whilst these two procedures differed, their goals were ultimately the 
same, and in the main, differences in their homicide legislation also 
tended to be procedural rather than substantive. Both societies 
differentiated between intentional homicide, which was punishable by 
execution, involuntary homicide, which was punishable by exile, and 
lawful homicide, which was not an offence. Although exile was a 
punishment in each society, the way it was implemented differed due 
to the differing circumstances of each. In Athens, the killer was 
required to leave Attica to remove themselves completely from the 
community, whereas in the Hebrew Bible they were required to reside 
in a city of refuge so that they could remain in the land.  
This had implications for whether voluntary exile could be chosen by 
a person accused of homicide. The defendant in an Athenian homicide 
trial did have the option of voluntarily going into exile prior to the 
rendering of the verdict, but this was not an option in the Hebrew Bible. 
As exile removed the killer from the community in Athens but did not 
remove the killer from the midst of the people or the land in the Hebrew 
Bible, then allowing voluntary exile would have risked allowing an 
intentional homicide to remain within the community, even if confined 
to a city of refuge. An Athenian in exile could return if the victim’s 
family permitted it, whilst Numbers allows return from a city of refuge 
only on the death of the high priest, and Deuteronomy makes no 
allowance at all for a return.  
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The procedure for bringing a homicide case to trial was a lot more 
sophisticated in Athens, with a greater degree of granularity in type of 
homicide, and it would likely take a lot longer to come to trial. The 
substance of Athenian homicide law was also broader than that found 
in the Hebrew Bible, as the legislation in the latter always envisaged 
the killer physically carrying out the act, and it did not legislate for 
planning a homicide nor for attempted homicide. In both Classical 
Athens and the Hebrew Bible, the responsibility for prosecuting the 
homicide fell to the next of kin of the victim, and this devolved down 
the familial line. The state in Classical Athens had control over the 
punishment of homicide, with the next of kin’s role restricted to 
bringing the case to trial and prosecuting at the trial. The Athenians 
eschewed their usual practice of leaving the verdict in the hands of 
randomly selected dikastai, and utilised differing judicial panels 
depending on which of the five homicide courts heard the case, which 
was closer to the system of rendering verdicts through elders found in 
the Hebrew Bible, albeit the method for selecting the panels was not 
based on age.297 Self-help was allowed for in the Hebrew Bible with 
permission granted to the go’el haddam to execute the killer, even if it 
meant executing an involuntary homicide before they could reach a city 
of refuge. If the killer did dispute the killing was intentional, and they 
                                               
297 Gagarin has argued that the largely administrative role of the basileus in 
Classical Athenian homicide trials represents the culmination of a gradual 
diminishing of the power of the office in this respect.  In earlier periods, the 
basileus would have held the power to judge the trials, either alone or supported 
by a group of elders.  If this was the case then Archaic Athens would have had a 
judicial structure for judging homicide trials even closer to the Israelite model, 
although this view is largely speculative; Gagarin (2000), 569-579. 
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reached a city of refuge, then they were granted the right to a trial, and 
as both Numbers and Deuteronomy mandate that no-one should be 
executed for murder unless a conviction was secured on the basis of at 
least two witnesses, then it may be the case that the accused always had 
the right to a trial, with the role of the go’el haddam reduced to ensuring 
that the trial occurred, which would bring it much closer to the 
Athenian system, though it was perhaps the case that executing the 
sentence fell to the go’el haddam if a guilty verdict was rendered.  
 
Homicide Pollution in the Hebrew Bible 
 
The material on homicide pollution in the Hebrew Bible is not as full 
as that found in Classical Athens, and extrapolating an understanding 
of Hebrew pollution beliefs is complicated by the composite nature of 
the text, which means it is not always consistent in its presentation.298 
Whilst there are references spread throughout the Hebrew Bible to 
pollution, the Priestly material in Leviticus and Numbers provides the 
fullest example of a coherent pollution belief system. Deuteronomy 
also has material on pollution beliefs, which whilst it displays 
important differences from the Priestly material, discusses homicide 
pollution in a similar way. Common to all homicide pollution material 
in the Hebrew Bible is the polluting power of the victim’s blood. That 
this is common to many cultures has already been noted, and it is 
                                               
298 For example, skin diseases are presented as the result of sinful behaviour in 
some parts of the Hebrew Bible, whereas the Priestly source sees it as a physical 
impurity. See Num. 12 and 2 Kgs. 5.26-27 for examples of the former, and Lev. 
14-15 for the latter. 
110 
 
certainly found in Classical Athens, though blood plays an especially 
important role in Hebrew belief. Blood itself was not an inherently 
contaminating substance in the Hebrew Bible, and encountering it did 
not automatically make a person polluted.299 It was understood to 
contain the life of a living creature, and depending on the context in 
which it was encountered it had the ability to both be the ultimate 
purifying substance and a profoundly polluting substance. 300 As will 
be discussed below, the annual and ad hoc rituals of atonement for 
moral transgressions required the sprinkling of animal blood, making 
it a highly effective substance for cleansing impurity.301 Conversely, 
whilst Noah and his sons are given dominion over all the animals by 
God, they are prohibited from consuming the blood, as the blood 
contains the life, and from which God will require a reckoning.302  
Whilst the blood of an animal could not be consumed due to its life-
bearing property, it was not otherwise a polluting substance, and so 
could be safely spilled as long as it was not consumed. However, the 
life-bearing property of a person’s blood could be inherently polluting 
if it was spilled. The demarcation point between the blood of an animal 
as opposed to the blood of a person is presented at Gen. 9.5-6, wherein 
                                               
299 There is no indication that a person was considered polluting if they were 
bleeding or had come into contact with someone who was, nor were they barred 
from entering the sanctuary. Menstrual blood was considered polluting, but this 
is in line with the polluting force of genital discharges, rather than a quality of 
the blood itself. See Frymer-Kenski (1983), 401. 
300 Barmash (2005), 96. 
301 See also Exod. 24.6-8; Lev. 8, 14.5-25; Wenham, (1979), 88. 
302 Gen. 9.2-4. This prohibition on consuming animal blood because it contains 
the animal’s life is repeated in the Hebrew Bible several times subsequently. See 
Lev. 3.17, 17.14; Deut. 12.23. 
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God explains that humankind was made by God in his own image. 
Consequently, if any person spills the blood of another then their blood 
in turn must be spilled as a reckoning. Likewise, whilst an animal could 
be sacrificed, the sacrifice of a person was an act which polluted the 
land.303 Both the life-bearing and polluting properties of blood are seen 
in the account of the first homicide, wherein God becomes aware that 
Abel has been killed because he hears Abel’s blood crying out to him 
from the ground, and which in turn curses Cain to never again yield its 
strength to him.304 
As blood was understood to contain the life of a person, this had a 
profound effect on how the Hebrew Bible conceptualised homicide and 
its polluting effects. The word itself is used as a metaphor for the guilt 
brought upon a person, their descendants, or the people when a 
homicide is committed.305 In Deut. 22.8 it is even conceptualised as 
settling upon the house from which someone has fallen to their death 
because the owner did not put a parapet around the roof. It appears in 
the title of the go’el haddam, and its use in this context is a testament 
to the duel purifying and polluting nature of blood in the Hebrew Bible, 
as shedding the blood of the victim created a powerful impurity which 
could only be purified by shedding the blood of the killer.306  
                                               
303 Ps. 106.38. 
304 Gen. 4.10-12. 
305 It is often used in the plural, damim, in this context; see Deut. 19.10; 2 Sam. 
3.28-29; 1 Kgs. 2.32-33. A person who condemns themselves through their own 
actions is considered to have brought their own blood upon themselves; 1 Kgs. 
2.37; Ezek. 33.4.  
306 The root גאל , from which go’el is derived, has the meaning of ‘the rightful 
getting back of a person or object that had once belonged to one or one’s family 
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As has been discussed, the institution of the go’el haddam existed 
alongside the cities of refuge, with the latter existing as a means of 
preventing the former from killing the involuntary killer. In their 
respective discussions of the cities of refuge, Numbers and 
Deuteronomy diverge on how blood-guilt operates with the go’el 
haddam and the involuntary homicide, but whilst their conceptions are 
somewhat different, they both rest upon the purifying and polluting 
properties of blood. Deut. 19.1-9 mandates the introduction of the cities 
of refuge to prevent the go’el haddam from bringing blood-guilt upon 
the people by slaying the involuntary killer, whose offence presumably 
did not bring blood-guilt because it was not intentional.307 Num. 35.26-
27, however, states that no blood-guilt is incurred if the go’el haddam 
kills the involuntary killer outside the bounds of the city of refuge, 
presenting both intentional and accidental killings as acts which incur 
blood-guilt. Once safely in the city of refuge, Deuteronomy sets no 
period of time for how long the involuntary killer is to remain there in 
exile, but Num. 35.28 allows the involuntary killer to return home upon 
the death of the high priest.308 No explanation is given as to why, 
                                               
but has been lost.’; Daube (1947), 40. In this instance, it is the blood, haddam, 
which is being rightfully taken back. See also Barmash (2005), 98-99. 
307 Though it should be noted that if the go’el haddam caught and killed the 
involuntary killer before he reached a city of refuge, then there was no 
culpability placed upon him for doing so. There is no sense that he could be 
prosecuted himself, and blood-guilt caused by the slaying of the involuntary killer 
is envisaged as descending on the people as a whole. The responsibility of the 
people is to ensure that there are sufficient cities of refuge to allow any 
involuntary killer to reach one before they can be caught by the go’el haddam; 
Deut. 19.6-13. 
308 It is not clear whether Deuteronomy required the involuntary killer to live out 
the rest of their life in the city. The city of refuge allowed the involuntary killer 
protection from the anger of the go’el haddam, and it may be that the 
involuntary killer could leave the city once the go’el haddam’s anger had 
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though it is almost certainly expiatory, with the death of the high priest 
purging the guilt of the involuntary killer.309 Whereas the blood of the 
victim of the intentional killer can only be redeemed with the death of 
the killer, the death of the high priest redeems the blood shed by the 
involuntary killer, and, consequently, the presence of the involuntary 
killer ceases to be a cause of impurity. Whilst the two books differ 
somewhat, their understanding of how the institutions of go’el haddam 
and the cities of refuge operate is fundamentally informed by their 
understanding of the polluting effect of spilled blood. The danger that 
unredeemed blood poses can be found in the account of the procedure 
at Deut. 21.1-9 for dealing with a corpse slain by an unknown killer. 
As the killer is not known, then their blood cannot be shed to redeem 
the blood of the victim, leaving the community at great risk from its 
polluting effects.  
Whilst the life-containing properties of blood provide the symbol for 
the way in which homicide pollution was conceived of, the threat it 
posed to the purity of the people and the land, and the consequences 
for not adequately dealing with the killer, require that it be placed 
within the context of impurity and pollution beliefs in the Hebrew 
Bible. Ensuring the purity of the Israelites and the land is a particular 
focus of the Priestly source, especially in Leviticus, and to a lesser 
                                               
subsided and they no longer wished to execute the involuntary killer; see Driver 
(1902), 232.  
309 It is unlikely to be the case that the death of the high priest is a cause for 
amnesty, as these usually occur upon the accession of a ruler, rather than on 
their death. See Greenberg (1959), 127. 
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degree in Numbers also.310 Deuteronomy also demonstrates a concern 
for the purity of the people, though there is not as much material as 
there is in Leviticus and Numbers, and D.’s conception of its effects is 
slightly different to that found in the Priestly source. Although they 
contain less material on pollution than Leviticus, both Numbers and 
Deuteronomy have the more important passages for understanding 
homicide pollution in the Hebrew Bible. However, it is Leviticus which 
is the major source of Hebrew pollution beliefs, and the Priestly 
understanding of homicide pollution along with the risks the Israelites 
faced from an accumulation of polluting effects requires an 
understanding of how purity and impurity are conceived of in 
Leviticus.311  
Impurity in Leviticus could be acquired by eating unclean animals, 
through certain acts, whether voluntary or involuntary, and by coming 
into contact with a person who is themselves impure. Although 
impurity was conceived of by P.  as a polluting force which could be 
spread by physical contact, not all deeds which brought on impurity 
could be spread in this way. Those deeds that did not could pose an 
even greater threat to the Israelites as whole, with pollution from 
physical contact tending to have an effect only on an individual level.312 
At the heart of P.’s understanding of impurity is a pair of dichotomies 
found at Lev. 10.10. These are ‘holy’ and ‘common’, and ‘clean’ and 
                                               
310 Almost half of the occurrences in the Hebrew Bible of the words for ‘clean’ 
and ‘unclean’ appear in Leviticus; Nihan (2013), 311. 
311 See Frevel (2013), 370. 
312 Weinfeld (1972), 225. 
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‘unclean’.313 The threat that the unclean poses is primarily to the holy, 
such as the sanctuary or the priesthood, which is set apart and sacred 
and which must always be clean.314 The common, however, can either 
be clean or unclean, and can move between these two states, but whilst 
they are unclean they pose a threat to the sacred. Although some of the 
acts which can incur impurity, such as adultery and theft, are also 
secular offences and do have punishments mandated by Leviticus, it is 
in the context of the threat these acts pose to the sacred that they are 
presented.315 The Israelites themselves are conceived of as a sacred 
people set apart from the other nations, so any uncleanliness which they 
incur poses a threat to them if it is not dealt with.316  
Broadly speaking, the transgressions which incur impurity in Leviticus 
fall into two types. The first of these are transgressions which arise 
from either experiencing or coming into contact with things which are 
impure; such as skin disease, sexual intercourse, or menstruation. 
Coming into contact with these impurities can make a person unclean, 
and if the person then comes into contact with other objects whilst they 
are unclean then they can pollute these objects with their impurity, and 
from where it can then also be transmitted on to a third party rendering 
them unclean also.317 The purification procedures for these types of 
                                               
313 The Hebrew words used are qodesh and chol, and tame’ and tahor. The 
English translations of these are taken from the NRSV. 
314 For example, the high priest may never leave the sanctuary, nor can he ever 
come into contact with a corpse, even that of his mother or father; Lev. 21.11-
12. 
315 Lev. 18-20. 
316 Lev. 20.25-26. 
317 Lev. 11-15. 
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transgressions prescribe a specific period of time in which the person 
is unclean, and they can include a ritual which must be undertaken once 
this period of time is up.318 Impurity in this way carries no inherent 
threat as the person is not expected to come to harm, nor to experience 
misfortune simply because they are impure.319 Their impurity does 
become an issue, however, if they encounter the sacred, which will 
become infected with their pollution if they do. God warns that entering 
the sanctuary whilst impure will result in the death of the unclean 
person, and that eating a sacrificial offering whilst impure will result in 
the person being cut off.320 As long as the unclean person avoids the 
sacred for the required period of time, and performs the required 
purification rituals, then no harm will come to them and they can return 
to a state of cleanliness which will allow them to interact with the 
sacred once again. 
The second type of transgressions cover behaviour which is unclean, 
such as sexual intercourse with inappropriate subjects, stealing, child 
sacrifice, or practicing witchcraft.321 In contrast to the first type of 
transgression, which is contagious to others and provides only a 
                                               
318 The severity of the pollution affects both of these purification conditions. 
Touching a menstruating woman makes a person unclean until the evening, but 
the menstruating woman is unclean for seven days, and a woman who 
experiences a discharge of blood outside of regular menstruation is unclean until 
seven days after the discharge ends, and she must take two turtle-doves or 
pigeons to a priest for sacrifice before she is considered purified; Lev. 15.19-30. 
Frymer-Kenski separates these into ‘minor pollutions’, which expire in the 
evening, and ‘major pollutions’, which expire after at least seven days; Frymer-
Kenski (1983), 399, 402. 
319 Frymer-Kenski (1983), 403. 
320 Lev. 7.20-21, 15.31. Being cut off likely means the extermination of the family 
lineage; Feder (2013), 165. 
321 Lev. 18-20. 
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temporary state of uncleanliness, moral transgressions can have 
permanent effects which are also not directly contagious to other 
people. The impurity incurred by an adulterer or a person who has 
consumed blood, for example, cannot be passed on to another by 
physical contact.322 The difference between these types of impurity can 
be seen in the example of sexual intercourse, which is an act that can 
overlap across both categories. Licit sexual intercourse makes both the 
man and woman polluted until the evening and requires bathing to 
remove the impurity, whilst prohibited sexual intercourse results in 
both parties being permanently cut off from the people, but it does not 
incur any contagious pollution.323 Whilst these types of transgressions 
do not pose any threat of pollution to others on an individual basis, they 
do on the other hand pose a severe threat to everyone on a communal 
basis. Instead of infecting individuals, the pollution here accrues to the 
land, and the threat of this is so severe that it ultimately will result in 
the people being removed from the land. This was the fate of the 
nations who occupied the land prior to the Israelites, and the threat of 
the same fate extends to the Israelites who are warned that they are 
                                               
322 Frymer-Kenski (1983), 404. 
323 Lev. 15.18, 18.29. It is worth noting that even in this form of pollution, which 
is primarily aimed at deeds that would be considered immoral rather than to do 
with bodily emissions, the disgust response as a motivator of impurity belief can 
be found. Intercourse with a menstruating woman is found alongside the likes of 
incest and bestiality as morally transgressive behaviour. In this instance, it is not 
the inherent status of the partner which is transgressive, but rather an otherwise 
licit form of sexual intercourse becomes morally transgressive for the duration of 
a bodily emission. This goes even further than in the case of homicide, wherein a 
transgressive act can elicit a disgust response to blood. Here, an otherwise licit 
act becomes transgressive primarily due to a disgust response caused by an 
emission of blood.  
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under the same risk of being removed from the land if they defile it 
with these types of transgressions.324  
The unity of Priestly doctrine on pollution is called into question by the 
existence of these two different forms of impurity, which are derived 
from different types of acts and have different types of effects. As 
mentioned earlier, Mary Douglas sought to provide an overarching 
theory of pollution that would apply in all cases, and so collected all 
the forms of impurity in Leviticus under the rubric of boundary 
transgressions. Conversely, Jonathan Klawans argued that these two 
sets of impurities are distinct and entirely separate.325 The contagious, 
but temporary transgressions found in Lev. 11-15 are labelled as ‘ritual 
impurity’ as these can be purified by a ritual, and these are ascribed by 
Klawans to P.; whilst the long-lasting, non-contagious, sinful 
transgressions of Lev. 18-20, which Klawans argues cannot be ritually 
purified, are ascribed to the Holiness Code and are labelled as ‘moral 
impurity’.326 According to Klawans, these two separate pollution 
beliefs have been fused together and then placed side-by-side by the 
final redactor of Leviticus, and they do not form a coherent system. A 
different model again is argued for by Yitzhaq Feder, who sees 
infectious impurity as primary, and moral impurity, which is referred 
                                               
324 Lev. 18.24-28. The idea that Israel is a land which has become polluted by the 
moral transgressions of the Israelites is one which recurs several times in the 
books of the prophets. See Ezek. 36.17-19, where Israel is compared by God to a 
menstruating woman in their conduct towards him; Isa. 24.5, where the 
transgression of God’s laws has polluted the land; Hos. 5.3, 6.10; Jer. 2.7, 3.9. 
325 Klawans (2000), 22, 42. 
326 Klawans (2000), 23, 36. 
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to as ‘stain-of-transgression’ as being secondary and modelled after 
aspects of infection.327  
Regardless of the original provenance of these two forms of impurity 
as any of a single coherent system, two entirely separate systems, or 
one of the systems derived from the other system, they are unified into 
a Priestly doctrine of pollution by their ultimate effects. As noted, the 
fundamental aspect of pollution in Leviticus is the way in which it 
impacts on the sacred. Many of the acts which form the first type of 
impurity, the ‘ritual impurity’, such as bodily discharges, skin diseases, 
and sexual intercourse, are impurities which individuals will come into 
contact with over the course of their lives, and in many cases they are 
part of both the disgust and fear of death responses that underlines some 
pollution beliefs as discussed in the first part of this case study. One of 
the ways that a person who is unclean from a bodily discharge can pass 
their impure state on to another is by spitting on them.328 The person 
who is spat on must wash their clothes and bathe to become clean again. 
Pollution spread by spitting would seem a good example of the role of 
the disgust response, much more so than pollution derived from a 
liminal state or boundary transgression, and as bodily fluids and disease 
are encompassed, there is an incentive to avoid the impure person lest 
their state be passed on.  
Other examples of this first type of impurity do reflect more of a 
doctrine of liminal states, such as the woman who gives birth and is 
                                               
327 Feder (2013), 166. 
328 Lev. 15.8. 
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unclean for eight days if she gives birth to a male child, or two weeks 
if she gives birth to a female child.329 Disgust may play a part in the 
perception that childbirth is polluting, but the variable time period of 
impurity depending on gender demonstrates that it cannot be disgust 
alone which is causing the mother to be impure. Other than disgust and 
fear of death responses, what unifies these forms of impurity is that 
they are largely unavoidable, and they are not a secular offence. A 
woman cannot help but become unclean from menstruation or 
childbirth, a person does not choose to contract a skin disease, and 
whilst sexual intercourse is a choice from an individual standpoint, 
from a collective point of view the act is unavoidable and it does not 
carry any sense of being a prohibited behaviour. No blame attaches to 
the person who becomes impure in any of these ways as long they 
remain out of contact with the sacred for the duration of their impurity. 
The acts which comprise the ‘moral impurities’, such as witchcraft, 
adultery, and child sacrifice, are both avoidable and they are regarded 
as sinful. These are prohibited acts which are usually done from choice, 
and in this instance the more structuralist expression of pollution is at 
work. As these are acts which the society disapproves of, then, in 
addition to any secular sanction, they also incur pollution in line with 
the religious beliefs of the society. A permanent pollution which 
eventually results in the land vomiting out its inhabitants as a 
punishment is not suitable for the first type of impurity given these are 
                                               
329 Lev. 12.2-6. 
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unavoidable transgressions with no blame attached to them, but in the 
context of the religious outlook of the Hebrew Bible, and of the Priestly 
source in particular, which views the Israelites as a sacred people 
granted both the land and their status by God, then any sinful act 
tarnishes this status and affects their relationship with the land.330 
Equally, the type of disgust and fear of death-based pollution that 
attaches to the first type is not typically present here, so it does not 
incur the same type of contagious pollution.  
The unifying feature of these two forms of impurity, as demonstrated 
by Christophe Nihan, is their impact upon the sanctuary.331 With ritual 
impurity, the rules are designed to ensure that when a person becomes 
unclean they are kept away from the sanctuary until they are purified 
in order that they do not defile it.332 On the other hand, moral 
transgressions, whether intentional or inadvertent, automatically defile 
the sanctuary regardless of the distance the transgressor maintains from 
it, but this impurity can be mitigated by rituals to help prevent a 
permanent break occurring between the Israelites and the sacred.333 
Lev. 16 lays out an annual ritual of atonement to be performed by the 
high priest which was designed to purify the sanctuary, both from 
physical impurities that had not been properly purified, and from all 
moral transgressions, both of which have accumulated and served to 
                                               
330 “but you shall be for me a priestly kingdom and a holy nation.”; Exod. 19.6. 
331 Nihan (2013), 344-345. 
332 Nihan (2013), 350. 2 Chron. 23.19 records that guards were placed at the 
entrance to the temple to prevent anyone who was impure from entering.  
333 Speaking against Klawans’ assertion that they cannot be ritually purified. See 
also Nihan (2013), 344-349. 
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defile the sanctuary over the course of the previous year.334 The potent 
purificatory power of blood is to be found here, as it is the sprinkling 
of the blood of a bull and of a male goat in the inner sanctum, the tent 
of meeting, and on the horns of the altar during this ritual, which serves 
to purge the impurities of the Israelites that have accumulated onto the 
sacred over the course of the previous year.335 
The annual ritual of atonement was the only way to cleanse the 
sanctuary of an intentional moral transgression, but inadvertent ones 
could also be cleansed by a blood purification on an ad hoc basis.336 In 
these instances, the transgression did not necessarily pollute the whole 
sanctuary, but the status of the transgressor did impact on the extent to 
which it became defiled. An inadvertent transgression by the high 
priest required a bull to be sacrificed and its blood sprinkled before the 
curtain separating the sanctuary from the inner-sanctum, on the horns 
of the inner altar, with the remainder poured out at the outer altar.337 If 
an ordinary person transgresses unintentionally, then a female goat is 
to be sacrificed and its blood sprinkled on the outer altar, with the 
remainder poured out at the base of the outer altar.338 Based upon the 
ritual of atonement and these ad hoc rituals, Jacob Milgrom has 
demonstrated that there existed in Leviticus a three-stage, dynamic 
understanding of impurity and its polluting effect on the sanctuary, 
                                               
334 Nihan (2013), 345. 
335 Lev. 16.15-19. 
336 Lev. 4; Num. 6.9-12.  
337 Lev. 4.3-7. 
338 Lev. 4.27-30. 
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based upon the nature of the impurity and the transgressor.339 Whereas 
physical and inadvertent moral transgressions form the first two stages, 
the third and most severe is that of the intentional moral transgression, 
which serves to pollute the entire sanctuary all the way into the inner 
sanctum.340 This form of impurity can only be purged by the annual 
rite, and it must be done to prevent the sanctuary from becoming so 
polluted that the Israelites’ relationship with God reaches the point of 
no return, with the result that they are removed from the land.341 
The Priestly material on impurity extends into Numbers also.342 Here, 
as with Leviticus, becoming impure prevents a person from interacting 
with the sacred, so as to prevent the passing of their impurity onto it. 
Num. 1-4 contains rules for the organisation of the Israelites’ camp 
during the desert migration, in which a conceptual space is created 
within which the sanctuary is placed in the centre, the Israelites around 
it are ‘inside’ the camp, and at the periphery is ‘outside’ the camp.343 
The concept is an elastic one which can be applied in other contexts to 
make it relevant to the audience. For example, it can be applied to the 
sanctuary, the land, and the neighbouring lands.344 Incurring impurity 
can prevent a person from moving from the camp or the land to the 
sanctuary and can even cause them to be removed to outside the camp 
                                               
339 Milgrom (1983), 70-84. 
340 Milgrom (1983), 78-79. 
341 Milgrom (1983), 81-82. 
342 Frevel (2013), 407. 
343 Frevel (2013), 378-381. 
344 Frevel (2013), 378-381. 
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or the land for a period of time, such is the threat their impurity can 
pose to the centre. 
Although impurity caused by discharges or skin diseases is discussed 
in Numbers, particular focus is given to impurity caused by coming 
into contact with corpses, which is the most virulent form of pollution 
a person can acquire.345 So potent is the pollution it incurs, that a person 
coming into contact with a corpse is to be put outside of the camp, 
whilst a Nazirite can never intentionally come into contact with a 
corpse as they are set apart to God and thus have a sacred status, those 
who have come into contact with a corpse must wait until a later date 
to celebrate the Passover, touching a corpse makes a person unclean for 
seven days, including for those who have killed with the sword, and 
those who do not purify themselves after coming into contact with a 
corpse defile the sanctuary, even from afar.346 In this, Numbers 
presents an understanding of death as the ultimate form of impurity, 
and as such it is inimical to the life-giving power of the holy.347 As long 
as the person made impure through contact with a corpse is kept 
sufficiently away from the sacred for the specified period of time and 
then performs the requisite purification rituals, then they do not defile 
                                               
345 Skin diseases may be considered severely polluting precisely because they 
result in the person resembling a corpse. See Num. 12.12; Frymer-Kenski (1983), 
400. 
346 Num. 5.2-3, 6.6-12, 9.6-12, 19.11-13, 31.19. Although other forms of impurity 
are discussed in Numbers and also result in the polluted person being put 
outside of the camp, it is specifically contact with corpses which prevents 
attendance at the Passover at the appointed time. See also Frevel (2013), 396-
397. 
347 Frevel (2013), 395-396. See also Ezek. 9.7, 23.38-39. This is reminiscent of the 
argument of Meigs that the body contains the life force of the individual, and 
that pollution taboos derive from a fear of death; Meigs (1978), 304-318. 
125 
 
the sanctuary. This places corpse pollution amongst the first type of 
impurity in the Priestly doctrine.  
No inherent moral pollution is incurred simply for coming into contact 
with a corpse, though it suggests that even the lawful homicide incurs 
a virulent pollution from their unavoidable contact with a corpse, and 
indeed outright states this in the case of killing in battle. This is in 
marked contrast to the Priestly view on intentional and involuntary 
homicide. These offences fall squarely into the category of a moral 
impurity, and Num. 35.31-34 is explicit in its presentation of the grave 
risks the act poses to the land if the homicide is not dealt with by 
removing them from the land. The polluting threat of a homicide is here 
tied closely to the laws on homicide in Num. 6-30, in that an intentional 
homicide can only be expiated by shedding the blood of a killer, whilst 
an involuntary homicide can be expiated by the removal of the killer to 
a city of refuge, and the defilement this act brings can be wiped from 
the land by the expiatory death of the high priest. A strict ban is placed 
on the next of kin accepting a ransom payment in lieu of punishment at 
35.31-32, as taking a payment does not redeem the blood which has 
been shed. Instead, the defilement will remain in the land and risk the 
relationship of the Israelites to it.  
Deuteronomy has much less material on impurity and pollution than is 
found in the preceding two books, and the conception of pollution that 
D. presents also differs in some respects from that found in the Priestly 
source. Pollution in Deuteronomy is concerned with its effect on the 
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people rather than on the sanctuary or the land.348 In line with P., it does 
also share the idea that the previous inhabitants of the land were 
expelled because of their wicked deeds, and the Israelites are warned 
in it not to imitate those deeds, though here there is no threat that they 
will lose the land if they do.349 Whilst Deuteronomy shares with P. the 
idea of the Israelites as a holy people, this is not dependent on the 
behaviour of the people, but rather it is an automatic status granted to 
them by their covenant with God.350 That said, it is not the case that 
there is no threat to the status of the Israelites if they do not conduct 
themselves correctly, as Deut. 28.15-68 lays out in great detail all the 
misfortunes which will befall them if they do not obey God’s 
commandments and decrees, but there is no equivalence to the gradual 
accumulation of moral impurity that will, if not ritually atoned for, 
pollute both the sanctuary and land. This means that in Deuteronomy, 
the conception of impurity as a dynamic and threatening force, which 
ultimately risks severing the people both from God and from the land 
is not present.351 Homicide does, however, still pose a polluting risk to 
the community in Deuteronomy if it is not adequately dealt with. The 
                                               
348 Although the sanctuary and centralisation of the cult plays an important role 
in Deuteronomy, its outlook is more secular than that found in the Priestly 
material; Weinfeld (1972), 179-189.  
349 Rüterswörden, (2013), 417, 426-427; Weinfeld (1972), 225-226; Deut. 9.4-5, 
18.9-12. The idea that the previous inhabitants of the land were driven from it 
due to their wicked deeds is also found in the Deuteronomic history at 1 Kgs. 
14.24; 2 Kgs. 16.3, 21.2. An explicit link is made in 2 Kgs. 17.7-8 between the 
wicked deeds of the people of Samaria, a city located in the northern kingdom, 
and its destruction and the deportation of its inhabitants by the Assyrians, 
though this is presented as a retrospective cause and effect, rather than a 
doctrine of the effects of wicked deeds on the land. 
350 Deut. 22.18-19; Regev (2001), 252-253. 
351 Regev (2001), 243-261. 
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Israelites are here commanded to purge the guilt of innocent blood by 
putting the killer to death, so as to ensure that that things will go well 
for them.352 It is Deuteronomy which recognises that blood-guilt in the 
case of an unknown assailant could pose a great risk to the community, 
and provides the ritual of the heifer as the vehicle for removing it, and 
it is in Deuteronomy where blood-guilt can be envisaged as not only 
affecting people, but buildings also.353 
Whilst the Priestly outlook on impurity is not found in Deuteronomy, 
both do have important similarities with regards to homicide pollution. 
They each envisage the killing in terms of the blood of the victim, in 
keeping with the Hebrew Bible’s conception of blood as the life of a 
person, and the multiple examples throughout of the blood of the victim 
descending on the killer. They envisage that the blood-guilt brought 
about by the killing affects more than just the killer. For P. it is the 
sanctuary and the land, and for D. it is the people. Each require that the 
killer must be dealt with by either execution or exile to remove the 
blood-guilt, and there is a collective responsibility placed on the people 
to ensure that shed blood is redeemed, but the obligation falls onto the 
next of kin in the role of the go’el haddam, whether this meant bringing 
a prosecution or catching and executing the killer themselves.  
 
                                               
352 Deut. 19.13. 
353 Deut. 22.8; see also McKeating (1975), 64. 
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The Function of Homicide Pollution in Classical Athens and the 
Hebrew Bible 
 
This survey of homicide legislation and pollution in the Hebrew Bible 
allows for theories on the function of Classical Athenian homicide 
pollution to be tested against it. Whilst the sophisticated court system 
of Classical Athens is not found in the Hebrew Bible, nor was it lacking 
in formal legal institutions. Whilst there was no system of public 
prosecution, nor was there one in Athens. Much as the next of kin was 
required to bring a prosecution for homicide in Athens, so the next of 
kin in the form of the go’el haddam was required to do so in the Hebrew 
Bible. It may have been the case that a greater degree of self-help was 
granted to the go’el haddam than was found in Athens, but in principle 
the two systems worked in the same way. Much as someone accused 
of homicide in Athens was entitled to a trial, so they were in the Hebrew 
Bible. The laws on the cities of refuge allow for the elders in the city 
to render a judgement on the accused’s guilt.354 Deuteronomy lays out 
an entire judicial system, beginning with judges to be appointed in 
every town that are required to be impartial and to refuse bribes.355 If 
these judges cannot resolve a dispute, including ones involving 
homicide, then they are to refer the case to the Levitical priests to 
render a judgement instead.356 Further, in both Numbers and 
                                               
354 Deut. 19.12; Josh. 20.4-6. 
355 Deut. 16.18. 
356 Deut. 17.8-11. 
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Deuteronomy, a high evidentiary burden is placed on homicide trials in 
requiring there be multiple witnesses in order to secure a conviction.  
Nor does this argument on the function of homicide pollution make 
much sense in the wider context of pollution in the Hebrew Bible. A 
wide array of circumstances are envisaged as causing pollution, and in 
all cases these are linked to either the relationship of the Israelites to 
the land or with God. Homicide pollution is bound up with pollution 
caused by the likes of sexual offences and witchcraft. All of them 
pollute in the same way, and each requires the offender to be removed 
from the community due to the risk their pollution poses.  
That the severity of the pollution was tied to the severity with which 
the killing was regarded in both Classical Athens and the Hebrew Bible 
demonstrates that, contra Eck, pollution was capable of making the 
kind of fine distinctions required by their respective homicide 
legislation.357 There is no evidence in the Hebrew Bible that killing in 
warfare caused any pollution, aside that from contacting a corpse, 
which whilst it does not disprove Eck’s theory, it does show that it is 
not a requirement for homicide pollution beliefs to develop.  
An important area of common ground can be found between Classical 
Athens and the society of the Hebrew Bible, and it is one which helps 
to understand why these two societies envisaged a pollution accruing 
from homicide, whereas other neighbouring ones did not. These other 
                                               
357 Although the Hebrew Bible would not speak strongly against his assertion that 
guilt was a requirement for pollution given that modern scholarly understandings 
of guilt culture are largely based on Christianity.  
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societies could envisage the blood of the victim attaching itself to the 
killer in a similar manner to Athenian and Hebrew sources, but it was 
not envisaged as extending beyond this to threaten the community.358 
It is not that these other societies did not envisage any acts as capable 
of accruing pollution on the offender, but where it is found in the 
cuneiform sources it is with respect to sexual offences rather than for 
homicide.359 The Constitution of Telipinu states the Hittites allowed the 
head of the victim’s family to decide whether to accept a payment or 
to enforce the death penalty, whilst the Hittite laws prescribe a level of 
payment dependent on the circumstances of the killing.360 However, 
illicit sexual offences carried the death penalty, and if the king 
pardoned the offender then they could not in future approach the king 
as they would defile his royal person.361 In one instance, a sexual 
offence which carries no criminal penalty prevents the offender from 
ever approaching the king or becoming a priest.362 Nothing comparable 
is found in the Hittite homicide laws. This was an entirely private 
matter to be resolved between the killer and the victim’s family with 
no risk to anyone else. 
The Middle Assyrian Laws also allowed compensation to be accepted 
at the discretion of the head of the victim’s family, and although other 
Near Eastern sources reflect only the death penalty for homicide, 
                                               
358 Barmash (2005), 111-112.  
359 Westbrook (1988b), 82. 
360 Constitution of Telipinu 49; HL 1-5; Haase (2003), 644; Westbrook (1988b), 49-
50. 
361 HL 187-200a. 
362 HL 200a.  
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Westbrook has convincingly argued that the wronged party had the 
right to accept a ransom payment that was automatically assumed, and 
thus it was not required to be explicitly stated.363 It has already been 
noted that the trial scene on the Shield of Achilles regards a blood 
payment owed, and elsewhere in the Iliad, Ajax states that a man can 
accept a payment for his dead brother or son from the man who killed 
them, and if it is accepted then the killer can remain among the 
people.364 Unlike Classical Athenian and Hebrew sources, there is no 
concern from the community that the killer be removed from it, nor any 
sense that by allowing the killer to remain the community is placed at 
risk from their pollution. The concerns of the next of kin are paramount 
in these sources, not those of the community. 
In its ban on the practice of accepting a ransom payment from a killer, 
Num. 35.31-32 assumes that the principle of accepting payments must 
have been known, as there would have been no need to prohibit it 
otherwise. The practice is alluded to in the Hebrew Bible at 2 Sam. 
21.1-9, wherein God informs David that a famine in the land is the 
result of an unresolved blood-guilt brought on by Saul. Whilst he was 
king, Saul had attempted to wipe out the Gibeonites, a non-Israelite 
people whom the Israelites had sworn to spare. In their discussion with 
David over how to remove the blood-guilt, they reject a payment of 
                                               
363 MAL A 10. “It was accepted throughout the Ancient Near East that injury or 
killing gave rise to a right to revenge by the victim and/or his family on the 
perpetrator and/or his family. It was equally accepted that that same right could 
be commuted into a money payment, i.e. that revenge could be bought off with 
a ransom.”; Westbrook (1988b), 45. 
364 Hom. Il. 9.632-635. 
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gold or silver, and demand that seven of Saul’s sons be handed over to 
them to be impaled.365 If Westbrook is correct, and a right of payment 
in lieu of punishment was assumed in the cuneiform sources, then it 
would provide the context for the necessity of an explicitly-stated ban 
on the practice. 
The evidence from the Iliad demonstrates that ransom payments for 
homicide had once been a practice in Greece, and Classical Athens also 
explicitly placed a bar on its practice.366 Whilst it may not necessarily 
be the case that a doctrine of contagious and threatening homicide 
pollution automatically meant a bar on accepting ransom payments, the 
two elements are explicitly linked in Numbers. A ransom payment 
cannot be taken, the blood of the intentional killer must be shed and the 
accidental killer must remain in exile, as to fail to do so pollutes the 
land. Whilst the Classical Athenian sources do not explicitly link the 
two, it is not an unreasonable assumption that the fear of a contagious 
pollution harming the community was bound up in the bar on accepting 
ransom payments for homicide.367 More importantly, it speaks strongly 
against the argument of Parker that pollution was a feature of Homeric 
Greece, in which the system of ransom payments is conceived of as 
                                               
365 The blood-guilt here differs from that presented in Numbers and 
Deuteronomy in some important ways. It can be redeemed with the blood of the 
killer’s descendants, not just the killer himself. It is an example of misfortune 
pollution. A misfortune has occurred: the famine, and the blood-guilt is 
retroactively applied as the explanation. Also, it is unlikely to be the case that 
Saul carried out all of the killings himself, but rather would have been likely to 
have ordered them instead. 
366 Dem. 23.35. 
367 Even if the pollution is just the expression of the community or state’s desire 
to remove a killer, rather than the motivating force for it.  
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buying off the victim’s family’s private right of redress, and allowing 
the killer to remain in the community with no sense that the killer 
possesses any form of contagious pollution.368 In both cases, it seems 
that the introduction of a bar on ransom payments went hand-in-hand 
with the development of a doctrine of homicide pollution. 
Fundamental to a functionalist understanding of homicide pollution is 
that it must be the product of the society from which it originates. As 
Douglas herself argues, pollution is the expression of the violation of a 
system which it presupposes, and Parker also makes a similar 
argument.369 This means that wherever homicide pollution is found, it 
must be considered the expression of that society. If no homicide 
pollution beliefs are found in Homer, it must be accepted that it either 
was not there, or that we cannot know if it was there.370 When homicide 
pollution beliefs are found in fifth and fourth century Athens, it must 
be accepted that those beliefs both belong there and that they are the 
expression of that society. To understand Classical Athenian homicide 
pollution requires understanding it in its context. The varying degrees 
of pollution which could attach to a killer, whether a homicide or not, 
demonstrate a close correlation with the Classical Athenian laws on 
homicide, and cannot be understood without reference to them.  
                                               
368 Hom. Il. 9.632-635. 
369 Douglas (2002), 44; “the vehicle through which social disruption is expressed”; 
Parker (1983), 121. 
370 As noted, the evidence would suggest that it was not there. See also Harris, 
(2015). 
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As has been seen, there were public spaces where the presence of a 
homicide was seen to be detrimental to the community. They were 
barred from the agora, from attending public sacrifices, public 
meetings, and from entering sacred spaces. These sanctions are a 
product of the polis, itself the product of the Archaic period. The 
Homeric period does not have the same understanding of public space, 
and it did not see the presence of a homicide as a threat to public 
space.371 By expressing the negative effects in terms of the impact it 
could have on public spaces, the Classical Athenian conception of 
homicide pollution was expressing the concerns of the community over 
the presence of a killer in its midst. What had previously been seen in 
Greece as only a private wrong to the victim, became by the Archaic 
and Classical periods a concern of the entire community to remove a 
killer from its midst, and the development of homicide pollution as the 
expression of that concern cannot be seen apart from the development 
of the polis over the same time.   
This arrival of homicide pollution into the Athenian imagination was 
the result of the combination of this concern alongside the traditional 
legal right of the next of kin to prosecute. The Athenians did not go as 
far as to remove this right, and to make a homicide primarily a public 
offence instead of a private one, but they did restrict the right to accept 
a payment to settle the offence, and they did begin to express their 
anxiety over the continuing presence of a killer in the community by 
                                               
371 Harris (2015), 25-26. 
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assigning a polluting quality to the act which risked not the individuals 
the killer came into contact with, but the entire community if the killer 
entered the public spaces of the polis.  So great was this concern, that 
at some point during this period they did make homicide a public 
offence in the specific circumstance of an accused killer entering these 
spaces. A convicted killer had to be removed from the community, 
whether by execution or by exile, and so homicide pollution was also 
expressed in terms of placing at risk the people responsible for bringing 
a successful prosecution. Neither the pollution that placed the 
community at risk, nor the pollution that placed the next of kin and the 
dikastai at risk, was primary over the other. They were instead the 
collective expression of Athenian concerns, which played out 
alongside each other to ensure the polis was not placed at risk by the 
presence of a killer. Classical Athenian homicide pollution beliefs are 
the expression of Classical Athenian concerns. Their expression is so 
closely wrapped around the polis, and around Athenian homicide law, 
that they cannot be seen apart from them. 
There are differences in how homicide pollution beliefs were expressed 
in Classical Athens and in the Hebrew Bible. The enduring power of 
blood imagery with regard to killing is found in both, but it is much 
more prominent in the Hebrew Bible due to its understanding of blood 
as containing the life force of a person, and its consequent powerful 
purificatory, expiatory, and polluting effects. Conversely, the emphasis 
on the anger of the victim infecting those who fail to prosecute a killer 
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is not found in the Hebrew Bible.372 It is a product of the Classical 
Athenian court system, not of the broader theological concerns of the 
Hebrew sources. These differences, however, are differences in 
expression as opposed to a difference in function, and they are born 
from differences in Classical Athenian and Hebrew society. The 
function and purpose of homicide pollution in the Hebrew Bible 
remains the same as that found in Classical Athens. Homicide pollution 
here also expresses the concerns of the community over an offence that 
was traditionally a private wrong to the victim, to be settled by the 
victim’s family.  
The communal concern here is not the polis, but rather it is a 
theological one. Two separate sources, P. and D., express the concern 
slightly differently, whether through the medium of a covenant, a 
sanctuary, or the land, but the same concern exists in both. 
Consequently, the pollution here is not one that risks infecting 
communal spaces but is one that risks the community’s occupancy of 
the land and their status with God. Much as in Athens, homicide 
pollution in the Hebrew Bible is the expression of Hebrew concerns, 
and their expression is wrapped around the Hebrew homicide laws in 
their bar upon accepting payments, in the understanding of the role of 
the next of kin as the go’el haddam, the exile of the involuntary killer 
in a city of refuge, and its expiry at the death of the high priest. In both 
societies, homicide pollution served as the religious expression of the 
                                               
372 Though the blood of the victim can be an expression of the distress of the 
victim; see Gen. 4.10 and Job 16.18. 
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point where a traditionally private wrong intersected with the concerns 
of the community. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the evidence for a belief in homicide pollution found in a 
number of Classical Athenian sources, influential studies such as those 
of Douglas MacDowell and Robert Parker have led to a tendency 
amongst a number of Greek legal scholars to de-emphasise homicide 
pollution beliefs in Classical Athens. The purpose of this case study 
has been to re-examine the evidence for Classical Athenian homicide 
pollution in the context of a comparative study of homicide pollution 
in the Hebrew Bible in attempt to locate its function. As the Hebrew 
Bible is only the surviving Near Eastern source that betrays a concern 
over pollution caused by homicide, it provides an important test case 
for examining theories as to its role and function in Classical Athens. 
The study has demonstrated that in each society, homicide pollution 
was expressed in a way that corresponded closely to their laws on 
homicide. Blood imagery was an especially important element of 
Hebrew belief but was found in Athens also, and in both cases it was 
not simply a mechanical expression of their societal values. Neither 
society demonstrated any great emphasis on attributing actual 
misfortune to unresolved homicide pollution, yet it was still very 
clearly of great concern in the Hebrew Bible that homicide pollution be 
dealt with. Whilst the Hebrew judicial system was not as sophisticated 
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as the Athenian one, they did have a one which served the same 
function, and homicide pollution in the Hebrew Bible was not intended 
to replace a judicial system. Both societies also betrayed great concern 
over the polluting effects of a killer in the community, and it is here 
that a common function of homicide pollution across both societies can 
be found.  
What separated Classical Athens and the Hebrew Bible from 
neighbouring societies that had similar homicide laws without 
betraying any concern over homicide pollution, was that homicide in 
the ancient world was a private offence, but in Classical Athens and in 
the Hebrew Bible there existed a communal concern over removing a 
killer from the midst of the community. In Athens, this was a concern 
of the polis, and it was correspondingly expressed in terms of the public 
spaces of the polis, and the Athenian court system in which the offence 
was prosecuted. In the Hebrew Bible, this was a theological concern 
over the relationship of the Israelites to God and their continuing 
occupancy of the land, and it was correspondingly expressed in those 
terms. There were certainly differences in how homicide pollution was 
expressed in each society, but these simply reflected differences in 
those societies. The actual function of homicide pollution was the same 
in each, as it was the expression of the concerns of the community over 
an offence that was traditionally a private affair.  
 
 
139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Comparison of Near Eastern Adultery and Greek 
Moicheia 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In English and Welsh modern law, adultery is defined as the act of 
sexual intercourse between a married person and another person who 
is not their spouse; it is not a criminal offence, and nor does it 
discriminate on grounds of gender.373 There is no legal compunction 
for the injured party to act if they discover their spouse has committed 
adultery, and the only legal relevance of adultery is that it is one of the 
five facts for proving that a marriage has irretrievably broken down, 
and so it can allow for a divorce to be granted.374 If a divorce does occur 
as a consequence of adultery, it has no impact upon the financial 
                                               
373 Herring (2015), 139, 142- 143. 
374 Herring (2015), 142. 
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settlements between the couple, nor any decisions made over child 
custody.375 The third party is also considered to have committed 
adultery, but beyond being the grounds for a divorce, there are no other 
legal ramifications for them. 
Broadly speaking, adultery was the same offence in the ancient Near 
East, in that it covered acts of extra-marital sexual intercourse, but it 
differed in the details on almost every point. Despite the variety of 
civilisations and the broad amount of time covered by the period, it is 
possible to speak of a common approach to adultery law in the ancient 
Near East, given the remarkable lack of variability in both the 
definition of the offence and in how it was punished. Near Eastern 
adultery legislation did discriminate on grounds of gender as it was 
only concerned with whether the woman was married, not the man. A 
husband could have sexual intercourse with a women other than his 
wife without committing adultery, as long as the woman herself was 
not married.376 Adultery was a serious offence, which left both parties 
liable to punishments up to and including a capital sentence, and if the 
husband chose to divorce his wife, she could be subject to a financial 
penalty in the divorce settlement. 
By contrast, the Greeks demonstrated no separate and distinct 
conception of adultery as a specific individual offence, and instead 
presented it as just one example of a broader offence, that of moicheia, 
                                               
375 Herring (2015), 27.  
376 Which is not to say it could never be an offence for the husband, especially 
with regards to intercourse that impacted upon a daughter’s ability to marry, but 
this was not adultery. 
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or ‘seduction’. This offence covered sexual intercourse between a man 
and woman who was under the control of a kurios, assuming the man 
was not her husband. Whilst this did cover adultery, as her husband 
was her kurios if she was married, it was not restricted to this, and if 
she was unmarried it could cover parental and sibling relationships 
also. The extent to which this is an accurate reading of Greek laws has 
been disputed in modern scholarship, with David Cohen in particular 
arguing that this reading of moicheia misunderstands the offence, and 
that it was in fact no more than just adultery. However, there are several 
uses of the term in Greek sources which clearly demonstrate the 
contrary.  
There further existed another important distinction between the Greeks 
and their neighbours with regards to adultery, which comes to light 
when their laws on moicheia are compared with Near Eastern adultery 
law. This distinction is found in their approach to punishment. Adultery 
in the Near East was an offence by the adulterous couple against the 
husband, and whilst capital punishment was an option, a significant 
amount of discretion was usually given to the husband in choosing 
exactly what the punishment would be. The one restriction he was 
placed under was that whatever punishment he chose for the lover had 
to be meted out in equal measure to the wife. The husband could not 
choose to kill the lover and pardon the wife. In Classical Greece, there 
is no reliable evidence that this was the case, and strong evidence to the 
contrary. The Athenian lawcourt speech, Against Eratosthenes, 
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demonstrates that at least in Athens, a husband could go as far as to kill 
his wife’s lover whilst subjecting his wife to no punishment at all.  
The first part of this case study will survey the Near Eastern evidence 
for adultery law, which demonstrates a consistent and cohesive 
approach to the offence across the region, with minor regional 
variations noted. The second part of the case study will examine the 
Greek evidence for moicheia, both in terms of the nature of the offence 
and the punishment for it. The case study concludes with a comparison 
of the two, from which an argument is made that the difference in 
conception between moicheia in Greece and adultery in the Near East 
is what led to the Greeks having a distinct approach to punishing the 
woman. 
 
Adultery Legislation in the Near East 
 
The evidence which comprises the adultery legislation surveyed in this 
section comes from across the Near East and is distributed over a long 
period of time. Caution should certainly be exercised when using such 
a broad diachronic and synchronic survey for a comparative study. 
There is a danger of smoothing over differences and homogenising 
evidence from a variety of cultures in the process of using them for a 
comparative study with the Greeks. This is especially true given the 
tendency noted in the introduction for modern scholarship to treat these 
civilisations under the umbrella of the ‘Near East’ and approach them 
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as a distinct identifiable unit, both in and of themselves and as opposed 
to the Greeks.  
Whilst the following case study does draw from a wide variety of Near 
Eastern civilisations, the core of the evidence is from Mesopotamia, 
with legislation found in multiple law codes that span several centuries 
and range across the region, along with evidence of the day-to-day 
regulation of adultery law spanning the earliest and latest periods 
covered by this survey in form of records of Sumerian adultery cases 
and Old Babylonian documents detailing ordeals found in Mari at one 
end, and Neo-Babylonian divorce documents at the other.  
Many of the arguments made in this case study could be made with 
specific reference to the Mesopotamian evidence, and it may be the 
case that a more focused study based upon them or upon evidence from 
elsewhere in the Near East could yield results that are more nuanced 
and in-depth, and which may possibly highlight greater regional 
variation. However, whilst the evidence from outside of Mesopotamia 
is not as full and performs something of a complimentary role, its 
inclusion in this survey is important to demonstrate the extent to which 
a uniformity in approach to adultery legislation can be found in the 
Near East. Without it, important similarities cannot be highlighted, and 
the conclusions drawn in this comparative study cannot be as firmly 
made. Despite the chronological, cultural, and geographical distance 
covered in this survey, the civilisations of the Near East do demonstrate 
a remarkable consistency in approach to adultery legislation, and a 
survey which is restricted to just one area of the Near East would 
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disregard important comparative evidence. At the same time, this study 
does not attempt to examine every piece of surviving evidence for 
adultery legislation in the Near East as to do so risks making the study 
too superficial and lacking in depth. Instead, sufficient evidence is 
surveyed to build a consistent and coherent picture of adultery 
legislation in the region. 
 
The Definition of Adultery 
 
For an act to be considered as adultery, it needed to have three features. 
Firstly, it must involve sexual intercourse, secondly, the woman must 
be married, and thirdly, it must involve a man other than her husband. 
The marital status of the man is not important, and none of the laws 
envisage intercourse between a married man and someone other than 
his wife as adultery, other than where the woman is herself married. 
Nor do any of the laws on adultery ever consider sexual intercourse 
between two people of the same gender. 
The Law Code of Eshnunna demonstrates the importance of the marital 
status of the woman. 
Law Code of Eshnunna 27-28 
If a man marries the daughter of another man without the consent of 
her father and mother, and moreover does not conclude the nuptial feast 
and the contract for(?) her father, and mother, should she reside in his 
house for even one full year, she is not a wife. 
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If he concludes the contract and the nuptial feast for(?) her father and 
mother and he marries her, she is indeed a wife; the day she is seized 
in the lap of another man, she shall die, she will not live. 
 
This is not an adultery law per se, but rather one which is concerned 
with defining whether a woman co-habiting with a man is considered 
to be married to him. Without the permission of her parents, a contract 
with them, and a marriage feast, then the woman is not considered to 
be married no matter how long the couple live together. If these 
elements are subsequently satisfied, then they are then considered to be 
married, and the woman is now a wife. The importance of this for the 
definition of adultery is it means that if she is found in the lap of another 
man, she is liable to be punished as an adulteress.377 If she had not 
fulfilled the marriage conditions, then she would not be liable to a 
capital charge as she is not a wife, meaning an unmarried woman in the 
                                               
377 Yaron points out that there is no distinction in the Akkadian of the period of 
LE between masculine and feminine in the third person singular. There is no 
question that ‘she’ is meant with regards to being seized in the lap of another 
man, but after that it is possible that the translation should be ‘he shall die, he 
will not live’, as changes in gender do occur elsewhere in LE. Consequently, she 
argues that the punishment here is for the man, with the woman to be turned 
over to her husband for punishment; Yaron (1969), 189-190. Against this, Roth 
argues that as the passage is concerned with defining the woman’s status as a 
wife, then it is her life which is at stake should she be found in the lap of another 
man. By being legally married, she can be punished as an adulteress; Roth 
(1988), 205-206. Of course, the opposite assertion could also be made. As the 
woman is legally a wife, then the man is liable for the death penalty as an 
adulterer if she is found in her lap. Either way, what is important here is that for 
either party, no matter which is intended, the key fact that leaves them liable to 
punishment for adultery is that the woman is legally a wife. 
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Eshnunna law code cannot commit adultery, even if she is co-
habiting.378 
As just being caught in the act left open possible defences of rape for 
the wife, and lack of knowledge that the woman was married for her 
lover, then the liability of each party could change depending on the 
circumstances in which the intercourse took place. If the circumstances 
meant the man could reasonably not be considered to know the woman 
was married, then he is absolved of any blame.379 The Law Code of Ur-
Nammu absolves the man if the woman has approached him. 
Presumably, she is away from her home, and as he is pursued rather 
                                               
378 A similar law is found at LH 128, which states that if a man marries a woman, 
but does not draw up a marriage contract for her, then the woman is not a wife. 
There is no mention of what will happen to the woman if she found with another 
man, but presumably it will be as in LE 27-28, and she will not be liable as an 
adulteress. See Petschow (1990), 59-60. 
379 In Sumerian wisdom literature, if the young man has knowledge of the wife’s 
marital status, he is warned to not sit with her or laugh with her to prevent even 
the rumour of adultery from arising; Alster (2005), 63; Instr. Šur. 33–34. Three 
very similar stories in the Hebrew Bible suggest that in Judah and Israel, 
ignorance of the marital status of the woman may not be sufficient to absolve 
the adulterer of liability. In Gen. 20.2-9, Abimelech takes Sarah from Abraham in 
the mistaken belief that she is not Abraham’s wife, but his sister. Abimelech is 
saved from punishment only because God appeared to him in a dream and 
warned him of Sarah’s marital status, and even then, it is only because he has 
not yet touched Sarah, and so has not actually committed adultery. Had he done 
so he would have been liable to punishment regardless of his ignorance. A very 
similar story is recounted in Gen. 12.10-16, in which Pharaoh takes Sarah, also in 
the mistaken belief she is Abraham’s sister and not his wife. This causes God to 
inflict great plagues upon Pharaoh and his house, even though he was not aware 
that Sarah was married. Finally, Isaac passes his wife, Rebekah, off as his sister to 
people of Gerar. When the king discovers that Isaac and Rebekah are married, he 
rebukes Isaac for placing the people of Gerar at risk if one of them had touched 
her because they thought she was not married. In the first two cases, the 
potential or actual punishment is to be inflicted by God, it is not clear where the 
punishment would come from the Isaac story, but that it would be divine also is 
likely. As these are variations on a single story placed in the patriarchal period, 
caution should be exercised in reading too much into them. It may be that they 
represent a theological outlook rather than are reflective of any actual legal 
practice.  
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than pursuing, the man could reasonably claim he did not know the 
woman was married.380 
Law Code of Ur-Nammu 7 
If the wife of a young man, on her own initiative, approaches a man 
and initiates sexual relations with him, they shall kill that woman; that 
male shall be released. 
 
The same principle is found in the Middle Assyrian Laws: 
Middle Assyrian Laws A 13, 14 
If the wife of a man should go out of her house, and go to another man 
where he resides, and should he fornicate with her knowing that she is 
the wife of a man, they shall kill the man and the wife. 
If a man should fornicate with another man’s wife either in an inn or in 
the main thoroughfare, knowing that she is the wife of a man, they shall 
treat the fornicator as the man declares he wishes his wife to be treated. 
If he should fornicate with her without knowing that she is the wife of 
a man, the fornicator is clear; the man shall prove the charges against 
his wife and she shall treat her as he wishes 
 
Here, the act taking place away from the woman’s home is not an 
automatic defence for the man, and he is liable for punishment even if 
                                               
380 Concern that married women will chase after men is found in several ancient 
Near Eastern sources. See Reiner (1975), 95-96; Gen. 39.7-12; Prov. 7. 
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the act takes place at his home, an inn, or in public, as long as he knows 
the woman is married. The laws do not assume that simply because the 
act takes place away from the woman’s home that the man could 
reasonably claim not to know she was married, albeit they do not define 
how he would be expected to know. However, if he does not know, 
then here too he is absolved of any liability. 
The Hittite Laws also seek to determine where liability lies based upon 
the location of the act: 
Hittite Laws 197 
If a man seizes a woman in the mountains (and rapes her), it is the 
man’s offense, but if he seizes her in her house, it is the woman’s 
offense: the woman shall die. If the woman’s husband discovers them 
in the act, he may kill them without committing a crime. 
 
Here, if the act takes place in the mountains, it is considered rape, and 
the liability lies with the man. However, if the act takes place in the 
woman’s house, then the offence is hers, and both can be held liable. 
The man’s knowledge of the woman’s marital status is not important, 
only where the act took place. This law does not consider any other 
locations in which the act could take place, and no explanation is given 
as to why the offence is the man’s if it takes place in the mountains, 
and the woman’s if it takes place in her home, but a similar law in 
Deuteronomy draws a similar distinction, and does give an explanation 
as to why. 
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Deut. 22.23-27 
If there is a young woman, a virgin already engaged to be married, and 
a man meets her in town and lies with her, you shall bring both of them 
to the gate of that town and stone them to death, the young woman 
because she did not cry for help in the town and the man because he 
violated his neighbour’s wife. So you shall purge the evil from your 
midst. 
But if the man meets the engaged woman in the open country, and the 
man seizes her and lies with her, then only the man who lay with her 
shall die. You shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman 
has not committed an offence punishable by death, because this case is 
like that of someone who attacks and murders a neighbour. Since he 
found her in the open country, the engaged woman may have cried for 
help, but there was no-one to rescue her.  
 
The distinction here is between a rural and urban location, and it is 
likely that a similar principle could be extrapolated from ‘mountains’ 
and ‘home’ in HL 197. The reason the woman is not held liable if the 
act takes place in a rural setting is because if she cried out for help then 
no-one would be able to hear her. Conversely, there would be many 
people in the town who could hear her, and if no-one did, then she must 
not have cried out, and thus the act must have been consensual. In a 
rural area, intercourse between a wife and a man other than her husband 
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is automatically considered to be rape, whilst in a town, and in the 
absence of evidence showing otherwise, then it is adultery. There is a 
regional variation to be noted here, as the woman in question is not 
actually married, but rather is engaged to be married. It is unlikely to 
be the case that this principle would not extend to a married woman 
also, but a clear distinction would seem to exist between Deuteronomy 
and the Law Code of Eshnunna, where there is only a provision to 
punish the woman if she is formally married with permission of her 
parents. LE does not seem to consider a transitory ‘betrothed’ state in 
which a woman could be punished in a similar manner as to a wife 
before she is married. There, she is either married or she is not.381 
 
Punishments for Adultery 
 
Without exception, all Near Eastern societies, where evidence for the 
punishment of adultery survives, regarded the act as a capital offence 
for both the adulterer and the wife. Legislation to this effect has already 
been seen in a Babylonian and an Assyrian context with LE 28 and 
MAL A 13 and 14, and it is found again in the Law Code of 
Hammurabi: 
                                               
381 Roman law also considered the problem of whether a betrothed woman can 
commit adultery. A rescript of Severus and Caracalla extended the law on 
adultery to betrothed women, and from that, Ulpian argued that a girl who lived 
with a man as his wife, but who was below the age of twelve, and thus below the 
age of consent to marriage by Roman convention, and who has intercourse with 
another man, is to be considered betrothed and thus liable for adultery; D. 
48.5.14.3, D. 48.5.14.8. 
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Law Code of Hammurabi 129 
If a man’s wife should be seized lying with another male, they shall 
bind them and throw them into the water; if the wife’s master allows 
his wife to live, then the king shall allow his subject (the other male) to 
live.382 
 
Evidence that this remained the case for a significant period of time is 
found in the form of marriage contracts from the Neo-Babylonian 
period, such as the one cited below, which enshrine the right of a 
husband to kill an adulterous wife:383 
                                               
382 LH 153 also touches on the death penalty for an adulterous wife, although in 
this context the wife has had her husband killed because of her affair, making her 
both liable for homicide and adultery. Whilst there is no specific legislation for 
homicide in LH, it is likely that the wife here is doubly liable for a capital sentence 
as both a murderer and an adulteress. The method of execution here is 
impalement, which differs from the method in LH 129, and is attested once as 
the punishment for adultery in a text from Ur, in which both of the adulterous 
couple were impaled by order of the king; UET 5 203. The circumstances which 
could give rise to a widow facing this kind of charge may be suggested by a 
Sumerian homicide trial from the nineteenth century, in which a widow was a co-
defendant in the trial despite not actually having taken part in the killing; see 
Kramer (1956), 58-58; Jacobsen (1970), 193-214. The charge against her was that 
the three men who carried out the killing told her that they had done it and she 
did nothing about it. The widow is accused by nine members of the assembly 
acting as the prosecution of effectively having killed her husband, and according 
to Roth’s reading of the text, they insinuate that due to her silence she may have 
been in a sexual relationship with the men, and consequently may even have 
instigated the killing; Roth (1998), 179-180. Westbrook offers an alternate 
reading in which the prosecution is arguing that the widow did in fact manipulate 
the men into killing her husband, explaining both why the men told her they had 
killed him, and why she did not tell anyone about it; Westbrook (2010), 195-199. 
Whilst this would mean that adultery would not have been considered by the 
prosecution as a motive for the wife to instigate killing, the trial at least 
demonstrates how a widow might find herself prosecuted for her husband’s 
killing. Collections of Babylonian omens derived from reading sheep livers also 
betray an anxiety that an unfaithful wife will have her lover murder her husband; 
Koch-Westenholz (2000), 105-106. 
383 Roth (1988), 187-188. 
152 
 
BM 65149, lines 1-11 – Neo-Babylonian Marriage Contract 
Guizanu voluntarily spoke to Bel-uballit and to Gudadaditu, his 
mother, as follows: “Please give me Kassa, your daughter (and sister), 
the lass, in marriage. Let her be my wife." Bel-uballit and Gudadaditu, 
his mother, agreed to his (proposal), and they gave Kassa, their 
daughter (and sister), the lass, to him in marriage. Should Kassa be 
found with another man, she will die by the iron dagger.384 
 
Moving outside of Mesopotamia, HL 197 has already been seen in the 
context of establishing the liability of the wife, but it also demonstrates 
that adultery was a capital offence in Hittite law. The situation in Israel 
and Judah will be examined in greater detail below, but for now it is 
sufficient to mention that both Leviticus and Deuteronomy contain 
legislation which mandates the death penalty for adultery.385  
                                               
384 The inclusion of the clause on adultery is somewhat unusual. It is present in 
ten of the extant contracts and implies that the husband does not have the right 
to inflict capital punishment on an adulterous wife in the contracts in which it is 
not present. No other cuneiform source outside of the Neo-Babylonian marriage 
contracts reflects anything other than the automatic legal right of the husband to 
kill an adulterous wife, and it would be unusual if the right did not exist 
independent of the clause. Roth has suggested that the reason for its inclusion is 
less to do with the legal rights of the husband, as it is to confirm the status of the 
woman as a wife; Roth (1988), 205-206. Westbrook that it widens the 
circumstances in which the wife is liable to the death penalty from specifically 
caught in the act, to caught with another in a compromising circumstance, 
though not necessarily in the act; Westbrook (1990), 562-563; and followed by 
Lafont, S. (1999), 68. Neither scholar questions that the Neo-Babylonian husband 
would have had the inherent legal right to inflict capital punishment on an 
adulterous wife regardless of whether the clause was present in the contract or 
not.  
385 Lev. 18.20; 20.10; Deut. 22.22. 
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No legislation on adultery survives from Egypt, but legal documents 
and narrative texts do make mention of it. Adultery is one of a long list 
of charges made against a priest and a foreman respectively in a pair of 
New Kingdom period papyri, though unfortunately no punishment is 
listed.386 However, adultery is discussed in a variety of literary sources 
from across a wide span of Egyptian history, and these do provide some 
insight into the punishment awaiting the adulterous man. In The 
Instruction of Ptahhotep, a collection of maxims which touch on virtue 
and human relations and which dates to either the Old or Middle 
Kingdom period, the reader is warned that if he wishes friendship to 
endure in the houses he enters, then he must beware the women in the 
house, for death is the penalty for having known them.387 That adultery 
remained a capital offence throughout Egyptian history is suggested by 
another collection of wisdom literature, the Instructions of 
‘Onchsheshonqy, a Demotic text which may be as late as the Ptolemaic 
period, though is likely a few centuries earlier.388 Here, the reader is 
                                               
386 P. Turin 1887; P Salt 124. See Eyre (1984), 93-94; Kitchen (1982), 410-411; 
Theodorides (1981), 18; Vittman (1996), 45-46.  
387 Instruction of Ptahhotep 18. The text itself attributes its authorship to a vizier 
named Ptahhotep who lived under the reign of King Isesi of the Fifth Dynasty of 
the Old Kingdom. However, the language the text survives in dates to the Middle 
Kingdom suggesting it may be a later pseudepigraphic composition, either from 
the Sixth Dynasty, which was the final dynasty of the Old Kingdom, or the Middle 
Kingdom. See Fontaine (1981), 156; Lichtheim (1973), 6-7; Simpson (2003), 129-
130. 
388 The manuscript likely dates to the first century, though a fragment may 
appear on a manuscript dating to the second century, setting a latest date as the 
Ptolemaic period, however the composition was most likely earlier. Glanville, 
who prepared the English translation, favours a date of either the fourth or fifth 
century; Glanville (1955). See also Smith (1958), 121-122, and (1980), 133-57; 
Walcot (1962), 15-19; Ryholt (2000), 119-120.  
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warned to not make love to a married woman, as those who do are 
killed on her doorstep.389 
As the passages dealing with adultery in Egyptian wisdom literature 
are directed at the behaviour of the man, then they give no insight into 
the fate of the adulterous wife, but some narrative sources suggest that 
the wife was also liable to the death penalty. In The Tale of the Two 
Brothers, a story from the New Kingdom, the older brother kills his 
wife and feeds her to his dogs when he discovers she has tried to seduce 
the younger brother.390 In P. Westcar, which is a collection of tales 
featuring feats of magic dating to the Middle Kingdom, a scribe who 
discovered that a man was visiting his house and having an affair with 
his wife used a wax crocodile to catch the adulterer and present him to 
Pharaoh for punishment.391 Both the adulterer and the wife were killed, 
                                               
389 Instructions of ‘Onchsheshonqy 23.6-7. Elsewhere in the text, another form of 
punishment is presented in which the wife of the adulterous man will have 
intercourse with others; Instructions of Onchsheshonqy 21.18-19. It is unclear 
whether this is intended to be a talionic punishment, in which the man’s wife is 
raped so as to deliver the same offence to the adulterer as was inflicted on the 
husband, or whether the intended meaning is that the wife of a known adulterer 
will be inclined to be as unfaithful to her husband as he was to her. If the latter, 
then no legal punishment is meant by this part of the text. As well as suggesting 
that Egypt was in line with the rest of the Near East in regarding adultery as a 
capital offence, the question of the man’s knowledge of the woman’s marital 
status is suggested also, much as is found in LU 7 and MAL A 13 and 14. In 
Ptahhotep, the act is envisaged as occurring either in or as a consequence of 
visiting the husband’s home, whilst in ‘Onchsheshonqy the adulterer is presented 
as being killed on the wife’s doorstep. As the act is envisaged as taking place in 
the wife’s home, then there can be no doubt that the man knew the woman was 
married and so was liable to be punished as an adulterer. However, another 
wisdom text, the Instruction of Any, this time from the New Kingdom period, 
cautions the reader against intercourse with a woman who is a stranger in the 
town, as she is almost certainly away from her husband, and as such if the reader 
allows himself to be seduced by her then he will be committing a great capital 
crime.  This stands in contrast with LU 7, where being seduced by the wife away 
from her home is not an offence for the seduced man. 
390 P. BM 10183 74-75. See Moldenke (1898);  
391 P. Westcar 1.18-4.10. See Erman (1927), 36-38.  
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though little insight into actual punishments can be found with regards 
to the adulterer, who was devoured by the magical crocodile.392 The 
wife, however, was burnt and thrown into the river, which recalls the 
punishment of a group of unfaithful Egyptian women in a story told by 
Herodotus.393 Execution by fire is attested in ancient Egypt as a 
punishment for treason, suggesting that if the punishments in P. 
Westcar and Herodotus have any basis in actual practice, then in Egypt, 
adultery may have been tantamount to treasonous behaviour by the 
wife towards her husband.394  
Returning to Mesopotamia, MAL A 15 deals with the requirement of 
proving the guilt of the adulterous couple before they can be punished, 
but due to its ambiguous wording, the exact situation it is envisaging is 
unclear. As a result, there have been several different interpretations of 
the passage in modern scholarship. Here is Roth’s translation of the 
passage: 
MAL A 15 
If a man should seize another man upon his wife and they prove charges 
against him and find him guilty, they shall kill both of them; there is no 
liability for him (i.e., the husband). If he should seize him and bring 
him either before the king or the judges, and they prove the charges 
                                               
392 P.Westcar 4.6-7. 
393 Hdt. 2.111.   
394 Cremation would prevent the corpse from being embalmed, and burning the 
body denied the victim access to the afterlife, thus it was reserved for the most 
heinous crimes; Sander-Hansen (1942), 10; Leahy (1984), 199-206, who also gives 
a number of examples of death by fire as a punishment for treason. See also 
Lloyd (1988), 41. 
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against him and find him guilty – if the woman’s husband kills his wife, 
then he shall also kill the man; if he cuts off his wife’s nose, he shall 
turn the man into a eunuch and they shall lacerate his entire face; but if 
[he wishes to release] his wife, he shall [release] the man. 
 
By this reading, MAL A 15 presents two alternative procedures for 
imposing a penalty upon the couple; one in which they are dealt with 
on the spot, and the other in which they are brought to a formal trial. 
The phrase ‘ubta’eruš ukta’inuš’ used in both sections, and it is the 
main source of ambiguity in the text as its meaning is unclear. It is 
translated by Roth as ‘prove charges against him and find him guilty’, 
but objections to this translation are noted by both Driver and Miles, 
pre-emptively, and by Westbrook, on the grounds that the charges 
would be proven by the witnesses and/or the accuser, whilst the 
conviction would come from the court, but there is no indication of a 
change in subject for this phrase.395 
Driver and Miles take the phrase to mean making an accusation and 
bringing sufficient evidence to support it.396 Consequently, in the first 
part of MAL A 15, they see some form of informal trial procedure as 
first being necessary before the husband can kill the couple, as this 
would both be necessary for the killing of a free man and would 
safeguard the position of the husband and anyone else who takes part 
                                               
395 Driver and Miles (1935), 342; Westbrook (2003a), 88. 
396 Driver and Miles (1935), 342.  
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in applying the punishment.397 For Cardascia, this procedure is a 
gathering of witnesses prior to the execution to both protect the 
husband from an accusation of homicide, and the couple from summary 
execution without first proving their guilt.398  
Westbrook initially took issue with this on the grounds that, based on 
its use elsewhere in MAL, ubta’eruš ukta’inuš implied a formal trial, 
which would render the second part of MAL A 15 redundant.399 As an 
alternative, he argued that rather than some form of trial occurring 
before the husband can inflict the death penalty, the first part of this 
law dealt with a situation in which the husband had caught the couple 
in the act, summarily executed them on the spot, and is now the 
defendant in a homicide trial.400 Later, however, Westbrook abandoned 
this argument as he reinterpreted the wording to mean both rational and 
supra-rational burdens of proof respectively.401 By this interpretation, 
the term refers to the court considering the material evidence first, 
finding it to be in favour of the accuser’s case though not sufficient to 
win the case, and so they allow the accuser to undertake an ordeal, or 
more likely, to swear an oath, which if done so, decides the case in the 
accuser’s favour.402 This would mean MAL A 15 is not for 
circumstances in which the couple are irrefutably caught in the act, as 
that would mean the rational evidence is sufficient on its own, but 
                                               
397 Driver and Miles (1935), 45-46.  
398 Cardascia (1969), 121. 
399 Westbrook (1990), 553. 
400 Westbrook (1990), 553. 
401 Westbrook (2003a), 87-97. 
402 Westbrook (2003a), 88. 
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rather when they are caught in a compromising situation, one which 
indicates adultery, but does not definitively prove it.403 Instead, the 
compromising situation reaches the threshold of rational evidence that 
the court would require for them to allow the husband to win the case 
by swearing an oath. 
The problem with this reading is the oath is superfluous as it duplicates 
the rational evidence. In the reconstruction which Westbrook presents, 
the husband has found the couple in a situation which is compromising 
without being definitive, gathered witnesses who can testify that the 
couple were found in this situation, and then the husband has an oath 
imposed on him to swear what the witness testimony already proves. 
In the first part of the law, it would mean that the husband gathered 
witnesses to the compromising situation, and they in turn imposed an 
oath on the husband to swear that the couple are in a comprising 
situation that they themselves have witnessed. As Westbrook’s reading 
of the phrase depends upon the rational evidence falling short of being 
compelling enough to prove the accuser’s claim, the accuser’s claim 
                                               
403 Westbrook places great emphasis on the use of ištu aššatišu, ‘with his wife’, 
to argue that MAL A 15 is specifically regarding a situation in which there is some 
proof, but not definite proof, else ‘upon’ would be the term used; Westbrook 
(2003a), 96. See also Lafont for a similar interpretation, in support of her reading 
of the Neo-Babylonian marriage contract’s adultery clause; Lafont, S. (1999), 67-
68. Driver and Miles recognise that by using ‘with’, the law is considering 
situations beyond those in which the adulterous couple are unquestionably 
caught in the act, but dismiss the distinction as unimportant, as if the situation 
was sufficiently compromising, it would be tantamount to being undisputedly 
caught in the act; Driver and Miles (1935), 48. Roth effectively follows this by 
smoothing over the distinction and translating ‘with’ as ‘upon’. If the use here of 
‘with’ is intended to broaden the circumstances in which the couple are liable to 
punishment as adulterers, then barring the specific example of the witness 
testimony falling short of the husband’s claim, then Driver and Miles must be 
correct. 
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must go beyond what can be proven by the rational evidence. The 
situation would need to be the much narrower circumstance in which 
the husband had definitively caught them in the act, but by the time 
witnesses were gathered, the situation had become merely 
compromising.404 Thus, the witness testimony could meet Westbrook’s 
standard for the court to then make up the gap by imposing the oath. 
Otherwise, if MAL A 15 does cover sufficiently compromising 
situations, then these must have been de facto considered to be same as 
being caught in the act, and so there would be no need for an oath.  
Another interpretation is offered by Stol, who does not see two separate 
procedures in MAL A 15, but rather a two-stage process in which the 
husband first discovers the adulterous couple, this leads to others 
discovering the adultery, and then the couple are brought to face 
                                               
404 Westbrook calls upon a comparison with G.72.2.20-45 from the Gortyn Law 
Code to help make his argument; Westbrook (2003a), 96-97. Here, the adulterer, 
or more accurately the moichos, has been caught in the house of his lover’s 
kurios and is being held for ransom. The accuser makes his request for the 
ransom in front of three witnesses, but these are not witnesses to the 
circumstances of the capture, rather to the request for the ransom. When the 
accuser swears an oath here it is to confirm in front of witnesses that he did 
catch the moichos in the act, and he did not entrap him, as is claimed by the 
moichos. However, and as Westbrook notes, there was no need for the Assyrian 
husband to swear an oath to this as MAL A 15 introduces a check on his ability to 
entrap the adulterer by forcing him to punish his wife also, which is not the case 
in Gortyn. Westbrook explains this away by splitting the Gortyn oath into two 
parts; an accusatory oath that he caught the moichos in the act, and an 
exculpatory oath that he did not entrap him. The requirement in MAL A 15 of 
equal punishment removes the latter part, leaving just the accusatory oath for 
the Assyrian husband to swear. This is a problematic reading as the Gortyn oath 
is only sworn if the accused defends himself by claiming to have been entrapped. 
If the requirement of equal punishment is sufficient to disprove entrapment, 
there is no need for an accusatory oath to state the intercourse was adultery and 
not entrapment. The Assyrian husband proves there was no entrapment, and 
that adultery did occur, by punishing his wife. The circumstances which make the 
oath necessary in Gortyn would be again superfluous in MAL A 15. 
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justice.405 However, ubta’eruš ukta’inuš  appears in both sections of 
the law, suggesting the first part of the law is envisaging a situation in 
which the husband discovers the couple, their guilt is proven in some 
way with a punishment administered without reference to a court, and 
the circumstances in which the husband has no liability for this 
punishment.406 Meanwhile, the second part is envisaging an alternative 
situation in which the couple are brought to a trial, their guilt is proved 
there, and they are punished. There is no need to reference the 
husband’s liability for any punishment in the second part as the charge 
has been proven in a formal trial, and instead in its place are the range 
of punishments the court allows the husband to choose from. 
That witnesses were necessary to secure an adultery conviction or 
protect a husband from a charge stemming from administering an on 
the spot punishment seems undeniable. A text from Mari records a 
merchant who caught his wife in bed with another man. The merchant 
tied the couple with ropes and brought them out so that others could 
see them and thus enable him to call upon them as witnesses when he 
brought the case to the official who wrote the text.407 Likewise, a 
Sumerian husband did the same thing when he caught his wife in bed 
with another man.408 Whilst not specifically in the context of adultery, 
Deut. 17.6 not only requires witnesses to prove any capital charge, but 
                                               
405 Stol (2016); 242. 
406 Stol translates ubta’eruš ukta’inuš as ‘show that he was the one, (and) can 
prove it’, which is in line with an understanding of the phrase as one which 
simply means being able to prove the guilt of the couple; Stol (2016), 242. 
407 LAPO 18 1064; Durand (1988), 524-525.  
408 Greengus (1969-1970), 34-35. 
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there must be at least two of them, and no-one can be put to death on 
the evidence of only one witness. It seems highly likely that both 
sections of MAL A 15 are dependent on witness testimony to prove the 
charge, and that if the husband wishes to inflict an immediate 
punishment upon discovering the couple, he must first gather witnesses 
to ensure the charge can be proven if he is to be absolved of any liability 
for his actions. These witnesses must be able to testify that the situation 
in which the couple were caught was in fact adultery, or perhaps a 
situation tantamount to adultery, which in effect would be the same 
thing.  
Leaving aside the issue of what exactly is envisaged by MAL A 15, it 
also demonstrates that whilst adultery was a capital crime, the husband 
had other options available for punishing the couple. Here, he can 
choose either to kill the couple, to mutilate them, or to set them free 
without any punishment. As has already been seen, LH 129 also allows 
for setting the couple free, albeit not explicitly for any punishment 
other than death if the husband did wish to impose one. A similar 
situation is found in the Hittite Laws:  
HL 198 
If he brings them (the adulterous couple) to the palace gate (i.e., the 
royal court) and says: “My wife shall not die,” he can spare his wife’s 
life, but he must also spare the lover and ‘clothe his head’, If he says, 
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“Both of them shall die,” they shall ‘roll the wheel’. The king may have 
them killed or he may spare them.409 
 
When considered along with the preceding law at HL 197, it seems as 
if the situation for the Hittite husband was the same as presented to the 
Assyrian husband in MAL A 15, as he could either kill the adulterous 
couple on the spot without liability if he caught them in the act, or he 
could bring them to trial to first secure a conviction for adultery. In 
addition to this, and uniquely amongst all surviving Near Eastern 
legislation on adultery, the Hittite Laws also allow for the king to 
override the decision of the husband and either kill or spare the 
couple.410  
                                               
409 The meaning of ‘clothe his head’ and ‘roll the wheel’ is not known; Roth 
(1995), 237, 240 n. 65, 66. 
410 The Hittite king is also presented at HL 187 and 188 as having the power to 
execute or pardon a defendant. Westbrook, consequently, ties the king’s right of 
punishment in adultery cases to this as an inherent right which exists 
independently of adultery law; Westbrook (1990), 555. However, in HL 187 and 
188, which deal with cases of bestiality, the defendant is always presented to the 
king for punishment, and it is not the case that the right of punishment exists 
with the victim in the first instance, with the king being granted the right to 
overrule his decision. The Hittite Laws do not deal with premeditated homicide 
of an ordinary person, but this offence is dealt with in another Hittite document, 
the Telipinu Proclamation. In this, the wishes of the next of kin are made 
paramount. It is they who get to choose whether the defendant is to be killed or 
has to pay compensation, with the king specifically excluded from having any 
role; TP 49. Whilst this is not located in the Hittite Laws themselves, it is issued 
by King Telipinu, to whom Roth attributes the Main Version of the Hittite Laws, 
and it complements them by providing legislation not found in them; Roth 
(1995), 214. Although Westbrook does make specific reference to the Hittite 
Laws only, it undermines the argument that the right of the king to overrule the 
husband in HL 198 is an independent right of the Hittite king in all cases, and it 
gives a unique surviving instance of the state specifically intervening in the rights 
of the husband in Near Eastern adultery law.  
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Mutilation, humiliation, and divorce are all found as punishments for 
adultery in the case of the previously mentioned Sumerian husband, 
who tied his wife and her lover to the bed so they could be presented 
to a court.411 No punishment is mentioned for the adulterer, but the wife 
had her genitals shaved, an arrow bored through her nose, and was led, 
presumably naked, around the city.412 The text recalls MAL A 15 in the 
manner in which the couple are seized by the husband and brought in 
front of the king for trial, and in the mutilation of the wife’s nose. The 
wife is also divorced, and the husband is in some way not required to 
return some or all of the dowry he would have received when marrying 
her.413 A similar provision is also found in Egyptian marriage contracts 
which survive from the early Demotic period, and which state that if 
the wife is found guilty of initiating adultery and is consequently 
                                               
411 See Greengus (1969-1970), 33-44; Lafont, S. (1999), 37-41; Neumann (2004), 
85-88. Adultery is the last of three accusations made by the husband against the 
wife. The others are stealing from him and breaching his oil jar. These collectively 
are intended to demonstrate that the woman is a bad wife, cumulating in the 
most serious offence against a husband, the adultery; Roth (1998), 180-181. 
412 By drawing on a text from Mari for a different offence, and Ezek. 16.39-40, 
Lafont suggests that these punishments could have been the preliminary to an 
execution by public lynching, or possibly that she could have been killed by the 
crowd during her procession through the city without incurring any liability for 
homicide; Lafont, S. (1999), 40-41. The Mari text does suggest that the physical 
punishment inflicted during the procession could be severe, as the man there 
had his ears cut off, was partially flayed, and was led around the city thirty times 
until he died; ARM 26 434. It is difficult to know whether or not a similar fate for 
the wife in this case is implied by the judgement against her, though the mention 
of divorce money may suggest it was not. 
413 Greengus allows for this either being a payment to the husband by the wife, 
or a non-payment that the husband would otherwise have been liable for when 
initiating a divorce; Greengus (1969-70), 39. In either instance, the source of the 
payment likely derives from the wife’s dowry and so effectively is the same thing. 
See LH 141-142, in which a husband can divorce a bad wife without paying her, 
and a wife can divorce a bad husband and take all of her dowry with her. 
Although adultery is not mentioned here, Westbrook argues that if the husband 
chose to divorce his adulterous wife, then this would be covered, and he would 
not have to pay compensation; Westbrook (1988a), 77. 
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divorced by her husband, she loses the right to reclaim her dowry.414 
Another Sumerian text from the end of the third millennium also 
records a wife who was divorced for adultery, and a text from Mari 
may also record a husband divorcing his adulterous wife.415  
From late in the second millennium, a series of royal texts from Ugarit 
record a divorce between King ‘Ammitṭamru and an Amurrite princess 
                                               
414 Pestman (1961), 56. That similar evidence does not exist for earlier periods 
does not mean that the same right did not exist for the husband throughout 
Egyptian history, but rather is likely just a consequence of the fact that 
documents of this type were not in use in earlier periods to record this 
information; see Allam (1981) 117, who argues in this context that marriage is a 
conservative institution which changes little over time. A similar, if slightly less 
severe, provision for retention of dowry is found in Roman legislation. There, if 
the wife was at fault for the divorce then the husband could retain one-sixth the 
value of the dowry per child the couple had up to a maximum of half, and if the 
fault was adultery on the wife’s part, then a further one-sixth could be retained 
on the grounds of serious immorality. Conversely, if adultery on the husband’s 
part was the cause of the divorce, the wife could only speed up the process by 
which she recovered her dowry; Ulp. 6.9-10, 12-13. 
415 NG 205:18-26, and see Lafont, S. (1999), 268, for the Sumerian text. For the 
Mari text see Durand (2000), 239. In the latter instance, the meaning depends 
upon the reconstruction and translation of le-em-ma by Durand, which is 
preserved in line 22 and reconstructed by Durand in line 25. In his first 
reconstruction of the text, Durand translated these as ‘ascend’, and argued that 
the adulterous couple undertook a river ordeal and survived; Durand (1988), 
524-525. Later, he retranslated these lines to argue that the husband was 
repudiating his wife; Durand (2000), 239-240. If the first attempt is correct, then 
this would provide a unique instance of an accused man undertaking a river 
ordeal for adultery. This ordeal is usually reserved in Mesopotamia for a wife 
accused of adultery, but where there is no proof, (see the section on Oaths and 
Ordeals below). Here, the couple had been caught in the act by the husband with 
witnesses, and it seems beyond question that they were involved in a sexual 
relationship. Durand addressed this by suggesting that the wife offered the 
defence that the intercourse was not consensual, whilst the lover offered the 
defence that he did not know she was married, causing the official deciding the 
case sufficient doubt as to refer it to the river god. This is a problematic 
argument as both of those defences are addressed in Near Eastern legislation 
and dismissed depending on the location of the act; see LU 7, MAL A 13, 14, HL 
197, Deut. 22.23-27. The location here is not clear, but it was both somewhere 
the husband could walk in on it unexpectedly, and then quickly gather witnesses, 
which would at least undermine any defence by the wife that the intercourse 
was not consensual. Given that, and the usual use of the river ordeal as a 
procedure for a wife accused without proof, then the second translation of 
Durand that the husband repudiated his wife is much to be preferred. This 
repudiation would seem likely to have comprised of the husband divorcing the 
wife for her adultery. 
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for adultery.416 Here, the king initially appeared to accept a simple 
divorce with no further penalty, possibly under some diplomatic 
pressure from the Hittite emperor.417 In this instance, the adulterous 
wife retained her dowry, but she was required to leave behind any 
possessions she had acquired whilst in Ugarit.418 The king then later 
seems to have changed his mind and requested his errant ex-wife be 
returned to him by her brother, the king of Amurru, to be executed.419 
As a dynastic marriage, the circumstances surrounding the wife’s 
punishment may not truly reflect how most cases of adultery would 
have played out, but in presenting both divorce and the death penalty 
as options, the punishments are consistent, and they also appear to be 
largely at the discretion of the husband, diplomatic pressure 
notwithstanding. 
As previously mentioned, the adultery legislation found in the Hebrew 
Bible is in line with the rest of the Near East in the respect that it 
presents adultery as a capital offence. There are two separate strands of 
legal material in the Hebrew Bible for adultery, one from the Priestly 
source and the other in Deuteronomy: 
 
 
                                               
416 RS 17.159 Following Márquez Rowe that the ‘great sin’ committed by the wife 
was adultery rather than a political conspiracy, both of which have attestations 
of the use of the term elsewhere. See Márquez Rowe (2000), 368-372. 
417 RS. 17.116; Márquez Rowe (2000), 366-367. 
418 RS 11.12-16, 17.396.  
419 Márquez Rowe (2000), 367. 
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Lev 18.20; 20.10 
You shall not have sexual relations with your kinsman’s wife, and 
defile yourself with her.  
If a man commits adultery with the wife of his neighbour, both the 
adulterer and the adulteress shall be put to death. 
 
Deut. 22.22 
If a man is caught lying with the wife of another man, both of them 
shall die, the man who lay with the woman as well as the woman. So 
you shall purge the evil from Israel. 
 
The Leviticus passage is placed within a longer section of legislation 
given by God, and includes crimes such as sorcery, incest, bestiality, 
and the eating of unclean animals.420 Failure to follow any of these laws 
is an offense against God, meaning Leviticus presents adultery not as 
an offence to the husband, who is not mentioned, but as an offence 
against God.421 If the Israelites do not adequately deal with the 
adulterous couple, then they risk their relationship with God, and their 
occupancy of the land granted to them by God.422 Adultery was 
regarded by the Priestly source as an offence to God of such seriousness 
                                               
420 Lev. 20.1-27. 
421 Lev. 20.22. 
422 Lev. 20.22-23. 
167 
 
that it lists a prohibition against adultery as one of the Ten 
Commandments.423 
Deuteronomy also presents its adultery legislation in the context of a 
much broader set of legislation given to Moses by God. The concerns 
of the Deuteronomist are slightly different to the Priestly source, in that 
it does not have the same conception of the relationship between the 
land and the people, but rather couches its theological outlook in terms 
of the people. Failure to observe any of God’s commandments risks 
bringing evil into the midst of the people, and ultimately this too risks 
the relationship between the Israelites and God.424 As with Leviticus, 
adultery is not presented here as an offence to the husband, who again 
is not mentioned, but rather as an offence to God.  
The manner in which adultery is envisaged in these passages as an 
offence to God, with no mention of the husband, nor any mention of a 
lesser punishment which can be imposed on the couple at the husband’s 
discretion, has led many scholars to regard adultery law in Israel and 
Judah as being distinct from that found elsewhere in the Near East.425 
                                               
423 Exod. 20.14. 
424 Deut. 28.15. 
425 Stol argues that adultery legislation which mandates the death penalty is 
found in LE 28, noting that the phrase ‘she shall die, she shall not live’, means 
that the adulteress there is to be killed, with no opportunity for the husband to 
impose a lesser punishment; Stol (2016), 245. As this law is dealing with the 
marital status of the woman, rather than adultery, Westbrook argues that LE 28 
is not concerned with the finer details of punishment for adultery, much as other 
laws which do deal with adultery do not concern themselves with whether the 
woman is to be considered a wife; Westbrook (1990), 553-544. Similarly, MAL A 
13 only makes mention of the death penalty as the punishment for adultery, but 
is a law concerned with whether the man knew the woman was married. If he 
did, the he is liable and must be killed. It does not need to go into any further 
detail than that, and a different law, MAL A 15, deals specifically with the 
husband’s right to impose a punishment. Further support for Westbrook is found 
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Given that this approach to adultery legislation is couched in 
theological concerns around the relationship of God to the people, it is 
understandable that the Hebrew Bible prioritises the concerns of God 
above the concerns of the husband. However, as these texts are first 
and foremost theological compositions, which present their legislation 
from a theological perspective, rather than an actual collection of laws, 
there is room for significant doubt that in their insistence that the 
adulterous couple must be killed they are reflecting actual practice in 
Israel or Judah. Support for a more traditional Near Eastern approach 
which prioritises the rights of the husband and which allows him to set 
the level of punishment can be found in Prov. 6: 
 
Prov. 6.32-35 
But he who commits adultery has no sense; 
he who does it destroys himself. 
He will get wounds and dishonour, 
and his disgrace will not be wiped away. 
For jealousy arouses a husband’s fury, 
and he shows no restraint when he takes revenge. 
                                               
in Yaron’s observation that LE often omits detail from the apodosis in 
comparison with other Near Eastern law codes; Yaron (1969), 56. In the case of 
LE 28, if the details mentioned encompass the entirety of the legislation on 
adultery, then it would also mean that there was no punishment at all for the 
adulterous man, as only punishment for the wife is mentioned. Whilst the 
absence of a law such as MAL A 15 in LE means it could be the case that a local 
variation is found at Eshnunna, and it did differ from its neighbours in mandating 
the death penalty for at least one of the adulterous couple, the context is still 
one of family law, and the rights of the husband, as opposed to that of Leviticus 
and Deuteronomy and its depiction of adultery as an offence to God. 
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He will accept no compensation, 
and refuses a bribe no matter how great. 
 
There are two elements in this passage which indicate that the death 
penalty was not automatically applied to an adultery, and that the 
husband did have significant discretion in applying any punishment. 
The first is found in the final two lines, which indicate that legal 
compensation from the adulterer may have been an option open to the 
husband. These two lines can be interpreted in different ways, 
depending on how kopher and shochad are to be translated. The NRSV 
translation given above translates them as ‘compensation’ and ‘bribe’, 
respectively. They could refer to a payment that the husband has the 
legal right to take in lieu of imposing the death penalty, or they could 
refer to an attempt by the adulterer to bribe his way out of the mandated 
punishment. The exact legal situation the passage presents changes 
depending on which it is, as in the former it would be presenting a one 
in line with the rest of the Near East, in which the husband has the right 
to set the level of punishment, whereas the latter supports the 
presentation of adultery in Leviticus and Deuteronomy as an offence 
for which the adulterer must be executed if caught.  
There is support for both readings elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible. In 
the vision of Judah and Jerusalem seen by Isaiah, shochad is used to 
unmistakably mean a bribe at Is. 1.23, to describe the corruption in 
Jerusalem.  In 1 Sam. 12.3, Samuel uses kopher to mean payments 
taken by an official to turn a blind eye. Conversely, Exod. 21.30 uses 
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kopher to mean the money that the owner of a goring ox must pay, and 
which is certainly used in the sense of legally mandated compensation. 
Shochad is more commonly used to mean a bribe, such as at 1 Sam. 8.3 
and Is. 1.23, though there are uses of it in 1 Kgs. 15.19 and 2 Kgs. 16.8 
to mean a gift given between kings to cement an alliance. However, 
whilst there are no negative connotations in the use of shochad in this 
passage to mean a bribe, nor is it a payment of compensation either. 
Given that, it seems unlikely that compensation which can legally be 
demanded by the husband is meant by its use in Prov. 6.35, and bribe 
is more likely to be the meaning. With the clear meaning of kopher as 
legal compensation in Exod. 21.30, the most likely reading is that 
kopher is being used to refer to the legal compensation that the husband 
was entitled to ask for instead of imposing the death penalty, and which 
in this instance he refuses to do, and shochad is being used to refer to 
the attempt of an adulterer caught in the act to buy his way out of the 
situation, which the husband refuses to accept.426 That it is only the 
                                               
426 Westbrook prefers to see both of these terms as referring to legal 
compensation due to the gift-giving use of shochad in 1 Kgs. 15.19 and 2 Kgs. 
16.8; Westbrook (1990), 545-546. To do so he calls upon these instances as 
representations of international law, and from there can be extrapolated the 
term as one used for legal payments. This stretches the use of the word further 
than seems warranted. In both instances, the word is used to describe a gift of 
silver and gold sent by one king to another to buy their aid in a war. Whilst not 
an outright bribe, it carries connotations of a payment offered with the intention 
of receiving something in return. When used in 1 Sam. 8.3, its meaning is that of 
a payment offered to a judge to pervert justice, suggesting that a punishment 
which should be administered is bought off by the shochad. It is thus difficult to 
read its use in Prov. 6.35 as anything other than an attempt by the adulterer to 
buy off the husband to prevent any physical punishment being imposed. Further, 
if both words mean legal compensation then 6.35 repeats itself in both clauses as 
‘He will not accept any compensation, and he will not accept compensation no 
matter how great’. For Phillips, the use of shochad alongside kopher is proof that 
the latter does not have the intended meaning of legal compensation, given that 
the former does not have this meaning; Phillips (1981), 18. Whilst he is on firmer 
ground than Westbrook in asserting one of the words definitely means a bribe, 
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shochad which the passage envisages as having the potential to be a 
substantial sum offered by the adulterer further suggests that it is a 
bribe, and the kopher is a set payment. 
The second element is found at 6.33, where the adulterer is described 
as receiving nega’, which is translated in the passage as ‘wounds’. The 
word has connotations of physical contact and is used at Deut. 17.8 in 
a trial context to mean assault, and at 2 Sam. 7.14 to refer to a beating 
given with a rod. It carries no connotations of killing, however, so the 
recipient of the nega’ in this verse is not necessarily presented as being 
killed by the husband, but rather as receiving another physical 
punishment which is likely a severe beating, but which stops short of 
killing. Nor is it a beating handed out in a judicial context, as may be 
expected if adultery is not an offence to the husband, but one delivered 
on the spot by the husband, suggesting it was something he had the 
right to do.427 It should be noted that the preceding verse does suggest 
that the adulterer is killed by the husband. Here, the root sh-ch-t is used 
in the hiphil to refer to the adulterer destroying himself. The same verb 
is used in the piel at 2 Sam. 14.11 to refer to a man facing the death 
penalty for homicide, and at Num. 32.15 to refer to the destruction of 
the Israelites if their behaviour causes God to abandon them in the 
wilderness. The juxtaposition of the two verses next to each other could 
                                               
he meets the same problem of repetition, in that the husband by this reading will 
neither accept a bribe nor accept a bribe. As kopher has a definite meaning of 
legal compensation, and as Westbrook points out its context as a bribe is when it 
is offered to an official, whilst when offered to a litigant it is compensation, then 
a reading of ‘He will not accept any compensation, and he will not accept a bribe 
no matter how great’ is to be preferred. 
427 Makkot is used at Deut. 25.3 for when a beating is imposed by a judiciary. 
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be read to say that the destruction the adulterer brings upon himself is 
his death caused by the beating he receives from the husband, though 
as nega’ is specifically assault or a beating with no inherent 
connotation that the victim is killed suggests that it is a simple beating 
which is being envisaged in 6.33.428  
The situation presented in Prov. 6.32-35 is that of a husband who 
catches his wife committing adultery with another man, and in his fury, 
decides to exercise his right to impose a physical punishment on the 
adulterer on the spot. He has the right to demand a compensatory 
payment but chooses not to. He may or may not be envisaged as killing 
the adulterer but does seem at least to be allowed to administer a 
beating, and that the adulterer can be killed certainly seems to be 
allowed for. The adultery legislation found in Leviticus and 
Deuteronomy imposes a theologically motivated mandate of the death 
penalty for an adulterer, whose offence is one committed against God, 
and which if left unpunished by his death risks the relationship of the 
Israelites to God. Consequently, it does not allow for the discretion of 
the husband, and nor does it make the wishes of the husband paramount 
over the Israelites’ relationship with God.429 That the adulterer could 
                                               
428 An alternative explanation for the juxtaposition of the adulterer’s destruction 
in 6.32 and beating in 6.33 is offered by Fox, who sees the destruction not as 
representing the immediate death of the adulterer, but that the adulterer has 
put himself on the path to death by his actions; Fox (2000), 235.  
429 It should also be noted that nor is it only in the Hebrew Bible that adultery is 
couched in terms of the crime being an offence to a deity. It is listed as a sin 
against Ninurta in a Middle Assyrian hymn to that god, whilst in Šurpu, Tablet II, 
adulterers are listed amongst sinners who are punished by the gods, and by 
Marduk in particular in Tablet IV; Lambert (1960), 119. The declaration of 
innocence given to a council of 42 gods in Spell 125 of the Egyptian Book of the 
Dead, includes the denial ‘I am not an adulterer’ (trans. Naville). Loewenstamm 
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be subject to the death sentence seems beyond dispute, and is in line 
with the rest of the Near East, but this passage strongly suggests that in 
reality, the rights of the Hebrew husband were the same as they were 
elsewhere in the Near East.430 
The Hebrew Bible also contains one of the most famous accounts of an 
adulterous relationship in the ancient world, that of David and 
Bathsheba in 2 Sam. 11.2-12.19.431 Here too, the narrative account 
strongly suggests that the offence was primarily conceived of as one 
against the husband, and of which the husband’s interests were 
                                               
argues that in Mesopotamia, both the gods and the courts had separate 
jurisdictions in punishing the adulterer, with the court’s interest being in 
upholding the rights of the husband rather than carrying out the will of a god, 
and that this distinction also is found in the Hebrew Bible when Prov. 6 is 
considered alongside the Pentateuchal legislation; Loewenstamm (1980), 147-
149.  
430 Loewenstamm sees no contradiction between Prov. 6 and the passages in 
Leviticus and Deuteronomy on the grounds that in all cases, the task of 
prosecuting adultery would fall to the husband, and not on any third party whose 
interest would be avenging the affront against God. For Loewenstamm, the 
legislation in the Pentateuch is primarily intended to drive home the seriousness 
of the offence. However, other Near Eastern legislation does allow for alternative 
punishments, such as MAL A 14, 15 and HL 198, and even where it does not, such 
as LU 7 and MAL A 13, there is no suggestion that death is the only acceptable 
penalty. This is not the case with Leviticus and Deuteronomy, for which only the 
death of the adulterer will maintain the relationship of the Israelites with the 
land and with God. Objections to the understanding of Prov. 6 as being 
representative of any actual legal practice in Israel have been raised by several 
scholars. Weinfeld argues that this proverb is couched terms of an instruction in 
correct behaviour to a young person, and so it represents didactic-secular 
teaching only rather than any legal practice; see Weinfeld quoted in 
Loewenstamm (1980), 172. This viewpoint is problematic, as it would rely on the 
punishment meted out by the husband in 6.32-35 as having no basis in any legal 
sanction. If this were the case, then it would undermine the passage’s ability to 
serve as teaching, as in reality, an adulterer would not be subject to this 
punishment. Greenberg argues that the passage does not reflect any actual legal 
practice on the grounds that the use of nqm means a vengeance taken by the 
husband outside of any legal framework, and so the payments mentioned in 
6.34-35 cannot be legal compensation; Greenberg (1986), 4; see also Greenberg 
(1983), 13. However, see Westbrook (1988b), 89-100 for a survey of the use of 
nqm in the Hebrew Bible to show that in a legal context it can refer to a fixed 
payment.  
431 Galpaz-Feller (2004), 153. 
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paramount. David began the affair whilst her husband, Uriah, was away 
with the army. Then, after Bathsheba fell pregnant, David arranged to 
have Uriah killed in battle and he brought Bathsheba to his house to 
live with him as his wife.432 David is punished for his deeds, but not by 
his or Bathsheba’s death, and not by Uriah nor any secular authority. 
Instead, it is God who punishes him by causing the child born as a result 
of the adulterous affair to be struck down by illness. Despite this, 
David’s main concern throughout the affair is not that he risks divine 
punishment, but that Uriah not discover what has occurred, and that he 
not question the paternity of the child.433 When David is not successful 
at manipulating Uriah into going home and lying with Bathsheba so 
that he subsequently will believe the child is his, it is then that he 
arranges Uriah’s death as a last resort, so important is it to him that 
Uriah not find out what has happened. It is only after this that God 
intervenes to punish David, and the main charge is not so much that he 
has committed adultery, but that he has taken a wife from Uriah when 
he already has many wives, and that he had Uriah killed.434 It is clear 
from the passage that David regards his adultery primarily as an 
offence against Uriah, and it is only when Uriah is dead and cannot 
                                               
432 Pregnancy in the absence of the husband is also taken as proof of sexual 
infidelity in Gen. 38.12-26, where Tamar falls pregnant whilst she is a widow and 
effectively betrothed to her brother-in-law. 
433 A set of Old Babylonian omens on pregnancy resulting from adulterous affairs 
include one in which the wife prays to Ishtar to make her child look like her 
husband; Stol (2000), 103. 
434 Janzen also notes that the punishment David receives is not for the adultery, 
but instead because God has given him much, including wives, and could have 
given him much more, but he took a wife that God did not give him. In doing so, 
he has despised God by assuming God’s role. See Janzen (2012), 209-220. 
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exercise his rights as Bathsheba’s husband against David that God 
intervenes.435 
The books of the Hebrew prophets often use adultery as a metaphor for 
the Israelites’ unfaithfulness towards God. As they are narrative 
sources which do not directly touch on the subject, their usefulness for 
reconstructing adultery law is certainly limited, but as the metaphor can 
only work if it in some way reflects actual practice, they also help to 
demonstrate that not only was it the case that the husband did have 
discretion in how his adulterous wife was to be punished, but that these 
punishments were also in the line with the remainder of the Near East. 
The husband of Hos. 2-3 divorces his adulterous wife and humiliates 
her by stripping her naked, the adulterous wives of Ezek. 16.38-39 are 
also publicly stripped naked, and the fall of Israel is envisaged as a wife 
who has been divorced by her husband for adultery in Jer. 3.8.436  
Stripping naked is also a punishment mentioned several times in the 
Hebrew Bible for prostitution, meaning the adulterous wife in these 
passages was seen as comparable to a prostitute.437 
                                               
435 As Anderson points out, David’s actions in attempting to conceal the affair 
from Uriah only make sense if the right of bringing a charge of adultery fell to the 
husband alone, and not to the community; Anderson (1989), 156. 
436 Phillips sees these as punishments which were available to the husband prior 
to Deuteronomy and its reforms, after which the punishment became death; 
Phillips (1973), 352-354. Even if this is correct, then it would mean that for a 
significant portion of Israelite history, the punishments would have been in line 
with the remainder of the Near East. However, Prov. 6 strongly suggests that it is 
not. 
437 Jer. 12.26-27; Ezek. 16.37-38, 23.10, 29; Hos. 2.5; Nah. 3.5. An eighth-century 
Aramaic treaty inscription from Sefîre in northern Syria may also record stripping 
as a punishment for prostitution. The treaty records a punishment for one of the 
parties involving his wives, daughters-in-law, and the wives of his nobles being 
stripped if he breaks the treaty and depending on the reconstruction of the text 
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The cumulative picture built up by this survey of the evidence suggests 
that death, mutilation, financial compensation, divorce with retention 
of at least some of the dowry, and even no punishment at all were all 
options available to the wronged husband across the Near East. Only 
in the Hebrew Bible is any attempt made to deny the husband any 
discretion in the manner of the punishment, but even here it seems as 
if the husband still retained these rights, and as McKeating has pointed 
out, there is no example in Biblical literature of anyone being put to 
death for adultery.438 This contrast between laws which cite a capital 
punishment and actual instances of it being applied for the offence is 
also found elsewhere in the Near East, as LH frequently imposes the 
death penalty in its legislation, but in practice it appears that a lesser 
punishment was usually applied.439 This, coupled with the adultery 
divorce clauses in Demotic marriage contracts, documented divorces 
in Sumerian and Ugaritic texts, plus mutilation and humiliation also in 
Sumerian texts, suggests that whilst the husband could impose the 
death penalty, in practice it may rarely have actually happened.440  
                                               
their punishment may be that of a prostitute’s. See Sf I A 40-41; Hillers (1964), 
58-60; Fitzmyer (1967), 15, 57. 
438 McKeating (1979), 58. 
439 See Westbrook and Wilcke (1974/1977), 118-119, for a discussion of lesser 
punishments handed out for theft.  
440 In part due to the lack of legal evidence documenting the execution of an 
adulterer by the courts, Lorton goes as far as to argue that whilst summary 
execution was available to the husband in Egypt, the death penalty for adultery 
was not an option in the Egyptian courts. He explains the judgement of the 
pharaoh against the adulterous couple of P. Westcar as being branding for the 
wife and burial for the adulterer whom is already dead at the hands of the 
husband. In other literature, death either comes at the hand of the husband, 
and/or other crimes are involved in addition to adultery. However, and as has 
been seen, other Near Eastern societies very definitely allowed for the courts to 
consider adultery as a capital offence, even though actual instances of this 
penalty being carried out may be lacking. Lorton’s argument also raises the 
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Oaths and Ordeals 
 
As has already been seen in the likes of LH 129, MAL A 15, and HL 
197, an adulterous man was liable to sanction by the husband if he was 
caught in the act.441 In the absence of any clear evidence as to his guilt, 
there was no provision for the husband to take any action against 
him.442 For the wife, however, this was not the case, and she was 
vulnerable to accusations of adultery both by her husband and by a third 
                                               
objection that if the courts could not treat adultery as a capital offence, then why 
could the husband summarily execute the adulterous couple? Especially as even 
when a guilty verdict is given by a court, the husband would likely be the one 
who decided the level of punishment. This is something Lorton tacitly 
acknowledges when he suggests the adulterer of P. DeM 27 was not punished by 
the courts because the husband chose not to punish the wife. If the punishment 
lay only in the hands of the court, then once they handed down a guilty verdict it 
would not matter what the husband did. See Lorton (1977), 15, 38-39. 
441 Or possibly in circumstances sufficiently compromising as to be effectively 
adultery.  
442 Frymer-Kensky offers two readings of LU 14, which deals with a river ordeal 
being undertaken following an accusation of adultery. In one of which it is a man 
who is accused of adultery and undergoes the ordeal, rather than the wife; 
Frymer-Kensky (1977), 145-148. By her admission, this would be contrary to 
other Mesopotamian legislation wherein it is the wife who takes the ordeal 
following an accusation by a third party, and whilst it cannot be ruled out, the 
other reading of the wife, which is also favoured by Finkelstein (given as LU 11) 
and Roth, is to be preferred; Finkelstein (1968/1969), 68; Roth (1995), 18. An 
instance in which a man could be required to undertake a river ordeal for 
adultery is found in MAL A 22. In this, a man is caught travelling with the wife of 
another man. If he did not know she was married he can swear to this and pay 
damages to the husband. If he did know she was married he can swear that he 
did not have intercourse with her and pay damages to the husband. If the wife 
then says they did have intercourse, then as he has already sworn and paid 
damages, the remaining recourse to prove it did not occur is to submit to a river 
ordeal. He is not required to, though, and if he refuses then he is punished as the 
husband chooses to punish his wife. This differs from other Mesopotamian 
adultery legislation on river ordeals, as it is not the result of an accusation by a 
third party, but by one of the involved parties. This legislation is also in line with 
MAL A 14, in that the man’s liability as an adulterer is only if he admits to 
knowing she was married. If he swears he did not, then nothing is mentioned 
with regards to his liability if intercourse had taken place. However, it is a rare 
example of the adulterer’s possible liability when he is not caught in the act. 
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party, even when she had not been caught in the act. For example, in 
LH 143, she could be considered tacitly guilty of adultery if she was 
wayward, squandered her possessions, and refused to have intercourse 
with her husband. The punishment here is exactly as it would be had 
she been caught in the act.443  
Where there was no evidence at all in a Near Eastern legal dispute, one 
recourse to resolving the case was to refer the matter to the gods in the 
form of supra-rational procedures such as swearing an oath or 
undertaking an ordeal.444 The Law Code of Hammurabi provides 
several pieces of legislation for dealing with a wife who is accused of 
adultery, but for which there is no evidence. Two of them relate to 
circumstances in which the wife is accused by a man other than her 
husband: 
 
Law Code of Hammurabi 127, 132 
If man causes a finger to be pointed in accusation against an ugbabtu 
or against a man’s wife but cannot bring proof, they shall flog that man 
before the judges and they shall shave off half of his hair. 
If a man’s wife should have a finger pointed against her in accusation 
involving another male, although she has not been seized lying with 
                                               
443 Finkelstein (1966), 363. Withholding intercourse on its own is not sufficient 
proof that she is an adulteress. Her otherwise bad behaviour is required to give 
the context.  
444 Jas (1996), 73-75; Lion (2000), 151-153. 
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another male, she shall submit to the divine River Ordeal for her 
husband.  
 
A river ordeal involved the accused party entering waters associated 
with a river god.445  If the person survived the ordeal they were 
considered innocent, but if they died or refused to undertake the ordeal 
then they were considered to be guilty.446 The river ordeal for an 
accused adulteress of LH 132 varied from the one undertaken by an 
adulteress caught in the act in LH 129 as the wife here is not bound 
when she enters the water. Presumably being bound would result in 
certain death and as such was suitable for a proven adulteress, but 
                                               
445 The exact nature of the river ordeal procedure is unclear. The best evidence 
for it is found in the Mari Letters, though there is disagreement as to exactly 
what it involved. Bottéro interprets ARM 26.1 249 as requiring the person 
undergoing the ordeal to remain afloat for a certain distance; Bottéro (1981), 
1005-1067. Durand interprets the same text as requiring the person to remain 
underwater for a distance of forty metres: Durand (1988), 519-520 n. 62.  
Heimpel objects to the former on the grounds that anyone who could swim 
would survive the ordeal, rendering it pointless, and to the latter on the grounds 
that the swimmer would come up for air rather than drown if they could not 
complete the distance; Heimpel (1996), 7-8. Heimpel proposes that the ordeal 
took place in a bitumen spring, which would have subjected to the person to 
uncomfortable temperatures and to noxious fumes which could render them 
unconscious and cause them to drown; Heimpel (1996), 6-10. Cardascia also 
rejected Durand’s argument on the grounds that it would have been too difficult 
to achieve. Instead, Cardascia argues that the person did not swim at all, but 
waded out to a pre-defined distance, and that the judge responsible for imposing 
the ordeal could manipulate the difficulty of the ordeal based on whether he 
thought the person undertaking it was guilty or innocent; Cardascia (1993), 169-
184. See also Westbrook (2003b), 375. It may have been the case that the 
requirements were specific to each ordeal undertaken, rather than a set 
standard for all ordeals; Lafont, B. (2001), 205-206. It is also not clear whether 
the guilty party was expected to die in the river. The evidence varies depending 
on the location, but it appears that at least in some places, the outcome of the 
river ordeal would deliver the guilty verdict, but the person would be pulled from 
the river and executed rather than dying in the river; Frymer-Kensky (1977); 530-
534. 
446 Kataja (1987), 66. 
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simply being accused required a genuine trial by water which the wife 
could conceivably survive. Evidence that the river ordeal was a genuine 
feature of Babylonian adultery legislation is found in the Mari Letters, 
a city located on the Syrian side of the Euphrates that was invaded and 
conquered by Hammurabi, and which are roughly contemporary with 
LH.447 Among the letters are passages which discuss river ordeals 
undertaken by wives who have been accused of adultery.448 In one, a 
woman accused of both sorcery and adultery is described as having 
been spat out by the river, which suggests that it was certainly possible 
to survive the ordeal.449 In another, it seems that one woman who had 
been accused and was liable to the ordeal was even able to request 
another woman do the trial for her.450  
As the wife who survived the river ordeal was considered to be 
innocent, then there may well have been consequences for the accuser 
if this proved to be the case. LH 127 specifies a punishment of flogging 
and shaving off half of the hair of anyone who brings an accusation 
against a woman and cannot prove it.451  The earlier Law Code of Ur-
Nammu prescribes a fine of twenty shekels of silver to anyone who 
brings an accusation of adultery against a wife who in turn is cleared 
                                               
447 Sasson (2015), 1-3. 
448 See Durand (1988), 512-514; Heimpel (2003), 272-273. 
449 ARM 26.1 249. 
450 ARM 26.1 252. That a person could nominate someone else to undertake the 
ordeal for them is found several times in the Mari Letters; ARM 26.1 253-254.  
451 Shaving off hair is likely intended to humiliate; Richardson (2000), 81, n.62. A 
similar punishment is found for a person bringing a trial without good grounds in 
a Babylonian text, where the accuser in this instance also has half of his head 
shaved, but instead of being flogged is led around the city by his nose; CT 45 
18:14-16; see Driver and Miles (1952), 278-279; Westbrook (2003b), 423.This 
punishment also recalls that of the adulterous Sumerian woman who was led 
around the city by her nose; Greengus (1969-1970), 33-44. 
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by the river ordeal.452 This further suggests that an equivalent piece of 
legislation to LH 132 must either have existed in the complete LU or 
be assumed by it.  
It is also possible that if there was a punishment should the wife survive 
the river ordeal, then it would be talionic and the accuser would be put 
to death. The Mari Letters mention a person who is to suffer death by 
burning if the people they have accused of treason survive the river 
ordeal.453 Similarly, LH 2 deals with a situation in which a man accused 
of sorcery survives the river ordeal, leading to the execution of the 
accuser. However, as there is no punishment of any kind mentioned by 
LH 132, in contrast to LH 2, it is difficult to know if a talionic 
punishment was intended to be imposed in cases of adultery and is just 
assumed by the legislation rather than stated. If there is not, then whilst 
there are talionic punishments attested if a person accused of treason or 
sorcery survived the ordeal, there may have been no punishment at all 
for adultery.   
LH 127 demonstrates that the law code clearly saw a need for punishing 
false accusations of adultery, and it could be the case that the same 
punishment specified there was also applied in LH 132. However, a 
comparison with the Middle Assyrian Laws is instructive in suggesting 
                                               
452 LU 14. A similar law is found in the Law Code of Lipit-Ishtar, in which a fine of 
ten shekels is imposed if a virgin daughter is falsely accused of having had sexual 
intercourse; LL33.  
453 ARM 28 20. This text also demonstrates that there must have been very 
specific sites in which a river ordeal could take place, as the accused men are 
sent by the king of Carchemish to Mari so that they can undergo the ordeal 
there. See Lafont, B. (2001), 204-205. 
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that these were two different sets of legislation envisaging two different 
and divergent scenarios. In MAL A 17, if a man brings an accusation 
of adultery against another man’s wife, but he can provide no proof for 
this, then just as in LH 132 the river ordeal is to be undertaken to 
determine her guilt or innocence.454 In MAL A 18, the same accusation 
is made, but the man here claims that he can prove the charge and then 
he fails to do so. His punishment is similar to that of LH 127, and he is 
to be struck forty times, to have his hair shaved, to undergo one month 
of forced labour, and he must pay a fine.  
MAL A 17 and 18 provide a clear comparison with LH 132 and 127 
respectively, as each is dealing with the same situations, and dealing 
with them in the same way. The Middle Assyrian Laws also provide 
                                               
454 MAL A 17 does not explicitly state which party is to undertake the ordeal, 
meaning it could be either the accuser, the husband, or the wife. Driver and 
Miles argue for the wife, both on comparison with other Near Eastern legislation 
and that it is unlikely that the accuser would risk an ordeal, or that a husband 
would undertake one to clear his wife’s name; Driver and Miles (1935), 68, 103. 
Westbrook argues instead that the ordeal would have been undertaken by the 
accuser; Westbrook (2003a), 93. The weakness identified by Westbrook in Driver 
and Miles’ argument is that there is no punishment specified for the accuser if 
the wife is proven innocent by the ordeal. They account for this by suggesting 
that rather than a slanderous accusation, the husband has heard unprovable 
gossip and it is he who wishes to test its veracity; Driver and Miles (1935), 68-69. 
Westbrook argues that MAL A 18 demonstrates that these laws are for public 
accusations of adultery, therefore the absence of a punishment must mean it is 
the accuser who is taking the ordeal, with his likely death if he fails the ordeal 
being the punishment if the wife is proven innocent, Westbrook (2003a), 93, 
n.31. Whilst Westbrook is almost certainly correct in stating that MAL A 17 does 
envisage a slanderous accusation, this does not mean that the lack of any 
mentioned punishment for the accuser means the wife did not undertake it. As is 
discussed here, it may actually have been the case that adultery was an 
exception that carried no risk of punishment for the accuser, but even if not, LH 
132 is clear that it is the wife who undertakes the ordeal, and there is no 
punishment for the accuser mentioned here either. As the comparative evidence 
strongly suggests that it is the wife who undertakes the ordeal when an 
accusation is made, there is no difficulty in assuming that the wife is also 
intended in MAL A 17 also; see LU 14; LH 131, 132; ARM 26.1 249; Num. 5.12-31.   
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some additional detail which makes it clearer where the demarcation 
point between the two situations is. The accuser of MAL A 17 cannot 
bring proof specifically because he cannot produce witnesses. As 
discussed in the section on punishment, witnesses were likely key to 
proving a charge of adultery in a trial situation. As the accuser of MAL 
A 18 says he can prove the charges, then this must mean he can bring 
witnesses, and therefore to reach the point where he does not prove the 
charges must further mean the case has gone to trial, where he then fails 
to produce the promised witnesses and is punished as a result.455 
Conversely, as the accuser of MAL A 17 could not bring witnesses then 
the case would never have gone to trial. Instead, the accuser and the 
husband draw up the agreement for the river ordeal between them. As 
he never claimed to be able to bring witnesses nor brought the case to 
trial, he is not subject to the punishment for failing to produce the 
witnesses.456  
                                               
455 Driver and Miles see LH 127 as envisaging a trial scenario also; Driver and 
Miles (1952), 276, 278 
456 Frymer-Kensky argues that as the accusation had still been made, then the 
wife would still have to undergo the river ordeal even as her accuser was 
punished for failing to bring any proof; Frymer-Kensky (1977), 150-151. It is not 
out of the question that this could have been the case. LH 132 only makes 
mention of the wife having been accused without having been caught in the act, 
so if the accuser of LH 127 cannot bring proof, it will leave the wife with an 
unsubstantiated accusation adultery made against her. Consequently, it may well 
be that LH would now regard her has a wife who has been accused without 
proof, and thus subject to LH 132. By extension the same would presumably 
apply with regards to MAL A 17 and 18. However, the Middle Assyrian Laws seem 
a little clearer that this would not the be the case as they are presented as 
alternative situations, rather than complementary ones. Both begin with the 
accuser approaching the husband with the allegation, but then divert based on 
whether the accuser says he has proof or not. If the Assyrian wife would remain 
liable to MAL A 18 even after her accuser was punished as per MAL A 17, it 
would require the accuser approaching the husband again after the trial, making 
the allegation again though this time making it clear he had no proof, and then 
drawing up a contract for the river ordeal. It should be noted that Assyrian 
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As it is unlikely to be the case that the punishments of LH 127 and 
MAL A 18 would apply in cases where the wife cleared her name via 
a river ordeal, and no punishments are mentioned in LH 132 or MAL 
A 17, the former especially noteworthy as LH 2 is clear that a river 
ordeal carries a talionic punishment for accusations of sorcery, then it 
leaves the very real possibility that someone could freely make an 
unfounded accusation of adultery without risking any consequences.457 
However, LU 127 does specify a punishment, even if it was not 
talionic, and LH 127 and MAL A 18 do demonstrate that the 
Babylonian and Assyrian laws did see a need to punish false 
accusations of adultery, so it would be unusual if this only applied in 
certain circumstances.458 The talionic punishment for an accusation of 
treason is found in a letter by a king rather than in a law code, so the 
absence of any mention of a punishment in these law codes may not 
                                               
legislation from several centuries later is not conclusive proof as to how LH 127 
and 132 should be read in relationship to each other, but given their close 
similarities coupled with the absence of anything in the Babylonian sources to 
suggest the wife in LH 127 would be liable to the river ordeal, they do provide 
some useful context. 
457 From his survey of talionic punishments attested for false accusations, Locher 
does conclude that the law favoured the accusing man over the accused wife. 
See Locher (1986), 315-80, for the survey, and 376-380, for adultery accusations. 
458 As penalties for false accusations in LH 127, MAL A 18, and LU 14 fall short of 
execution, Finkelstein concludes that whilst adultery was in theory a capital 
offence, as it was left to the husband’s discretion it must very rarely have been 
so in practice, and thus the punishment for a false accuser could not be a capital 
one either, as this would exceed the principle of talion. This contrasts with 
sorcery and treason, which were prosecuted by the state with set capital 
offences, and so for the punishment to be talionic if a false accusation was made 
then it must be death; Finkelstein (1966), 372. This is a convincing argument if 
only LH 127 and MAL A 18 are considered, which can only guess at the 
punishment the husband would have chosen had the charge been proven, but 
for LU 14 the wife has actually undertaken the river ordeal, which presumably 
did place her life at risk, and so the punishment here would seem to fall some 
way short of being talionic.   
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mean the principle of punishing false accusations would be abandoned 
in this instance, even if it is not explicitly stated. 
If a husband wished to bring a formal accusation of adultery against his 
wife, but had not caught her in the act, then this did not require a river 
ordeal, and was dealt with under a different law in LH: 
Law Code of Hammurabi 131 
If the husband accuses his own wife (of adultery), although she has not 
been seized lying with another male, she shall swear (to her innocence) 
by an oath by the god, and return to her house.459  
 
Oaths were a common resort in the Near East where there was a dispute 
between two parties and in which there were no evidence nor witnesses 
                                               
459 Driver and Miles read ‘return to her house’ as the oath has been taken in a 
court and she then returns home, whereas Stol reads it as meaning her father’s 
house, and that the wife goes back to her family, presumably meaning an end to 
the marriage; Driver and Miles (1952), 276; Stol (2016), 247. If Stol’s reading is 
correct it would mean the wife is divorced regardless of whether she affirms her 
innocence with the oath, rendering the oath somewhat pointless, albeit it would 
prevent her from potentially receiving a more severe punishment, and 
presumably would allow her to keep her dowry. Divorce is the punishment for 
the Sumerian woman who admitted adultery rather than take an oath denying it, 
there is no sense that the Israelite wife who swears an oath is divorced, nor the 
woman who survives the ordeal of LH 132, and in MAL A 13, the wife is described 
as going from her house, which cannot be her father’s house; NG 205:18-26; 
Num. 5.12-31. This does leave the question as to what is meant by ‘her house’ as 
it cannot normally be the marital home. For MAL A 13, Driver and Miles read it as 
the husband is absent, but here they read it as the wife’s quarters within the 
marital home, albeit this is read with LH 148 which refers to quarters built in 
specific circumstances; Driver and Miles (1935), 42; (1952), 284. As there is no 
evidence from the Near East which would provide context for anything other 
than the innocence of the wife being proven by taking the oath, then whatever is 
meant by ‘her house’, it is unlikely to mean she must return to her father’s 
home. 
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to settle the outcome.460 For example, in the Middle Assyrian Laws, a 
man who has intercourse with an unmarried virgin can avoid part of the 
penalty by swearing an oath stating that the act was consensual and that 
he did not force himself on her.461 Swearing an oath was considered to 
be an ordeal just like entering the water, and if a guilty person feared 
the consequences of falsely swearing an oath and refused to take it, 
then as with refusing a river ordeal, this was also effectively an 
admission of guilt.462 In the case of the Sumerian wife divorced for 
committing adultery, she chose to confess to the crime rather than 
falsely swear an oath that she had not.463 The procedure required the 
oath-taker to swear the oath in or at the door of a temple, in a shrine, or 
before an emblem of a god, and given the seriousness with which it was 
regarded, swearing it was considered proof that the oath-taker was 
telling the truth.464 It is not clear why it is that the procedure varied 
depending on whether the husband or a third party has made the 
accusation. It may be that in the case of an accusation by a third party, 
then a river ordeal provided a necessarily immediate resolution to the 
                                               
460 Lafont S. (2003), 528; Postgate (1992), 280. Oaths were themselves a form of 
ordeal and are one of the features which makes it possible to speak of a common 
Near Eastern judicial system, as they occur in so many Near Eastern societies, 
across all periods; Driver and Miles (1940), 132; Westbrook (2003b), 24.  
461 MAL A 55-56; see also Driver and Miles (1935), 57-60. Similarly, a man who 
travels with another man’s wife can offset some of the penalty by swearing an 
oath that he did not know she was married; MAL A 22. 
462 Driver and Miles (1935), 90-92, and (1952), 466-468; Westbrook (2003b), 376. 
Refusing to swear an oath was even expressed as fearing the oath in Babylonian 
and Hebrew sources; Landsberger (1937), 77.45-78.50; Eccl. 9.2.  
463 NG 205:18-26. 
464 Driver and Miles (1952), 467; Lafont, S. (2011), 350-351; Westbrook (2003b), 
34, 374. A proverb cited in a Neo-Assyrian letter even goes as far as to state that 
a sinful wife’s word is taken over her husband’s when in court; ABL 403.13-15; 
Lambert (1960), 281; Steele (2007), 302. 
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charge, as any divine judgement would be immediately rendered, 
whereas divine judgement was not necessarily immediate to a person 
who falsely swore an oath.465 It also protected the wife from a husband 
who wished to be rid of her and for which the river ordeal could provide 
a convenient way of doing so. Whilst at the same time if a husband was 
genuinely suspicious, and there was a punishment for the accuser if the 
wife survived a river ordeal, then it would not place the couple in a 
situation in which either the wife died or the husband risked a 
punishment that could possibly be his own death if there were talionic 
punishments for adultery accusations. Both spouses would leave an 
oath ordeal physically and financially intact if the wife was prepared to 
undergo it. 
The swearing of an oath by an accused wife is also found outside of 
Mesopotamia in both Egypt and Israel.466 From the New Kingdom 
period in Egypt, an ostrakon fragment records part of the text of a 
judicial oath spoken by a wife accused of adultery.467 As only part of it 
                                               
465 Fishbane argues from the reference to the wife entering the water for her 
husband, that an accusation from a third party impacts the husband’s reputation 
and requires an immediate and public resolution, whereas the husband’s 
suspicions are private, and the oath procedure allows them to remain that way; 
Fishbane (1974), 37-38. See also Wells (2005), 53; Westbrook (2003b), 376; Willis 
(2001), 197. 
466 Whilst the river ordeal is not attested in either society, the Hebrew Bible does 
suggest a knowledge of the river ordeal in a number of passages which speak 
metaphorically in terms of the speaker being rescued from the waters by God. 
Kyle McCarter argues that the term ‘ed in the Hebrew Bible can specifically refer 
to a river ordeal, though allows for them to be part of a shared conceptual space 
with Mesopotamia rather than a feature of Hebrew legislation; Kyle McCarter 
(1973), 403-412. 
467 “The wife was like a (good) wife; she did not commit love, she had no 
extramarital intercourse with…” (trans. Pestman); O. Cairo 25227. A similar oath 
survives from either the Ptolemaic or Roman period of Egypt; O. Louvre 8112 II.4-
6. 
188 
 
survives it lacks any context with regards to the circumstances which 
brought about the oath, nor does it mention any possible punishments, 
but as what does survive is the wife affirming she has not been 
unfaithful, then it would at the least seem a very similar procedure to 
that found in LH 131. 
The other account of an oath sworn by an accused wife is found in the 
Hebrew Bible at Num. 5.12-28, and this is also by far the fullest.468 The 
circumstances here are the same as in LH 131, in that a husband who 
suspects his wife of adultery but who has no witnesses to prove it, can 
bring his wife to a priest to have her swear an oath as to her innocence. 
This passage gives a detailed account of the procedure the wife must 
follow to swear the oath. The husband first brings his wife along with 
a grain offering to the priest, who places the offering into the wife’s 
hand, and recites a curse whilst holding bitter water.469 These curses 
                                               
468 There are a number of repetitions within this passage, which has led several 
scholars to use source criticism to argue that it is a combination of two different 
procedures; see Budd (1984), 62-63 for a review of scholarship. Among them is 
de Vaulx, who has argued that the two procedures are a direct parallel to LH 131 
and 132, though to do this he makes the demarcation point between the two 
passages the level of certainty over the wife’s guilt, rather than the source of the 
accusation being either the husband or someone else. As it is the latter which 
separates LH 131 and 132 then the comparison is unconvincing; de Vaulx (1972), 
93. Whilst it may or not be the case that two procedures have been combined, if 
they have then both are intended to be used by a jealous husband against a wife 
suspected of adultery, but against whom there is no evidence. There is no 
mention in Num. 5.11-15 of anyone other than the husband bringing an 
accusation. Bewer argues, also based on LH 131 and 132, that the two 
procedures were originally separate, one consisting of an oath and a meal 
offering, and the other consisting of an ordeal involving drinking cursed water, 
and that they have been later combined by Hebrew law; Bewer (1913), 36-47. 
However, these two elements are found combined in a single procedure partially 
preserved on a Middle Assyrian tablet. Here, the two litigants drink the water 
and swear the oath, and they are regarded as innocent if they do so; VAT 9962. 
469 Num. 5.15-22. Water drinking as part of an oath ceremony has already been 
mentioned with regards to the Middle Assyrian text VAT 9962. There may also be 
another water drinking ordeal in the Hebrew Bible which takes place at Exod. 
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are washed into the water, and the wife must drink it, with the 
punishment for falsely swearing the oath being that the water will 
“enter your bowels and make your womb discharge, your uterus 
drop”.470 
It is worth noting that the punishment for the wife who commits 
adultery and falsely swears an oath is not death, which is the mandated 
punishment in all the adultery legislation in the Hebrew Bible. Milgrom 
                                               
32.32. After Moses discovered the Israelites worshipping a golden calf, he ground 
the calf into a powder, mixed it with water, and made the Israelites drink it, 
which may have been an ordeal to determine which of the Israelites was guilty of 
idolatry; Milgrom (1989), 348. 
470 Num. 5.22-24. The exact meaning of this punishment is a little unclear. What 
the NRSV translates as ‘uterus’ is yarēch which actually means ‘thigh’, although it 
used in Gen. 46.26 to describe Jacob’s descendants ‘coming forth from his thigh’, 
so can be used euphemistically to refer to offspring. Beten means ‘belly’ but is 
used in Judg. 16.17 by Samson to refer to himself being born from his mother’s 
belly. This gives the two most likely explanations for the effect of the curse on an 
adulterous wife to be either causing sterility, causing a miscarriage, or perhaps 
either depending on whether the wife was pregnant or not. Brichto sees the 
fallen thigh as sterility, but argues that the use of verb ṣbh, which only appears in 
the Hebrew Bible in this passage, but is used in post-Biblical Hebrew to mean ‘to 
swell’, must refer to a swollen belly, but sees the bitter water as causing a false 
pregnancy and sterility in the wife, rather than the wife being pregnant already; 
Brichto (1975), 66. Similarly, Driver suggests that if the water causes the belly to 
swell then it could not already be swollen, and so cannot mean the wife is 
pregnant, though argues that the verb refers to becoming dry, which means 
sterile, but that the fallen thigh means to miscarry, and both punishments are 
intended; Driver (1956), 74-75.  Milgrom favours sterility as the only punishment, 
dismissing Driver’s interpretation of the falling thigh and citing passages 
elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible in which sterility is a punishment for sexual 
offences; Milgrom (1989), 303 n.64.  If it is an either/or punishment based on 
whether the wife was pregnant, as Driver argues, then this raises the odd 
circumstance in which the adulterous wife who is pregnant by her lover loses the 
baby but can continue to conceive, but the adulterous wife who did not fall 
pregnant cannot have any more children. If it is both punishments which are 
intended then it would only make sense if the oath was sworn by a pregnant wife 
only, as one who is not could not miscarry. As the passage makes no mention of 
the wife’s pregnancy as being the cause of the husband’s suspicion, nor does the 
parallel passage in LH 131, then it seems most likely that sterility is the intended 
punishment for an adulterous wife who undergoes the oath. See also Frymer-
Kensky who suggests the result is a prolapsed uterus, and Levine who notes the 
contrast with the innocent wife retaining her seed, though is non-committal on 
whether this should be read literally to mean a child or to mean the ability to 
procreate; Frymer-Kensky (1984), 20-21; Levine (1993), 201-202.   
190 
 
explains this away by arguing that as the adulteress has not been 
apprehended in the act, she is protected from secular punishment, 
especially as the system could be abused by a husband who wished to 
no longer be married to his wife.471 Whilst the sterility inflicted on the 
wife is clearly envisioned as a divine punishment rather than a secular, 
befitting its status as an ordeal, it begs the question that if this was 
available as a divine punishment, then why was not death an option, 
especially given the vehement mandate elsewhere in Leviticus and 
Deuteronomy that the adulteress must be put to death else she defile 
the land and risk the relationship of the Israelites to God? As has been 
seen, death is certainly a possible outcome for an ordeal elsewhere in 
the Near East, and death by ordeal is seen to be a divine judgement. It 
is further argued by Milgrom that sterility is a measure-for-measure 
retribution by God, though the comparative examples he cites of 
Jacob’s deception of Isaac, and the penalty of forty years wandering in 
the wilderness, are not crimes with mandated punishments in the 
manner of adultery, and nor is God elsewhere unwilling to kill those 
whose behaviour affects the Israelites’ relationship with God.472  
It seems most likely that the procedure for a wife accused of adultery 
by a jealous husband who had no evidence for it was ultimately 
intended to allow the wife to be considered innocent simply by 
swearing the oath. As Brichto points out, it is unlikely that an ancient 
Israelite would expect that any physical swelling of the belly or falling 
                                               
471 Milgrom (1989), 348-350. 
472 Milgrom (1989), 350. See Gen. 38.7, Lev. 10.1-3, and Num. 16.27-32, 25.9 for 
examples of divine killings in the Pentateuch. 
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of the thigh would actually occur when the wife drank the bitter 
water.473 An ordeal in which death was a genuinely possible outcome 
would require the wife to be placed in physical danger, such as in the 
river ordeal, and Milgrom is correct in pointing out this would be open 
to abuse by a husband who wished to be rid of his wife, albeit not 
because the wife in this situation is protected from secular punishment, 
as divine punishment could certainly be death also, such as the river 
ordeal was. This would bring Num. 5.12-28 into line with LH 131, and 
they each serve the same function. The wife undergoes a similar 
procedure in each having been accused of adultery without any proof 
by her husband, it is one which does not place her in any actual physical 
danger, and although Numbers allows for a theoretical and immediately 
obvious physical punishment, in reality the expectation would be that 
this would not occur. Instead, the seriousness with which oath-taking 
was regarded would mean any wife who underwent this ordeal would 
be considered innocent, with the possibility of a divine punishment in 
the form of sterility if she was lying, which was a punishment that did 
not require any immediately visible effects. 
As this survey of ordeals and oaths suggests, their usage across in the 
Near East was not entirely uniform, as whilst oaths are attested across 
the region, the river ordeal seems to have been a Mesopotamian 
procedure. However, whilst the method may not always be consistent, 
the intent to have the divine adjudicate a case in which evidence is 
                                               
473 Brichto (1975), 66. 
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absent remains consistent. More importantly for this case study, is the 
diminishing use of supra-rational procedures from the second quarter 
of the first millennium onwards. In Mesopotamia, the river ordeal all 
but disappears from the record, whilst swearing the judicial oath no 
longer means a decisive victory, with physical evidence becoming 
favoured ahead of it.474 In the Hebrew Bible, a reform of the Judaean 
judicial system is at least envisioned, if not necessarily enacted, in 
Deuteronomy.475 
As this is contemporary with the period of Greek history with which 
this case study compares, then if the situation in the Near East had 
moved away from supra-rational procedures, then it could be 
misleading to include them in comparison. Whilst this should be borne 
in mind, two points speak strongly in favour of their inclusion. The first 
is that Mesopotamian legislation on adultery always favoured physical 
evidence, and supra-rational procedures were resorted to in their 
absence, and even then, only with regards to the wife.476 Both LH 127 
and MAL A 18 are testament to the value placed on physical evidence 
                                               
474 For the absence of ordeals in the Neo-Babylonian period see Joannès (1997), 
163-174. There are examples in the preceding Neo-Assyrian period; Kataja 
(1987), 66. For the reduction in force of the judicial oath in this period see 
Magdalene (2004), 304-309. Otto and Ries see these trends as the result of a 
secularising tendency in Mesopotamian courts from the Neo-Babylonian period 
onwards, whereas Wells considers the Mesopotamian evidence alongside Biblical 
evidence to argue that it stemmed from an attempt by officials to acquire stricter 
control over economic, political, and religious issues; Otto (1998), 263-283; Ries 
(1999), 457-468; Wells (2008), 205-232.  
475 Centralising of the cult, secularisation, and rationalisation are all identified as 
possible reasons for the changes envisaged by the Deuteronomist; See Fishbane, 
(1985), 91-230; Levinson (1997), 118; Otto (1996), 112-122; Patrick (1985), 125; 
Weinfeld (1972), 233-236. 
476 Barring MAL A 22, which was for a very specific set of circumstances, and for 
which the agreement to undertake the ordeal was not binding.  
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in adultery cases, with LH 132 and MAL A 17 specifically for when 
there is no evidence, and legislation which allows for a capital 
punishment requires the couple to have been caught in the act. The 
second is the detailed oath procedure of Num. 5.12-28. This is 
commonly attributed to the Priestly source, which is post-exilic, and 
indicates that supra-rational procedures for adultery cases lacking 
evidence remained in the Hebrew imagination even after 
Deuteronomy, and well into the period of Greek history under 
comparison. 
 
Equal Punishment 
 
One final element common to Near Eastern adultery legislation is 
found in the requirement that whatever punishment the husband chose 
to impose upon the adulterous lover, must also be imposed in equal 
measure by the husband upon his wife. As has already been seen in LH 
129, the husband could choose to spare his wife from being bound and 
thrown into the water, but if he does, the king will also spare her lover 
from the same fate. In MAL A 15, the husband is required to impose 
equal levels of punishment on the adulterous couple. This does not 
necessarily mean the same punishment, as cutting off his wife’s nose 
is equated with turning the lover into a eunuch, but this law is clear in 
stating that if the husband wishes to release his wife, he must also 
release her lover. In HL 197-198, the husband may kill the couple if he 
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catches them in the act or bring them to the palace gate and state that 
he will not kill his wife, but if he does must also spare her lover.477 
The existence of the same rule in Egypt is heavily implied by P DeM 
27. In this, a man on two separate occasions took an oath not to commit 
adultery, each time with the same woman.478 Aside from demonstrating 
that not everyone in the Near East took oath-taking seriously, it is 
obviously the case that after the first occasion, neither member of the 
adulterous couple was killed, nor was the wife divorced. The first oath 
sworn stated that if the man even spoke to the woman again, he would 
have his nose and ears mutilated and be banished to Nubia. Whilst it is 
possible that the mutilation could have occurred, the man clearly could 
not have been banished to Nubia when he was caught a second time, as 
the second oath would send him to hard labour at Elephantine if he 
broke it. Given the insistence elsewhere of equal punishment, then the 
likely reason that the adulterous lover twice escaped from being caught 
with nothing more severe than promising not to do it again, is that the 
husband did not wish to punish the wife, and therefore could not 
enforce the punishment on her lover.479  
It is difficult to know whether this rule existed in Israel and Judah, 
given that the legal material in the Hebrew Bible mandates the death 
penalty for both members of the adulterous couple without discretion 
                                               
477 If the husband does set them free he must also ‘clothe his (the lover’s) head’. 
Exactly what this means is not clear; Roth (1995), 240, n.65. 
478 See Allam (1973a), 301-302, and (1973b), 98-99. 
479 Lorton has suggested that the husband’s decision not to punish his wife 
removed any obligation on the court to punish the adulterer, and so the oaths 
were not enforced by them; Lorton (1977), 38-39.  
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given to the husband.480 If Prov. 6.32-35 is a window into actual 
practice, it is insufficient to demonstrate whether the enraged husband 
was required to punish his wife with something comparable to the 
beating he deals out to her lover. However, clear evidence for equal 
punishment in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and the Hittite kingdom, suggests 
that if Proverbs 6.32-35 shows Israelite practice was in line with the 
rest of the Near East with regards to the husband’s discretion in 
imposing punishment, then it may also be in line with regards to 
requiring that whatever punishment he chose should be imposed 
equally.  
Exactly why this requirement of equal punishment is found in a number 
of Near Eastern adultery laws is not clear, as no source discusses it. 
Driver and Miles suggest it was partly due to fairness, and partly 
because there could have been no offence against the husband if he did 
not punish his wife, so consequently there was nothing to punish the 
adulterer for.481 This latter element is identified as further having the 
advantage of preventing the husband from blackmailing the adulterer, 
as without a punishment inflicted on the wife there would be nothing 
                                               
480 Although it is noteworthy that both of the couple are to suffer the 
punishment, so whilst it may not be the case that these two laws envisage the 
husband as having discretion over the level of punishment, the punishment 
remains equal. McKeating suggests that it may be the implicit intention of these 
laws that the death penalty can only be exacted if both parties suffer it; 
McKeating (1979), 58-59, followed by Westbrook (1990), 551. However, given 
the context of these passages in the broader legislation of Leviticus and 
Deuteronomy, it is difficult to envisage the intention of these laws to be that the 
wife must die if the husband is to kill her lover. Adultery is one of the several 
crimes which must be punished to maintain the relationship between the 
Israelites and God, and so as both parties have committed adultery, then both 
must be punished. Leaving the wife alive would mean an adulteress remains in 
the land and amongst the people. 
481 Driver and Miles (1935), 24. See also Cardascia (1969), 119. 
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to blackmail the adulterer for.482 Westbrook allows for fairness to be a 
consideration, but primarily sees the requirement as designed to 
prevent collusion and entrapment.483 If the husband could freely choose 
separate punishments for each party, then he could collude with his 
wife to seduce another man, possibly for financial gain or to remove a 
rival. Stol disagrees that the requirement had anything to do with 
collusion, pointing out there is no proof for it, and instead argues it is 
nothing more than fairness.484 
The Middle Assyrian Laws contain another example of equal 
punishment for adultery in addition to that of MAL A 15. In MAL A 
23, a woman who takes another man’s wife into her home and gives 
her to another man for the purpose of sexual intercourse, is liable to the 
same punishment as the husband inflicts on his wife. If the wife is not 
punished, then she is not to be punished either. If collusion is the 
concern then this would seem an elaborate way to go about doing it, as 
the husband and wife could collude together without the help of a third 
party, plus the wife is punished regardless in this scenario. It seems 
much more likely that if the husband does not punish his wife, then the 
procuress is considered not to have committed an offence against 
him.485 By extension, this would suggest that the requirement of equal 
punishment for cases for adultery was at least partly rooted in the act 
                                               
482 Driver and Miles (1935), 24. 
483 Westbrook (1990), 554. 
484 Stol (2016), 240. 
485 Similarly, in MAL A 24, if a man’s wife should withdraw from his house and 
reside in the house of another married couple, he may punish the couple, but 
only if he mutilates his wife and divorces her. If he does not mutilate her, he 
must take her back and can impose no punishment on the married couple.  
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being an offence to the husband. If he did not punish his wife then he 
could not consider her as having committed an offence, and so no 
offence had been committed against him by either party.  
Support for this reading is suggested elsewhere in the Middle Assyrian 
Laws. In MAL A 4, slaves who receive property given to them by a 
wife, which presumably means the property was taken by her from the 
husband without his permission, are liable to mutilation and the return 
of the property. The wife is also to be mutilated, but if she is not, then 
the husband can neither mutilate the slaves nor take the property back. 
This must be because if the husband does not punish his wife then he 
cannot consider her actions as a wrong against him, and thus the 
property cannot have been stolen. Her lack of punishment is proof that 
he does not consider the slaves to have received stolen goods. It would 
seem unlikely that this law is concerned with the situation in which a 
husband and wife collude just to mutilate slaves. Nor does fairness 
alone seem an adequate explanation, as that would mean the law does 
consider that a crime has been committed by the wife but is concerned 
with fairness with regards to the slaves.  
It could be argued that the underlying principle behind these laws is 
still that of collusion, as by allowing the husband to set the level of the 
offence it prevents collusion from occurring. However, in the absence 
of any evidence in support of this, collusion and entrapment must be 
seen as secondary considerations behind the discretion of the husband 
to decide whether he wishes to regard his wife as having committed an 
offence against him, and the extent to which he regards it as an offence 
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if he does choose to punish. This is not to say that collusion was not a 
consideration, only that it was not primary. Fairness as the sole 
consideration is an inadequate explanation. Caution should be taken in 
extrapolating a general principle for the entire Near East from just the 
Middle Assyrian Laws, but as they provide some insight into what is a 
more widely attested Near Eastern practice, then it is reasonable to 
suppose that they highlight a more general approach to the subject of 
equal punishment in the Near East. 
 
Moicheia Legislation in Classical Greece 
 
Whereas the Near Eastern evidence allows for a relatively 
unproblematic reconstruction of both what the offence of adultery was 
and how it was punished, the situation is much less clear in Greece. As 
would be expected, much of the surviving evidence for adultery and 
how it was dealt with in law comes from Classical Athens, but whilst 
there are narrative accounts, legal speeches, and laws which all touch 
on the topic, there is dispute over exactly what the offence was and how 
it was punished. Much of the issue stems from the fact that adultery as 
a specific offence did not exist in Athens. Whilst the act was recognised 
and legislated against, it was done so as part of a broader offence 
known as moicheia, and not as the singular offence of adultery. A 
number of scholars have attempted to both define what moicheia was 
and to identify a single unifying element which tied adultery to the 
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other sexual offences that were seemingly covered by it, without any 
consensus emerging, particularly on the latter point. 
In addition to the Athenian sources, important evidence for moicheia is 
also provided by Gortyn. This was a polis on Crete whose laws provide 
the best collection of legal material for any Greek polis outside of 
Athens.486 Amongst the inscribed laws is the Gortyn Law Code, which 
most likely dates to the second half of the fifth century, which collects 
together laws enacted from at least the early sixth century onwards, and 
of which what survives is likely one part of a larger and more complete 
code.487 The laws on moicheia are contained within a section relating 
to family law and are part of a larger section on sexual offences, and 
they appear alongside laws on topics such as divorce, inheritance, 
property, and children. By having material on moicheia law from two 
different poleis, it does make it possible to speak in more general terms 
of a Greek approach to adultery, rather than a purely Atheno-centric 
approach, and the evidence from one polis helps to shed light on the 
evidence from the other. As will be seen, whilst they differ on some 
details, broadly speaking they present very similar approaches to 
moicheia.  
This section begins with an attempt to understand what moicheia was 
by reviewing the evidence for it, and then discussing the scholarship 
which has attempted to interpret it. It is followed by an examination of 
the legal procedures for prosecuting moicheia and the punishments a 
                                               
486 Gagarin and Perlman (2016), 264-265. 
487 Gagarin (1982), 129-146; Gagarin and Perlman (2016), 335. 
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moichos was liable to. Both of these discussions lead into the closing 
section, which examines how the woman was dealt with in the light of 
the Near Eastern requirement that the wife be punished to an equal 
degree as her lover, and what this can tell us about how moicheia 
differed from adultery. A communal concern in Athens over the 
presence of a moichos and his lover is also noted, which differs from 
the situation in the Near East, and recalls a similar concern over the 
presence of both an accused and a convicted killer within the polis. 
 
 
The Definition of Moicheia 
 
In the fourth century Athenian lawcourt speech, On the Killing of 
Eratosthenes, the speaker, Euphiletus, was the defendant in a homicide 
trial. Euphiletus did not deny that he killed Eratosthenes, but rather he 
offered as his defence that the killing was lawful, and thus he was not 
liable to any sanction. The reason that it was a lawful killing was 
because Euphiletus claimed he caught Eratosthenes in the act of sexual 
intercourse with Euphiletus’ wife, in Euphiletus’ house.488 This is 
clearly an example of what in Near Eastern law would be adultery. The 
word used by Euphiletus to describe the act is moicheia, and as the 
perpetrator of moicheia, Eratosthenes is a moichos.489 Whilst there are 
Athenian sources which do discuss moicheia, and some which mention 
or discuss laws on it, unfortunately very little text of any actual 
                                               
488 Lys. 1.24-27. 
489 For example, Lys. 1.31, 1.36. The verb is moicheuō; Lys. 1.4. 
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moicheia laws survive. It means that unlike in the Near East, where a 
number of adultery laws survive from across several civilisations, 
defining the offence of moicheia in Athenian law is comparatively 
difficult. 
In total, there are three Athenian laws which can be positively 
identified as being laws which mention moicheia. In the list of duties 
undertaken by the thesmothetai, the Constitution of the Athenians lists 
several graphai which fall under their authority, and among them is a 
graphe moicheias.490 Unfortunately, the text provides no more 
information than the name. What is of interest when compared with the 
Near East, where the offence was cast as one against the husband and 
one in which he had the right to decide the punishment, is that as a 
graphe this was a public suit, which means it could be brought by any 
free adult male.491 This presumably meant that a husband whose wife 
was caught with a moichos may find that he had no say in whether the 
moichos was punished, nor the extent to which he was punished, if a 
suit was brought by a third party under this law. This is in stark contrast 
                                               
490 Ath.Pol. 59.3. 
491 Both Harrison and MacDowell suggest that this procedure may have been for 
circumstances in which the moichos had not been caught in the act. This would 
itself be unusual in comparison to Near Eastern adultery law wherein there were 
virtually no circumstances in which the adulterer was liable for punishment if not 
caught in the act: Harrison (1968), 35; MacDowell (1978a), 125. It also begs the 
question as to how the case could be proven if there were no witnesses to it, 
which is precisely why Near Eastern law needed the adulterer to have been 
caught in the act. There is also no surviving Athenian law which specifically deals 
with punishing a moichos caught in the act. The lawful homicide law discussed 
below would cover this, but unless it also mandated killing a moichos caught in 
the act then it could not cover all possibilities for this circumstance. It leaves the 
graphe moicheias as the only surviving law under which a prosecution for 
moicheia could be brought, and this almost certainly would have covered 
situations for which the moichos was caught in the act. 
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to the Near Eastern husband whose interests were paramount in the 
prosecution of adultery. The offence was to him, as was the decision to 
prosecute, and the level of punishment. 
Two further laws which reference a moichos are found in the lawcourt 
speech, Against Neaira. One of these laws has the text of it given in the 
speech: 
[Dem.] 59.87 
After he has caught the moichos, the man who caught him shall not be 
permitted to continue living with the woman. If he continues living 
with her in marriage, he is to be disenfranchised. And the woman with 
whom a moichos has been caught shall not be permitted to attend the 
public cult ceremonies. If she enters, she is to suffer whatever she 
suffers, except death, with impunity. (trans. Kapparis)492 
 
Whilst this law deals directly with moicheia, it does not define what 
the offence of the moichos is. Instead, this law is concerned with the 
obligations placed upon the husband who has caught his wife with a 
moichos, and the sanctions the wife is exposed to for being caught with 
a moichos. This is the only Classical Athenian law on moicheia for 
which any text survives, but, unfortunately, and as will be discussed 
below, it is almost certainly a forgery which does not accurately reflect 
the law it attempts to reconstruct. This means that whilst Athenian laws 
                                               
492 I have given ‘moichos’ in place of Kapparis’ ‘seducer’. 
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on moicheia certainly existed, nothing survives of them, and 
consequently the offence of moicheia must be inferred from 
discussions of the laws that intersect with moicheia, and non-legal 
sources which discuss it. 
The other law on moicheia in this speech is not cited in the text, but 
rather is just discussed by the speaker, Apollodorus. Here, a man named 
Epaenetus was caught committing moicheia against a man named 
Stephanos. The latter held Epaenetus until he promised to pay a fine of 
30 minae. After being released, and instead of paying the fine, 
Epaenetus went to the thesmothetae and indicted Stephanos on a charge 
of unlawful imprisonment for moicheia.493 As with the previous law, 
whilst it mentions the moichos, it assumes the offence rather than gives 
any attempt to define it.  
Both of these laws are cited in reference to a woman named Phano, of 
whom Apollodorus is attempting to convince the dikastai that she was 
the daughter of a non-Athenian woman named Neaira and passed off 
as his own daughter by her lover, Stephanos. Apollodorus claims that 
Stephanos invited Epaenetus to his house with the intention of extorting 
money from him through entrapment by catching him in the act with 
Phano.494 When Epaenetus brought his counter-charge of unlawful 
imprisonment, he admitted to having had sexual intercourse with 
Phano, but denied it was moicheia on the grounds that Phano was not 
                                               
493 [Dem.] 59.65-66. As is discussed below, this law is a forgery. See Canevaro 
(2013), 190-197. 
494 [Dem.] 59.64-65. 
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Stephanos’ daughter, that her mother knew of the affair, and that he 
lavished large amounts of money on them. Epaenetus claimed that 
Stephanos and Neaira primarily made their living in this way, and thus 
Phano was to be regarded as a prostitute.  
What is remarkable about this is that nowhere does Epaenetus make his 
defence on the grounds that Phano was not married. That the woman 
was a wife was an integral aspect of Near Eastern adultery law, to the 
extent that laws such as LE 27-28 make the exact marital status of the 
woman fundamental to whether she was liable to punishment as an 
adulteress, and MAL A 13-14 make the man’s knowledge of her 
marital status fundamental to whether he was to be punished as an 
adulterer. The offence here was not against any husband, as Phano was 
not married when the act took place, but against Stephanos as her 
father. It is Stephanos who catches them in the act, who holds 
Epaenetus, and to whom the fine is to be paid. Likewise, it is 
Stephanos’ relationship to Phano that Epaenetus seeks to challenge 
when making his defence, as if Phano was not his daughter, then he 
could not have committed moicheia against him.  
Based on the grounds upon which Epaenetus does make his defence, it 
can be determined that it was not moicheia to have intercourse with a 
prostitute. Near Eastern legislation does not need to specify this, as 
adultery must be with a wife, though it can be extrapolated from the 
punishments in the Hebrew Bible which treat the adulterous wife as if 
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she were a prostitute.495 It may also be the case that one of the reasons 
the adulterer of MAL A 14 would not know the woman he met in an 
inn or on the street was married was that he could reasonably assume 
she was a prostitute. With regards to the defence that Phano was not 
Stephanos’ daughter, but Neaira’s, it may be the case that intercourse 
with a non-Athenian citizen could not be moicheia, or it more likely is 
the case that Epaenetus is demonstrating that he could not have 
committed moicheia against Stephanos, to whom he owes the fine. As 
he claims as part of his defence that Neaira knew of the affair, then it 
may also be the case either that sexual intercourse could not be 
moicheia if the person the offence would be to both knew and approved 
of it, or that it was moicheia, but the offender could not be legally liable 
for it. 
Subsequent to the affair with Epaenetus, Apollodorus claims that 
Stephanos then tricked a man named Theogenes into marrying Phano 
by representing her as his daughter. Theogenes was serving as king 
archon at the time, and as his wife, Phano was required to make 
sacrifices. Once her status was discovered, and facing punishment from 
the Areopagus, Theogenes plead that he had been deceived by 
Stephanos, and divorced Phano to prove it. It is here that Apollodorus 
references the law that a woman who has been taken by a moichos 
cannot attend public sacrifices. In neither this marriage, nor her 
previous marriage to a man named Phrastor, has Phano been presented 
                                               
495 Jer. 12.26-27; Ezek. 16.37-38, 23.10, 29; Hos. 2.5; Nah. 3.5. 
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by Apollodorus as having committed adultery. Only the incident with 
Epaenetus is presented as moicheia, meaning her liability to this law 
must come from this incident.496 It means both instances of moicheia 
law cited by Apollodorus do not refer to adultery at all, but to 
intercourse between a man and an unmarried daughter, with the offence 
being committed against the father, to whom also lay the right of 
redress. 
Earlier in the same speech, Apollodorus claims that Stephanos and 
Neaira conspired to entrap and blackmail rich foreigners in the exact 
same manner as they later entrapped Epaenetus with Phano, and here 
too, the offence which is claimed by Stephanos is that the rich foreigner 
is a moichos.497 In this circumstance, it is as Neaira’s husband that the 
moichos commits an offence against Stephanos, and it is as the husband 
that he is able to extort a payment from the moichos. In this lawcourt 
speech, the offence to Stephanos is identical in each incidence, 
                                               
496 Apollodorus does make insinuations as to Phano’s behaviour whilst married to 
Phrastor, but no incidents of adultery are mentioned and nor is it part of 
Phrastor’s reasons for divorcing her; [Dem.] 59.50-51. This of course contradicts 
Apollodorus’ account of the affair between Epaenetus and Phano. Omitowojou 
sees no contradiction here, stating that although Epaenetus cannot have 
committed moicheia with Phano, Phano can still be considered to have been 
taken by a moichos. She argues that this is because moicheia is a flexible term 
concerned about the respectability of those involved rather than any marital 
relationship, and that the effective counter open to Epaenetus is not that she is 
not married, but that she can never be a respectable citizen-wife; Omitowojou 
(2002), 78-80. It seems much more likely that Apollodorus is happy to 
inconsistently characterise Phano in whichever way suits his given argument 
best, than there existed a Classical Athenian doublethink in which a woman could 
be taken by a moichos who was not in fact a moichos, because she was not seen 
as respectable; see Kapparis (1999), 353. Contrary to what Omitowojou claims, it 
is, in fact, her lack of respectability which Epaenetus calls upon to demonstrate 
that sexual intercourse with her could never be moicheia. See Harris (1997) 492-
496, for a criticism of Omitowjou’s views on the status of a woman with regards 
to hubris and moicheia. 
497 [Dem.] 59.41. 
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regardless of whether the moichos had sexual intercourse with his wife 
or his daughter. 
Another instance of moicheia with an unmarried daughter is found in 
the comedy, The Girl from Samos, by Menander. The plot revolves 
around a misunderstanding over the paternity of a child, leading a man 
named Demeas to believe his adopted son, Moschion has had an affair 
with Demeas’ mistress. In fact, Moschion had fathered the child with 
the daughter of another man, Nikeratos, and confesses this to both men 
to clear up the misunderstanding. Later in the play, Nikeratos accuses 
Moschion of being a moichos.498 The play also has reference to 
moicheia in a mythical context, as Demeas recounts the story of the 
impregnation of Danaë by Zeus and uses the verb moicheuo to describe 
Zeus’ actions. As with Nikeratos’ daughter, Danaë is not married, and 
any moicheia must have been committed against her father. 
Aristophanes in Birds uses the same verb to describe the seduction of 
Alkmene, Semele, and Alope by Zeus and Poseidon, respectively.499 
The former was married, whilst the latter two were unmarried 
daughters.  
Returning to Euphiletus and his defence of lawful killing, despite his 
citation of three laws in support of his case none of them survive in the 
                                               
498 Men. Samia 717. Nikaretos accuses Moschion of being a moichos who had 
been caught in the act, despite the fact the affair only came to light much later 
when circumstances forced Moschion to admit to it; Men. Samia 717-718. It 
does suggest that a confession could be regarded as the same as being caught in 
the act, although the context within which this is found suggests caution should 
be exercised in accepting it as legal material. See Sommerstein (2013), 313.  
499 Aristoph. Birds 558-559.  
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text which leaves us with just his discussion of them. Of particular 
interest, are two laws cited by him which he claims are in direct support 
of his killing of Eratosthenes.500 Unfortunately, the discussion of the 
first of these makes it very difficult to know what it was.501 It seems as 
if it was a law that allowed for the killing of a moichos caught in the 
act, as Euphiletus states that Eratosthenes admitted his guilt, and 
attempted to offer compensation as a penalty, but that Euphiletus killed 
him in accordance with the law under discussion. Exactly what this law 
may have been will be discussed further in the section on procedures 
and punishments, but for now it is sufficient to note that it adds nothing 
to the understanding of what the crime of moicheia was beyond that it 
at least covered sexual intercourse with another man’s wife. 
Euphiletus also cites a law of the Areopagus which he claims states that 
a man is not liable to a homicide conviction if he kills a moichos that 
he catches in the act of sexual intercourse with his wife.502 Euphiletus 
states that so seriously did the Areopagus regard the offence, that they 
extended the same right to kill even if the woman was a pallake, a 
concubine, and not a wife.503 The text of the law that Euphiletus cites 
is not preserved in the speech, but it would seem to be the same law as 
a one mentioned by Demosthenes in Against Aristoctrates: 
 
                                               
500 Euphiletus also cites a third law at Lys. 1.31 though it is not a moicheia law. 
501 Lys. 1.28-29. 
502 Lys. 1.30. 
503 Lys. 1.31. 
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Dem. 23.53 
If someone kills someone else unintentionally during athletic contests, 
or overcoming him on the road, or in war without being aware of it, or 
catching him in intercourse with the wife, the mother, the sister, the 
daughter or the concubine held for the purpose of free children, on that 
account the killer is not to flee into exile.504 (trans. Canevaro) 
 
The word which has been translated as ‘in intercourse with’ is epi, or 
catching a man on top of a wife, suggesting that just as with the Near 
Eastern adulterer, the Athenian moichos needed to be caught in the 
act.505 Cantarella argues that this should be taken literally, and that the 
moichos must have been taken in the act of sexual intercourse.506 She 
argues that as Euphiletus describes finding a naked Eratosthenes in his 
home with his wife, but not actually in the act of sexual intercourse, 
that the lawful homicide law would not have applied, hence his appeal 
to other laws to support his case.507 Sealey also argues that an aggrieved 
husband must take an adulterer in the act, with witnesses to it. If he 
only caught him in his home, then he could only restrain him.508 
                                               
504 Dem. 23.53. Whether the wording of the law as it appears in this speech is 
accurate or a later insertion, the discussion of it subsequently in the speech 
suggests that even if it is a forgery, it reflects the content of the original law. See 
Canevaro (2013), 64-70 for a discussion of scholarship and an examination of the 
authenticity of the law. 
505 In Lys. 13.66, when the speaker attempts to slander the defendant with an 
accusation of being a moichos, he makes it clear not just that he was a moichos, 
but that he had been elephthe moichos, ‘seized as a moichos’. The implication 
being that the proof of his guilt is that he was caught in the act. See also Lucian 
Eunuch 10.  
506 Cantarella (1991), 291-292. 
507 Cantarella (1991), 292. 
508 Sealey (1994), 110.  
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Scafuro notes the ambiguity of the term and suggests that much would 
be left up to the discretion of the dikastai in how they chose to interpret 
it.509 Similarly, Kapparis argues that whether the couple were caught 
physically in the act would be an irrelevance in the Athenian legal 
system, as it would simply be up to each individual dikastes to decide 
whether the defendant had convinced them by the presentation of the 
whole of his case.510  
Both Scafuro and Kapparis overstate the extent to which the discretion 
of the dikastai was not guided by substance of the law. Before the case 
came to trial, an Athenian litigant needed to demonstrate how the case 
matched one of the laws in the polis, so a defendant citing the lawful 
homicide law would have to match his defence to the law.511 If epi 
literally meant on top of, the litigant would need to match this to be 
able use the lawful homicide law as a defence. However, the Near 
Eastern evidence does suggest that ‘in the act’ could be much broader 
than just physically in the act of intercourse. There is the example of 
the merchant from Mari who tied the adulterous couple to the bed and 
brought them both outside so that he could gather witnesses.512 More 
pertinent to Euphiletus’ situation is the informal trial procedure 
envisaged by MAL A 15, in which a husband would need to gather 
                                               
509 Scafuro (1997), 196. n.7. 
510 Kapparis (1995), 106. 
511 See Dem. 45.46 for an example of a counter-plea submitted at the pre-trial 
anakrisis, and Harris (2013), 166-173, for evidence that the Athenians both 
defined the key terms in their statutes and applied those definitions. 
512 LAPO 18 1064; Durand (1988), 524-525. 
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witnesses before executing the adulterous couple.513 By the time these 
witnesses could have been collected any physical intercourse would 
have ended, but the circumstances in which they were would be 
sufficiently compromising to prove adultery. The speaker of Dem. 
47.38 is at pains to point out that he entered the house of a man he knew 
not to be married. He had no designs on committing moicheia with 
anyone in the house, but simply entering would place him at risk if 
Theophemus was married. 
The law at Dem. 23.53 does not mention moicheia, and nor is it a law 
about moicheia. It makes no attempt to either explain or define what 
the offence of moicheia is, and lacking any further qualifier, the 
circumstances envisaged by this law could as equally be applied to rape 
as to moicheia.514 This contrasts with the Middle Assyrian Laws, which 
                                               
513 Kapparis also cites an example found in Achilles Tatius, in which a husband 
discovered his wife in the company of another man and confined him for being a 
moichos; Ach. Tat. 5.23; Kapparis (1995), 107. This recalls the Sumerian wisdom 
literature which advised a man not to sit or laugh with another’s man wife lest he 
be suspected of committing adultery with her; Alster (2005), 63; Instr. Šur. 33–
34. However, as Achilles Tatius was writing in the second century C.E., it is 
questionable the extent to which he would be a reliable witness for Classical 
Athenian practice.  
514 That the law certainly did envisage moicheia as an offence which could justify 
a defence of lawful homicide is clear from Lysias 1. In its discussion of the five 
locations in which homicide cases were heard, The Constitution of the Athenians 
abbreviates this section of the law simply to moichon labon, or ‘seizing a 
moichos’.  This is the same phrase that Lys. 1.31 uses when discussing the law. 
That is not to say it was a law specifically on moicheia. As Harrison points out, it 
would be difficult for the offended man to determine whether consent had been 
given by the woman before exercising his right of self-help if rape was not 
punishable under this law; Harrison (1968), 34. Much later, Plutarch associates 
this law with Solon and expresses his confusion that he permitted a moichos 
caught in the act to be killed, but a rapist was only subject to a fine; Plut. Sol. 23. 
This claim echoes that made by Euphiletus that a rapist was only subject to a fine 
and is perhaps even dependent upon the same rhetoric; Lys. 1.32. Cole has 
hypothesised that the Athenians introduced another law subsequent to the one 
found at Dem. 23.53, and that this law did attempt to distinguish between 
moicheia and rape, leading to Lysias, Plutarch, and the author of Ath.Pol to come 
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contain separate legislation for rape and for adultery, and the Hittite 
Laws and Deuteronomy, which both seek to determine whether the act 
was rape or adultery.515 What is at stake in the latter case is the liability 
of the woman to punishment, but no punishment is mentioned here for 
the woman. There is no sense in this law that the wronged man could 
lawfully kill his wife if he caught her with a moichos. Consequently, 
there would seem to be no need for the law to attempt to distinguish 
whether the sexual intercourse was rape or moicheia. Either way, the 
man is liable to an on-the-spot execution, with no punishment for the 
woman. 
Although Euphiletus’ discussion of this law focuses on the right to kill 
a man caught in the act of sexual intercourse with a wife or pallake it 
also extended to a man caught with a mother, sister, and daughter as 
well. If sexual intercourse with an unmarried daughter was an offence 
of moicheia against her father, then it stands to reason that it was not 
only in instances of rape that the lawful homicide law applied to finding 
a man on top of a daughter, but of moicheia also. By extension, this 
further implies that mother-son and sister-brother relationships were 
also ones in which moicheia could be committed against the man. In 
                                               
to see the lawful homicide law as a law on moicheia; Cole (1984), 103. There is 
no evidence either that this later law exists, or that it influenced how the lawful 
homicide law was seen. See Harris (2006), 287, for a rebuttal.  
515 MAL A 12 for rape, and MAL A 13-15 for adultery. LH only legislates against 
the rape of a betrothed virgin, for which the penalty is death for the rapist; LH 
130.  Much as with Dem. 23.53, LH 129 does specify the circumstances in which a 
man could be found with another man’s wife, meaning it could possibly be read 
in the same way. However, the reference to the punishment of the man being 
tied to the punishment of the wife suggests liability on her part, and thus is 
unlikely to be envisaging rape. See HL 197 and Deut. 22.23-27 for the laws 
defining whether intercourse should be considered rape or adultery.  
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the case of mothers, sisters, and daughters, it is unlikely to be the case 
that they would be regarded as such in reference to moicheia if they 
were married.516 The offence there would almost certainly be to the 
husband. Consequently, and despite the fact it makes no mention of 
moicheia, it is this law which has most often been understood in 
modern scholarship as the law which defines the act of moicheia.517 
This reading of moicheia to mean sexual intercourse with several 
different familial relationships, not just the wife, is largely accepted in 
modern scholarship. A vigorous challenge against it was made by 
David Cohen, who argued that important passages have been 
misinterpreted and other evidence ignored to arrive at a broader 
definition of adultery which is at odds with every other comparable 
society.518 Cohen was followed by Todd, who considered his 
arguments to have ‘seriously undermined’ the view that moicheia 
extended to more than adultery, and Sealey repeated Cohen’s claim that 
there is no surviving evidence which demonstrates moicheia in any 
other relationship than a wife.519 However, many scholars have rejected 
                                               
516 See Ogden (1996), 138. 
517 See Cohen (1991), 100-101 for a discussion of earlier scholarship, and 
Kapparis (1995), for a restating of Dem. 23.53 as defining moicheia following 
Cohen’s objections. 
518 See Cohen (1984), 147-165; (1990) 147; and (1991), 98-109. Cohen 
acknowledges that the way other societies legislated adultery does not provide 
definitive proof that the Greeks did the same, but as Omitowojou observes, he 
places much weight on this argument because it helps him argue for the utility of 
comparative studies between Athens and other Mediterranean societies; Cohen, 
(1991), 102-103; Omitowojou (2002), 73. See Cohen (1990), 147-165, for a 
comparative discussion of Athenian adultery norms and those of surrounding 
societies. 
519 Sealey (1990), 28 n.52; Todd (1993), 227. Todd did later acknowledge that the 
affair of Epaenetus and Phano was a weak point of Cohen’s argument, but cites 
the compulsory divorce rule of [Dem.] 59.87 to argue that the Athenian norm of 
moicheia was adultery; Todd (2007), 48. Whilst accepting the broader definition, 
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the argument.520 As Wolicki notes, critics of Cohen have tended to limit 
their criticism to a selective refutation of some of his arguments, with 
one or two weak points left to stand as a refutation of his entire 
argument.521 Consequently, what follows is a brief discussion of 
Cohen’s main points in favour of moicheia to mean adultery and 
nothing else. 
As a starting point, Cohen attacked the interpretation of the lawful 
homicide law as a law which defined moicheia, and argued that there 
was nothing inherent to either the law or the discussion of it which 
proved that violations of all the familial relationships had to be 
moicheia, as rape and seduction could equally apply.522 This argument 
was supported with reference to Euphiletus’ discussion of the law, as 
                                               
Foxhall considered Cohen’s arguments to be persuasive, and the evidence of 
Epaenetus and Phano to be shaky, but stopped short of endorsing Cohen’s 
argument completely, Foxhall (1991), 297-298. 
520 Cantarella provided a comparable example of moicheia with the lex Iulia de 
adulteriis, which uses adulterium to cover intercourse with married and 
unmarried women. Though it should be noted that the Romans did also have a 
separate term, stuprum, specifically for intercourse with an unmarried woman; 
see Modestinus D. 50.16.101.pr.  As noted by Cantarella, this was not the case 
with the Greeks, as there was no other term in Greek for seduction than 
moicheia; Cantarella (1991), 295-296.  See also Carey (1995), 407-408; 
Omitowojou (2002), 73-78. 
521 Wolicki (2007), 135. For example, see MacDowell (1992), 346. 
522 Cohen argues that Demosthenes makes specific reference to seduction at 
23.54-55, and to rape at 23.56, but does not mention moicheia at all; Cohen 
(1991), 105. The mention of rape is rhetorical, as Demosthenes is not attempting 
to explain the purpose of the law, but to support the argument that Charidemus’ 
person should not be made inviolable. Demosthenes is here attempting to show 
that even a friend can be killed if they act in the manner of an enemy, and thus 
the comparison is with a hubristes, as a moichos would not be appropriate. The 
discussion at 23.54 is about killing accidentally in an athletic contest, whilst at 
23.55 the wording of the law is largely just repeated with regards to killing a man 
found on top of a woman. Even if it had specified seduction, it is worth noting 
that when Euphiletus makes the claim that the lawgiver regarded seduction as a 
more serious crime than rape, he does not refer to it as moicheia, even though 
his case is clearly one of moicheia and he is discussing this law, but as peitho, 
‘persuasion’; Lys. 1.32-33.  
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Cohen pointed out that this was done only with reference to a wife or 
pallake, and not to any other relationship.523 He goes as far as to say 
that Euphiletus’ entire discussion of the threat posed by moichos is 
unintelligible if moicheia was not adultery.524 The main flaw in this 
argument is that whilst Cohen succeeds in demonstrating that the 
lawful homicide law was not specifically a moicheia law, and that 
moicheia certainly did encompass adultery, he failed to prove that 
moicheia could only be adultery. Similarly, a number of citations are 
also provided which Cohen claims demonstrate that moicheia was only 
ever used in reference to adultery, but these also only show that 
moicheia could be adultery.525 For example, when the women who 
                                               
523 Cohen further argued that if moicheia did also cover mother, sister, and 
daughter, then Euphiletus would have mentioned them alongside pallake as they 
would further to serve to underline his rhetorical point; Cohen (1991), 106. This 
is a circular argument as for that to be true, it would have to be the case that 
adultery was seen as the most serious violation, which is how Cohen sees it, but 
if they were all equally moicheia, then it would only be the pallake that 
Euphiletus could call on to make his point, as this would be the only one he could 
present as being an inferior relationship to that of a wife. As Ath.Pol. 57.3 also 
presents this law in terms of seizing a moichos without qualifying the 
relationship, Cohen must explain this away as adultery being the most common 
use of the law, despite being happy to cite the lack of reference to moicheia by 
Demosthenes in his discussion of the law as evidence it was not seen as such 
524 Cohen (1991), 107. Cohen presents examples such as this where moicheia is 
clearly adultery, as proof that moicheia was only adultery, whereas it in fact just 
demonstrates that moicheia could encompass adultery. The fear that an 
adulterer could cast doubt over the paternity of any children does not diminish if 
moicheia covered sexual intercourse with more than just a wife. As Harris notes, 
the people Euphiletus was trying to convince were themselves masters of their 
own households, and by using this rhetoric to play upon their own fears, he 
hoped to win them to his side; Harris (2006), 291. 
525 Such as Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1221b; Xen. Hiero 3.3. Complicating some of the 
examples is the use of gune, which can mean both ‘woman’ and ‘wife’. Aristot. 
Nic. Eth. 1134a.19 is given as an example of moicheia directed against marriage, 
but it gives no context for how gunaiki should be read; Cohen (1991), 108 n. 29. 
See Lys. 3.23, where gunaikas eleutheras is used in the context of the speaker’s 
female relatives, and the same words are used in the context of moicheia by the 
same orator at 13.66. Taken in isolation, the latter passage could be read to 
mean ‘freeborn wives’ and is translated as such in Lamb’s 1930 translation of the 
speech (as 13.68), but the former passage demonstrates it could equally be 
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have barricaded themselves into the Akropolis swear that they will 
withhold sexual intercourse from both husband and moichos, it shows 
that if they allowed themselves to be seduced by a man other than their 
husband then that man would be a moichos, but it does not show that 
this is the only way a man could be a moichos.526 Further, Cohen 
overlooks examples where moicheia is used in the broader sense, such 
as Aristophanes’ Birds, and Menander’s Girl from Samos, mentioned 
earlier.527 Conversely the account of Epaenetus and Phano’s affair 
proved to be a particular difficulty, as it directly contradicted his 
argument, and Cohen struggled to account for it.528  
                                               
‘freeborn women’, which is how Todd translates it in each instance. Lamb (1930); 
Todd (2000). 
526 Aristoph. Lys. 212. Cohen offers three citations from Ecclesiazusae as 
evidence that Aristophanes did not use moichos to describe the lover of an 
unmarried girl, but in fact none of them demonstrate that; Cohen (1991), 108, 
n.31. At 912ff., in which a young girl competes with an older woman for the 
sexual attention of a man, the women here are almost certainly prostitutes, and 
as Konstan points out, the mention of ‘mother’ by the young woman in the 
context of the genre means she is not under the power of a kurios; Konstan 
(2009), 59-60. 224ff. is a list of things that women in Athens continue to do. One 
of them is bineo, and there is mention of receiving a moichos, but nothing to 
suggest that Aristophanes distinguishes moicheia as an offence only committed 
with a married woman. 519ff. only concerns the married Praxagora and her 
husband’s suspicion that she has been visiting a moichos. 
527 Scafuro surveys the usage of moichos and moicheia from the fifth to fourth 
century. She concludes that although the large majority of uses refer to adultery, 
there are some which clearly do not, and there likely would be more if it were 
not for a reticence to discuss young, unmarried women; Scafuro (1997), 474-478. 
See also MacDowell (1992) 346; Ogden (1996), 139; Schmitz (1997), 130; Wolicki 
(2007), 137-139. 
528 Cohen focused upon discrediting Apollodorus’ reliability, pointing out that the 
account of Epaenetus and Phano was just a repetition of the same accusation he 
had earlier made regarding Neaira and the rich foreigners. Whilst this could well 
be true, the offence would still need to be moicheia with regard to Phano for 
Apollodorus’ argument to have any force with the dikastai. He further offered 
the suggestions that Phano pretended to be married to entrap rich foreigners, 
and that as Phrastor had adopted the child he had had with Phano, that she 
would have been his pallake. Presumably suggesting that any moicheia that 
occurred would have violated this relationship, rather than Stephanos and 
Phano’s; Cohen (1984), 154, n.15; (1991), 108-109, n.32. That Epaenetus offers 
his defence on Phano’s relationship to Stephanos, and not any fictional husband, 
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Much earlier than Cohen, Lipsius had argued that moicheia in a legal 
sense only meant adultery, but in practice was extended beyond this.529 
Harrison built on this by suggesting that prior to Drako’s time, 
moicheia only covered sexual intercourse with a wife, but by extension 
it came to be applied to the seduction or rape of unmarried women by 
the time the law on lawful homicide was written.530 Wolicki accepts 
the broader definition but also accepts as valid Cohen’s observation 
that in several classical texts, the discussion of moicheia inherently 
means adultery, making them the source of some ambiguity as to how 
moicheia should be understood.531 He supports the arguments of 
Lipsius and Harrison, and notes that the word stems from a somewhat 
vulgar verb for urination, suggesting that moicheia means unacceptable 
sexual intercourse, giving the circumstances for which the broadening 
of the definition could arise.532  
                                               
strongly refutes the former point. The way in which the dispute between 
Stephanos and Epaenetus plays out suggests that the real crime was not 
moicheia against Phrastor. The result of the arbitration between the two men 
was that Epaenetus agreed to pay one thousand drachmas into Phano’s dowry. 
This would seem an unlikely outcome if she was the pallake of Phrastor and the 
offence was against him; [Dem.] 59. 70. Ultimately, Cohen’s arguments here 
repeatedly fall down because he fails to address why Apollodorus would present 
the affair to the dikastai as moicheia, if moicheia was only adultery. So 
inadequate an argument was this, that for some scholars it was sufficient on its 
own to dismiss all of Cohen’s arguments; see Dover (1993), 658; Carey (1995), 
407-408; Omitowojou (2002), 77. 
529 Lipsius (1905), 429. 
530 Harrison (1968). 36. 
531 Wolicki (2007), 139. Robson also suggests that the archetypical act of 
moicheia in the Classical Athenian imagination was adultery; Robson (2013), 93.  
532 Wolicki (2007), 139-140. Whilst Wolicki acknowledges that etymology cannot 
prove whether the terms originally only meant adultery and broadened over 
time, he suggests that adultery would always have been seen by the Greeks as 
vulgar sex, lending credence to Harrison’s argument. 
218 
 
Whilst it is possible that this could be the case, and it would be very 
difficult to prove or disprove either way given the lack of sources pre-
Drako, there would seem to be good contemporary grounds for why the 
Classical Athenians could frequently refer to moicheia as if it was 
adultery, whilst at the same time understanding it both in law and in 
practice to mean something broader. The first is that whilst a woman 
could be any or all of a wife, mother, sister, and daughter at any given 
time, if she was married then her husband would be her kurios, and thus 
the offence of the moichos would primarily be to him, regardless of her 
other relationships. The second is that it is only this relationship in 
which there would be violation of the right of exclusive sexual access 
to the woman on the kurios’ part, and thus the threat the moichos posed 
would more directly bear upon his rights as a husband, with the 
additional threat posed to the legitimacy of his children.533 It is 
noteworthy that after references to moicheia which treat it as adultery, 
the next most frequent references are to moicheia committed against 
the father of an unmarried daughter, whilst no source specifically 
discusses moicheia in the context of mothers or sisters only. 
Regardless of the evolution of the term, there have been a number of 
attempts within modern scholarship to identify the single unifying 
factor that would cause the Athenians to group intercourse in all these 
relationships together as one offence, and not parse it out as their 
                                               
533 This is a point specifically raised by Euphiletus and recalls Harris’ argument 
that Euphiletus could play on the concerns of the dikastai over maintaining 
control of their wife and children when making the claim that seduction was a 
worse crime than rape; Lys. 1.33; Harris (2006), 290-291.  
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neighbours did. Paoli argued that it was aimed at allowing the Athenian 
man to prevent the introduction of illegitimate children into his 
household.534 Whilst adultery did carry a fear that a father could not be 
sure if his children were his own, the children of other close female 
relatives could also stand to inherit from the household, thus their 
legitimacy would also be important. However, the lawful homicide law 
extended to a person caught with a pallake kept for the purpose of 
bearing free children, and by no later than the end of the fifth century, 
and certainly by the time of both Lysias 1 and Demosthenes 23, any 
children born to a pallake were regarded as nothoi, and they could not 
inherit.535 As the lawful homicide law predates the legislation which 
specifically excluded nothoi from inheriting then it is possible that at 
the time it was drafted, children born to a pallake could inherit, and 
                                               
534 Paoli (1976), 266. 
535 Dem. 43.51 and Isaeus 6.47 date a law which prevents nothoi from inheriting 
to the time of the archonship of Eucleides in 403/02. In the latter instance, the 
speaker’s case is in part predicated on arguing that his rivals were the children of 
a paidike and thus nothoi who could not inherit even if they had been 
acknowledged; Isaeus 6.19. Half a century earlier, Perikles’ citizenship law had 
already restricted Athenian citizenship to children for whom both parents were 
Athenian citizens; Ath.Pol. 26.3. Harrison suggests this citizenship law must have 
fallen into disuse, necessitating the law of 403-02, although in Aristophanes’ 
Birds, staged in 414, Pisthetaerus tells Herakles that the law prevents him from 
inheriting from Zeus as he is a nothos; Aristoph. Birds 1650; Harrison (1967), 25-
26. Patterson has argued that nothoi was usually used to refer to acknowledged 
children born to a pallake, as opposed to illegitimate children born of other 
circumstances. As a nothos had been recognised by his or her father, then their 
status as legitimate heirs was problematic, and thus needed to be legislated with 
regard to their inheritance rights; Patterson (1990), 69-70. Ogden, contra 
Patterson, argued that all illegitimate children were nothoi, but regardless of 
which is correct, it would leave the children of a pallake as nothoi, and thus not 
able to inherit. Harris sees the right granted to a man to kill another man found 
on top of his pallake as evidence that the production of legitimate heirs could 
not be a sufficient explanation on its own; Harris (1996), 329. 
220 
 
thus the unifying concern of this section of the law was the threat to 
inheritance posed by either the moichos or the rapist.536  
For Cantarella, followed by Scafuro, that it remained part of the law 
into the fourth century is proof that this could not be the overriding 
concern of moicheia.537 If it was, then as soon as legislation 
disinheriting nothoi was introduced, then seduction of a pallake would 
by definition have ceased to be moicheia the century before Euphiletus 
positively identified it as such.538 Another possibility is that moicheia 
aligned with the rights of a kurios over the women under his kurieia. 
This was offered by Cole, who suggested that sexual intercourse by a 
woman under the kurieia of another man compromised both her and 
her family’s reputation.539 Similar to the objection raised against 
Paoli’s argument, this understanding of moicheia was dismissed by 
Cantarella on the grounds that a pallake was not under the control of 
                                               
536 See Harrison (1968), 12-13. It is noteworthy that Euphiletus presents his 
wife’s infidelity as beginning after the birth of their son, leaving no room for the 
paternity to be questioned; Lys. 1.6; see Robson (2013), 99. 
537 Cantarella (1991), 293; Scafuro (1997), 197-198. 
538 Gardner recognises an Athenian concern over the paternity of children but 
does not see this as necessarily related to moicheia. She instead argues that a 
concern of being cuckolded, and of the wife becoming closer to the moichos than 
the husband, meant the main concern was of the moichos gaining access to the 
possessions of the husband via the wife; Gardner (1989), 51-62; and see also 
Finnegan (1995), 91-92. In doing so, Gardner discusses moicheia as if it were 
adultery only, and does not consider whether the argument could apply to the 
other relationships covered by moicheia. As a daughter or sister could fall under 
the kurieia of a father or brother, then it is possible that it could, although it 
would have to mean that the Greeks formed a conception of moicheia due to 
concerns of theft achieved through the seduction of any female member of the 
oikos, and not due to the intercourse itself. As Kapparis notes, moichoi are not 
usually presented as being motivated by financial gain; Kapparis (1999), 295-296. 
539 Cole (1984), 97-98. This has been recently restated again by Lanni: “The 
rationale behind permitting the use of self-help in sexual offences is similarly 
uncontroversial: it preserved the kyrios’ prerogative to protect the house (oikos) 
from intrusion”. Lanni also restated Paoli’s argument that ‘adultery’ raises 
doubts about legitimacy and inheritance rights; Lanni (2016), 40-41.   
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her partner’s kurieia, yet was covered by the lawful homicide law.540 
Further, the wording of the lawful homicide law does not specify 
whether it would be the case that the man would also have to be the 
kurios of the woman, or whether the relationship alone would be 
enough.541 In the case of the wife, the man likely would be her kurios, 
but a brother would not be his sister’s kurios if her father was alive. It 
may be that the stating of the relationship assumes kurieia, as will be 
seen below that was likely the case in Gortyn, and so would not be an 
insurmountable objection to understanding moicheia as a transgression 
to kurieia, at least with regard to relationships other than a pallake. 
Likewise, Isaeus 3.39 demonstrates that a father could give his 
daughter away to another man as a pallake and not just as a wife, 
suggesting that the pallake could live in the oikos under the control of 
its kurios.542  
Against the objections of Cantarella and Scafuro to Paoli, unless the 
law was repealed and replaced, there would be no need to remove the 
part covering a pallake, even after laws were introduced excluding their 
children from inheriting, especially considering that this was not a law 
solely on moicheia to begin with. Euphiletus does identify intercourse 
with another man’s pallake as moicheia when he discusses this law, 
suggesting that it was still seen as such in the fourth century, but it is 
                                               
540 Cantarella (1991), 293. 
541 As noted by Scafuro (1997), 198 n.17. 
542 Sealey sees this as a regular and lasting union in which the woman was barred 
from sexual intercourse with other men, and that Athenian fathers would resort 
to this if they could not afford a sufficient dowry to be able to give their daughter 
away as a wife; Sealey (1986), 116-117. 
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difficult to know whether this was because it preserved the 
understanding of the offence pre-dating the laws on nothoi and 
inheritance, or because moicheia had never been primarily concerned 
with ensuring the legitimacy of all children in the oikos to begin with. 
Against the usual tendency amongst scholarship to seek a unifying 
element of moicheia, a speculative reading of the sources by Kapparis 
was used to try and reconstruct when different laws were introduced.543 
As part of this, he argued that the inclusion of the pallake would 
originally have been with the legitimacy of children in mind, as it long 
pre-dates Perikles’ citizenship law. By the fourth century, after their 
children became nothoi, it remained as part of the lawful homicide law 
in recognition of a man’s exclusive right of sexual access.544 
In attempting to account for the pallake, Cantarella argued that the 
unifying element of sexual behaviour criminalised under the term of 
moicheia was that the women listed in the lawful homicide law lived 
within the house of the man who was allowed to kill their lovers.545 
Rather than a concern over the legitimacy of children, or transgressions 
against kurieia, moicheia was instead a transgression against the oikos, 
and an offence against the time of the head of the oikos. The lawful 
homicide law was a compromise between the concerns of the polis to 
control self-help by requiring trial procedures and the traditionally 
unlimited power of the head of the household over those who lived in 
his oikos, and specifically his ability to exercise that power within his 
                                               
543 Kapparis (1995), 97. 
544 Kapparis (1995), 109-110. 
545 Cantarella (1991), 292-293. 
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oikos. Cantarella notes the emphasis Euphiletus places on Eratosthenes 
committing not only moicheia with Euphiletus’ wife, but also hubris 
against Euphiletus by entering his oikos.546 
This argument meets the significant objection that it reduced moicheia 
to an offence which could only be committed inside the house where 
the woman lived. If the woman left the house and had consensual 
intercourse with a man who was not her husband, then by this argument 
it could not be moicheia, and indeed would seem not to be an offence 
at all as no other law would cover it. This was not the case with regards 
to adultery in the Near East, as legislation there covered situations in 
which the woman left the home and went to a public place, to the home 
of the adulterer, in which she was in the countryside, and when she was 
travelling with another man, and even allowing for moicheia to be a 
broader offence than adultery, it seems highly unlikely it would be 
restricted in this way in Athens.547 A strong suggestion that it was not 
is found in Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae, in which a husband suspects 
his wife has been visiting several moichoi during a period of time in 
which she was away from his oikos.548  
Much as with a possible implicit connotation of kurieia, it could be that 
the lawful homicide law implicitly meant that the killing could only 
take place if the moichos was caught in the house in which the woman 
lived, which would salvage Cantarella’s interpretation of that law, if 
                                               
546 Lys. 1.4, 1.25. 
547 See LU 7; MAL A 13, 14, 22; HL 197; Gen. 20.2-9; Deut. 22.23-27. 
548 Aristoph. Eccl. 519-524. 
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not her definition of moicheia. In fact, if that were the case then it 
would undermine any attempt to derive a definition of moicheia from 
the law, as they would represent two separate, if overlapping, concerns. 
As Euphiletus provides the only surviving example of such a killing, it 
is difficult to know how much weight to place on his emphasis of 
Eratosthenes’ hubris in entering the oikos, but it is notable that in his 
discussion of the lawful homicide law, he does not discuss where the 
act must take place. Instead, he discusses only that the moichos must 
be discovered epi damarti, as per the wording of the law.549 If it was a 
requirement that it be in the oikos as well, it would seem likely 
Euphiletus would emphasise that he complied with this requirement 
too.550 
Another potential unifying factor appears to be the impact it has on the 
suitability of the woman as a current or prospective wife. In the story 
of Aphrodite’s affair with Ares in the Odyssey, Hephaistos demands 
the return of the gifts he had given Zeus in exchange for Aphrodite’s 
hand in marriage.551 Aphrodite’s infidelity lessens her value to 
Hephaistos as a wife. Further, the fine Ares must pay Hephaistos is 
described as a chreos, a debt, which he now owes Hephaistos.552 As 
opposed to the example of Neleus, who takes three hundred cattle and 
                                               
549 Lys. 1.30. 
550 Euphiletus does anticipate that his opponents will claim that he snatched 
Eratosthenes out of the street, though this would seem an argument designed to 
show Eratosthenes was not caught in the act, rather than he must have been in 
the oikos to be liable to a lawful killing; Lys. 1.27. This would also further 
reinforce that ‘in the act’ did not have to mean actually in the act of sexual 
intercourse, and that in the oikos could be grounds for being caught in the act. 
551 Hom. Od. 8.318-319. 
552 Hom. Od. 8.353, 355. 
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sheep as repayment for a chreos owed over prize winning horses that 
were taken from him, Ares cannot repay Hephaistos in kind for the 
diminished value of Aphrodite as a wife, and so a compensatory 
payment stands in its place.553 Similarly, Eratosthenes offered a 
compensatory payment when he was caught with Euphiletus’ wife.554 
In the story of Epaenetus and Phano, if Apollodorus’ account is to be 
believed, then the result of the arbitration was Epaenetus’ agreement to 
pay one thousand drachmas into Phano’s dowry.555 The amount 
Stephanos originally asked for was thirty minae, which is the exact 
amount Apollodorus claims that Phrastos withheld when he refused to 
return Phano’s dowry to Stephanos.556 Despite Apollodorus’ 
characterisation of the events, the money that Stephanos eventually 
received from Epaenentus was for her dowry, not to fund his lifestyle, 
and it is not inconceivable that the original amount asked for was 
intended to replace the entire dowry. Presumably, without replacing at 
least some of the lost dowry, Stephanos could not have arranged 
Phano’s subsequent marriage to Theogenes.557 Likewise, Nikaretos 
imposes no punishment upon Moschion when he learns of the affair 
with his daughter, but that is because Demeas assures him that 
Moschion means to go ahead with the wedding.558 In fact, the only 
instance in which Nikaretos refers to Moschion as a moichos, is when 
                                               
553 Hom. Il. 686-702. 
554 Lys. 1.29. 
555 [Dem.] 59.70-71.  
556 [Dem.] 59.50-52. 
557 It was not a legal requirement to provide a dowry, but the lack of a one would 
have made Phano far less desirable as a prospective wife. 
558 Men. Samia 558-600. 
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he mistakenly believes that Moschion plans to join the military instead 
of marrying Nikaretos’ daughter.559 Among the accusations made 
against Lycophron, is that he is a moichos who causes women to grow 
old unmarried, the implication being that moicheia committed by an as 
yet unmarried woman renders her unsuitable for any potential husband, 
and who instead remains in the home of her father who cannot arrange 
a marriage for her.560 So whilst moicheia against a husband risked 
diminishing the value of an actual wife, due both to her granting of 
sexual access to someone other than her husband and the doubt it cast 
over the paternity of any children, moicheia against an unmarried 
daughter risked her value as a potential wife, and thus the father’s 
ability to find her a husband.561 
The diminished value of the daughter as a potential wife is also found 
in Near Eastern legislation. In Deuteronomy, the man who lies with an 
unmarried virgin daughter is to pay fifty shekels to her father, marry 
her, and cannot divorce her.562 At LL 33, falsely accusing a man’s 
                                               
559 Men. Samia 717. 
560 Hyp. 1.12, 1.15. Preceding this section, it appears that Lycophron also answers 
a charge that he followed a woman on her wedding day and encouraged her to 
remain faithful to the oath she had sworn him; Hyp. 1.3-7. Due to the 
fragmentary nature of the text it is difficult to know exactly what is envisaged 
here, but as Lycophron’s defence against this accusation is that her husband 
would not have gone through with the wedding ceremony had it been true, it 
suggests that he was being accused of some sort of relationship with the woman. 
One which if true, would have rendered her unsuitable as a wife. 
561 Plutarch states that Solon passed a law that prevented a man from selling his 
unmarried sister or daughter into slavery unless she had lost her virginity; Plut. 
Solon 23. Ogden sees the primary purpose of this law as to protect the integrity 
of bloodlines in the state, but there is no sense that children have been 
produced, her lost value as a potential wife would seem the more likely reason; 
Ogden (1996), 141. However, as Plutarch is the only source for this law, and 
there is no evidence of it being in force during the Classical period, significant 
doubt is cast over its veracity.  
562 Deut. 22.28-29. 
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unmarried virgin daughter of having had sexual intercourse results in 
the accuser paying the father a fine of ten shekels. Other than a 
deterrent, the obvious other reason for the fine is the slander risks 
diminishing her value as a prospective wife. According to Roth’s 
translation, a law found on a Sumerian exercise tablet states that a man 
who deflowers the unmarried daughter of another man, the parents are 
to give her in marriage to him if he declares he will marry her.563 LH 
156 covers a situation in which a father selects a bride for his son, and 
then has sexual intercourse with her before his son does. He is required 
to pay her a fine of thirty shekels, restore her dowry, and allow her to 
marry someone else. Again, her value as a potential bride has been 
diminished, and she gains both an increased dowry and the freedom to 
marry outside of her intended husband’s household. At LH 159, if a 
man pays the bride-price to his prospective father-in-law, but then 
decides to marry someone else, the father-in-law can keep the bride-
price. The same law is found at HL 30.  
Whilst the Near Eastern father had the responsibility for arranging his 
daughter’s marriage, LL 23 requires the brothers of an unmarried 
woman to arrange her marriage if her father is dead. There are several 
Classical Athenian lawcourt speeches which demonstrate that this was 
also the responsibility of an Athenian brother if his father had died.564 
                                               
563 SLEx 7. See Roth (1995), 44 and 45 n.4. 
564 Euxitheus relates in a lawcourt speech how his mother was twice given away 
in marriage by her brother; Dem. 57.40-41. The speaker of Lys. 13.45 claims that 
Agoratus’ denunciations resulted in brothers being killed before they could 
arrange a marriage for their sisters. At Is. 2.3-9, the speaker recounts three 
instances of arranging the marriage of his sisters.  
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The lost value of a woman as a current or potential wife was present in 
both societies, but whereas Near Eastern societies defined them as 
different offences, with an emphasis placed upon the liability of both 
the wife and the lover in the case of adultery, and an emphasis placed 
on the liability of the seducer if the woman was either unmarried or not 
betrothed to be married, in Classical Athens they were both grouped 
together under the single offence of moicheia, with the primary focus 
of the offence being that of the moichos, as opposed to the seduced 
woman.  
Here again, however, the presence of the pallake as a moicheia 
relationship resists efforts to locate a unifying element, as they could 
not be a wife and thus held no intrinsic value as one. Whilst a dowry 
was not mandatory to conclude an Athenian marriage, the speaker of 
Isaeus 3 attempts to prove that his deceased uncle’s partner was a 
hetaira rather than a wife in part by demonstrating that her brother had 
provided his uncle with no dowry.565 Without a dowry she had no value 
as a wife, and thus must not have been one. However, although their 
positions were similar, it may have been the case that a pallake kept for 
the purpose of having freeborn children did differ from a hetaira in that 
when they were given to another man, some form of payment that 
functioned like a dowry was also provided at the same time. The same 
                                               
565 Isaeus 3.8-14. In noting that a dowry was not mandatory, Edwards suggests 
that if the speaker’s characterisation of the woman as having previous been 
sexually available is correct, then it may have been the case that her brother was 
happy to find her a husband wealthy enough not to need a dowry, even if he 
risked allowing him to freely divorce her with no financial consequences; 
Edwards (2007), 44. See also [Dem.] 40.22. 
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speaker of Isaeus 3 claims later in the speech that those who give their 
women away as pallakai do so along with gifts of an arranged 
amount.566 So even if a pallake could not be a wife, nor provide 
legitimate heirs, then as she lived with a man in much the same way as 
a wife, was given with a payment to her partner that approximated a 
dowry, and was expected to bear him freeborn children, then moicheia 
could have extended to the seduction of her in recognition that she had 
value as per a wife.  
In addition to the pallake, the protection of the mother-son relationship 
afforded by the lawful homicide law is a further point against the 
marriageability of the woman as being the unifying element of 
moicheia. If the woman was a widow and had an adult son, then even 
if her father was alive she could remain in her husband’s household and 
be under the kurieia of her son, but it is unlikely that the son who had 
come of age and inherited would arrange the remarriage of his 
mother.567  
Returning to the Near Eastern evidence for the rights and obligations 
of the father, MAL A 55 covers the circumstance in which a man rapes 
rather than seduces an unmarried woman. The father can impose a fine 
                                               
566 Isaeus 3.39. MacDowell directly equates this with a dowry; MacDowell 
(1978a), 90. 
567 Widows with sons certainly could remarry. The widow of Diodotus had two 
sons, and married Hegemon with whom she had another son. However, the sons 
of Diodotus were not of age when she remarried, and the marriage was arranged 
by her father using a dowry left by Diodotus; Lys 32.4-8. The speech 
demonstrates the problems that remarriage could bring to the sons of a previous 
marriage, as the plaintiff finds himself effectively marginalised and forced to call 
on his brother-in-law for support. See also Dem. 45, where the speaker’s father 
arranged for his widow’s remarriage, and the similar situation it placed the 
speaker in. 
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of three times the value of his daughter, and if the rapist is unmarried 
he can force him to marry his daughter. If he is married, then he can 
impose a talionic punishment and have the man’s wife raped. MAL A 
56 covers seduction but does not consider whether the seducer is 
unmarried. In this case, whilst the seducer does not have to hand his 
wife over, he still must pay the father three times the daughter’s worth. 
As this law does not deal directly with the unmarried man, it is unclear 
whether there would remain a requirement for him to marry the 
daughter if the father so wished. It is notable that whilst MAL makes a 
distinction between whether the daughter was raped or seduced in how 
it chooses to punish the offending man, in both cases the offence is 
conceived of as being towards the father, to the extent that when talion 
is applied, the corresponding penalty is the rape of the man’s wife, not 
a punishment directly inflicted on the rapist himself. It is not conceived 
of as a crime against the daughter when she has not given her consent.  
A survey of the Athenian evidence by Harris suggests that the situation 
was similar there also. In Menander’s Dyskolos, Gorgias suspects 
Sostratus of intending to have sex with Gorgias’ sister. Gorgias can 
equally conceive of the act occurring through persuasion or force, but 
in either case there is no distinction in how he perceives the offence, 
which is as a wrong done to him.568 As Rosivach demonstrates from a 
study of New Comedy, the rape of an unmarried daughter often results 
in a lenient treatment of the offender if he agrees to marry the 
                                               
568 Men. Dyskolos 289-298. Harris (2006), 311-312. 
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woman.569 From these, Harris also suggests that Moschion’s glossing 
over of the events which led to the pregnancy of Nikaretos’ daughter, 
and his shame at them, suggests the daughter was not at fault, whilst 
Rosivach assumes it was a rape as it fits a trope of the genre.570  
If this passage should be understood as rape, then this would cast the 
later use of moichos to describe Moschion in a different light. It was 
noted earlier that Moschion’s decision to marry Nikaretos’ daughter is 
what assuaged Nikaretos’ anger. If the offence to the father was not 
dependent on the daughter’s consent, and marriage was the appropriate 
action regardless of consent, then it does present the possibility that 
moicheia covered both seduction and rape. Likewise, it could explain 
why The Constitution of the Athenians could abbreviate this part of the 
lawful homicide law to seizing a moichos. A view that moicheia 
covered both seduction and rape is expressed in modern scholarship by 
both Harrison and Sealey, and in each man’s case this is seemingly 
based upon the lack of any distinction of the circumstances of the act 
in the law on lawful homicide.571 In another source, this time a legal 
speech, Alkibiades is described as a moichos who ‘harpages’ the wives 
or women of others.572 The word has connotations of rape, and of 
                                               
569 Rosivach (1998), 14-23. See also Harris (2006), 325.  
570 Harris (2006), 301; Rosivach (1998) 20-21. See Men. Samia 47-51. 
571 Harrison (1968), 36; Sealey (1990), 28. Cole also suggests that, based on the 
lawful homicide law, it may have been the case that moicheia could cover 
circumstances in which the woman did not consent; Cole (1984), 101. Foxhall 
sees moicheia and rape as being legally equivalent, though not that rape is 
considered moicheia; Foxhall (1991), 301. 
572 Andoc. 4.10. 
232 
 
seizing women as if they were booty, suggesting that the consent of the 
woman is not important to whether he is a moichos.573  
Lys. 1.33 does suggest, however, that there was a distinction between 
moicheia and rape, as the moichos there is specifically cast as one who 
takes a woman through persuasion, and not through force. Caution 
should be exercised, as Euphiletus would have a motive for obfuscating 
here if moicheia did cover both seduction and rape, as that would 
undermine the argument that rape was not punishable by death. 
However, and similar to Apollodorus, it would also mean Euphiletus 
would have to be redefining a common understanding of moicheia and 
expecting the dikastai to accept it. Further support is found in the 
Gortyn Law Code, where legislation on rape is placed next to 
legislation on moicheia, with similar penalties for each.574 Without 
clear examples of rape being regarded in Athens as moicheia, and 
Moschion’s affair with Nikaretos’ daughter is not clear as to its 
circumstances, coupled with the positive evidence of Lys. 1.33, it 
seems much more likely that it did not cover rape but was simply 
seduction.575 
                                               
573 See Aesch, Ag. 534, Seven 351; Hdt. 1.2, 5.94; Xen. Cyrop. 7.2.12.  
574 G. 72.2.2-28. 
575 From a survey of some of the evidence on moicheia and sexual assault, Cole 
concludes that the Athenians did distinguish between the two in both procedure 
and penalty. She does speculate that a law which distinguished rape from 
moicheia was introduced in Athens sometime between Drako’s lawful homicide 
law and the speeches of Lysias and Demosthenes, which in turn caused the 
former to come to be known as a law on moicheia. This would mean that the 
Athenians of the fourth century did distinguish between rape and moicheia with 
regards to the lawful homicide law. However, there is no evidence either for the 
introduction of a new law, nor for it causing any change in understanding of the 
lawful homicide law; Cole (1984), 100-103. In the case of Nikaretos and 
Moschion, Scafuro argues that Nikaretos’ is not a reliable witness for Athenian 
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A distinction between moicheia and rape is seen by Foxhall, who also 
follows Cantarella in emphasising the transgression against the control 
exerted by the head of the oikos as the unifying element of moicheia, 
though she groups them together as largely equivalent offences against 
the man under whose control the woman was.576 As Harris has shown, 
‘rape’ in the modern understanding of the offence did not exist in the 
same way in Classical Athens.577 Whilst it did require a lack of consent 
on the part of the woman, it did not concern itself with the woman’s 
right to control who her sexual partners would be, nor the impact upon 
her, but instead it was concerned with the effect on men’s power and 
honour.578 For Foxhall, as the offence was to the man, then the 
woman’s consent was not important, and the offence, and thus the 
punishment, was effectively the same. 
In this regard, Foxhall’s view risks making the offence so broad that it 
is difficult to know why there would need to be separate legal 
terminology for moicheia and rape, when a single offence would have 
sufficed. The obvious differential would lie in whether the woman 
should be punished, which is the legal distinction drawn between 
adultery and rape in Deut. 22.23-27 and HL 197, though even this is 
problematic. Foxhall claims that a woman with a moichos had taken 
control of her sexuality, and had taken it away from the man who 
                                               
terminology, and thus his use of moichos here is not to be taken as such, though 
this does leave the question as to why Menander decided to put the word in his 
mouth; Scafuro (1997), 437.  
576 Foxhall (1991), 299-300. Note that she does disagree with Cantarella on the 
location needing to be within the man’s oikos. 
577 Harris (2006), 297-332. 
578 Harris (2006), 330. 
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dictates her sexuality, noting that “no wonder her husband was required 
to divorce her, for she is effectively removed from the community of 
obedient women”.579 If this were true then this would mean moicheia 
is adultery, as the woman would return to her father’s oikos, and if she 
was not married there would be no punishment. If it was not the case, 
and the law is almost certainly a forgery, then it becomes difficult to 
know where the line would be drawn between the two.580  
Reference to the law code at Gortyn helps shed some light on what 
moicheia was: 
 
Gortyn Law Code 72.2.20-27 
“If someone is caught committing moicheia with a free woman in her 
father’s, brother’s, or husband’s house, he will pay a hundred staters. 
And if in someone else’s house, fifty. And if (he is caught committing 
moicheia) with the woman of an apetairos (he will pay) ten. And if a 
slave with a free woman, (he will pay) double. And if a slave with a 
slave’s (woman), five (staters).” (trans. Gagarin)581 
The code most likely dates from the fifth century, so is roughly 
contemporary with the Athenian sources.582 There are some important 
                                               
579 Foxhall (1991), 302. 
580 Plutarch’s previously cited ‘law of Solon’ could be how a father would punish 
a daughter or brother a sister, but there is no evidence it was in effect in the 
Classical period, if it ever was; Plutarch Solon 23. 
581 With amendment of ‘adultery’ to ‘moicheia’. 
582 As the date of composition of the laws is not known, it could be that the 
moicheia laws are earlier, though there is no evidence that any earlier law was 
copied into the code. Gagarin sees the collection as containing both changes and 
continuity from previous laws; Gagarin and Perlman (2016), 336. 
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differences, which in the main will be looked at in greater detail in the 
section on punishments, but for now the most noteworthy element is 
that once again, moicheia is presented as covering more than just the 
violation of the marital relationship. The locations which carry the 
greatest fines are the house of the father, husband, and brother, and 
whilst it could be the case that these are places a wife may take a lover 
to, it is much more likely to be the case that these are relationships that 
were covered by the offence of moicheia in Gortyn.583 It is unclear 
exactly what the status of an apetairos was. As there is a separate entry 
for slaves then they were likely free persons, especially as there was a 
fine for committing moicheia with an apetairos, but as the fine was 
much lower here, then they were probably not full citizens .584 Nor is it 
clear whether this clause referred specifically to the wife of an 
apetairos, as Gagarin translates, or a woman who was of the status of 
apetairos.585 The former would suggest that for a male apetairos, 
moicheia was the same as adultery, whereas the latter suggests any 
sexual intercourse with a female apetairos was moicheia. It may be that 
the same relationships mentioned for a free woman are implied for the 
female apetairos and given the otherwise broader definition of 
moicheia found for free women and in Classical Athens, it seems likely 
                                               
583 Sealey sees the offence here as simply adultery, although does not consider 
any alternative. Consequently, he suggests that unmarried women are not 
covered by the moicheia laws because consent to intercourse by the woman was 
the same as consent to marriage, and hence no offence could have taken place; 
Sealey (1990), 73-74. 
584 See Willets (1967), 12-13, for a review of who the apetairos may have been. 
585 Along with Gagarin, both Willetts and Lefkowitz translate to mean the wife; 
Lefkowitz and Fant (2016), 55; Willetts (1967), 58-59. Contra to this are Paoli 
(1976), 510; Effenterre and Ruzé (1995), 294-298; Wolicki (2007), 141-142. 
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that wife is not the intended meaning. Interestingly, moicheia in Gortyn 
extended to intercourse with a female slave by another slave.586  
Noticeable by its absence here is any sense that moicheia extended to 
offences committed with a mother, or with a pallake. It may be that the 
reduced fine for committing moicheia in someone else’s house could 
cover a widow who lived with her son, and thus make that moicheia in 
Gortyn, but it would seem more likely that it refers to a woman 
committing moicheia away from her own home. This could be because 
the offence is not as great to the woman’s husband, father, or brother if 
the moichos does not enter the household to commit the act, but 
comparison with Near Eastern legislation suggests it may be because 
the moichos would not be automatically expected to know the exact 
status of the woman if the act took place away from her home.587 As 
                                               
586 That some form of union between slaves was available in Gortyn is beyond 
doubt, though whether this was marriage is debated. Lewis argues against the 
right of slaves in Gortyn to marry or own property, preferring to see these 
‘marriages’ in terms of servile unions, in which the slaves have no rights; Lewis 
(2013), 390-416. For an opposing view see Gagarin and Perlman (2016), 79-84. Of 
interest here is less whether slaves could marry, as how a male slave could 
commit moicheia with a female slave, and who the offence would be against. 
Gagarin and Perlman translate moicheia as adultery and assume from this that 
this clause represents proof that slaves could marry, though the implications of 
the broader definition of the term are not explored in this regard, despite being 
accepted by them when discussing the preceding part of the text; Gagarin and 
Perlman (2016), 350. The fine here is five staters, though who it is paid to is not 
clear. Laws on the children of unmarried women suggest that children born to 
slaves would be the property of their owners, not of the slaves, and the slave 
woman would obviously be owned also, regardless of whether she was in a union 
with another slave; G.72.3.53-4.23, and see also G.72.6.56-7.10, wherein 
children born to a male slave and a free woman are themselves considered to be 
slaves. As there is similar ambiguity as to the identity of the female slave as to 
the identity of the female apetairos, then if she is not to be considered as a ‘wife’ 
the offence would seem to be to the slave’s owner. If she is to be considered a 
‘wife’, then moicheia is only adultery here, which given the broad use of 
moicheia both here in the code and elsewhere would seem unlikely. 
587 LU 7; MAL A 14. It should be noted that the adulterer here is absolved of any 
blame if he did not know the woman was married, whereas as there is still a 
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this leaves only the husband, father, and brother as the relationships 
against which moicheia can be committed, and as the Athenian 
evidence demonstrates that these are the relationships in which a 
woman’s current or potential status as a wife is at stake, then the 
absence of mention of son or pallake would be expected if this was a 
unifying feature of moicheia.588 Against this, there is room for doubt 
over whether women at Gortyn would be under the legal control of their 
sons, or even of a kurios at all, as they may have been able to inherit a 
half-share of their parents’ estate, and the legal authority to act for 
themselves in manner that an Athenian woman would require her 
kurios to do for her.589  
Whilst the same argument from silence that Cohen used to argue that 
the lawful homicide law may have meant moicheia in some instances 
and not in others could be applied to argue that Athens was in line with 
Gortyn, and that moicheia did not apply in the case of a mother; as this 
relationship is present, and the others are moicheia, there is no good 
                                               
punishment in Gortyn, albeit a reduced one. Sealey sees this circumstance as a 
mitigating factor in the offence against the householder’s authority rather than 
down to the man’s knowledge of the woman’s status; Sealey (1990), 73. 
588 Wolicki agrees that the significance of the stated locations was in the 
relationships they denoted but attaches no significance to the omission of the 
son’s house and argues that it may have been excluded as the legislator found 
moicheia with a person’s mother unlikely; Wolicki (2007), 141 n.38. If true, then 
this would mean moicheia with a mother was effectively legislated out of the 
Gortyn Law Code. If it were considered moicheia¸ then it would seem unlikely 
that it would be omitted. 
589 Such as choose a husband (6.55-7.10) and be a plaintiff (6.12-31). Maffi sees 
the half-share of the inheritance as setting the amount of the woman’s bridal gift 
and argues that the Gortyn woman would have been under the control of a 
kurios, much like an Athenian woman, with very limited powers to act or own 
property; Maffi (2003), 182-201. For arguments in favour of the absence of 
kurieia in Gortyn see Gagarin (1994), 61-71; Gagarin and Perlman (2016), 84-87; 
Link (2004), 44-93. 
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reason not to suspect that Athens did differ from Gortyn in this respect. 
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is most likely to be 
the case that Athenians did consider sexual intercourse with a mother 
to be moicheia. That Euphiletus does positively identify intercourse 
with a pallake as moicheia, suggests that whilst the woman’s value as 
a wife was important, it could not be an all-encompassing explanation 
for which situations the Athenians considered moicheia. Similarly, nor 
can Paoli’s argument that the unifying feature was the risk of any 
illegitimate children being born into the household, nor Cantarella’s 
argument that it was the act taking place within the household that 
made it moicheia.  
Moicheia in Classical Athens resists attempts to classify it by any 
single unifying quality. It was often mentioned in a context equivalent 
with adultery but was clearly more than just adultery. It damaged the 
woman’s value as a wife but covered both mothers whose adult sons 
would not be likely to want to arrange a marriage for them, and 
pallakai, whose partners would have no interest in their value as a wife. 
It threatened the legitimacy of any children born into the household, 
but covered intercourse with women who could not produce legitimate 
heirs. It is possible that the consent of the woman was irrelevant to 
whether the intercourse was moicheia, though the balance of the 
evidence suggests that the woman did need to consent. The most 
coherent understanding may be that it impacted all women under the 
control of a kurios, even a pallake living with him in a manner similar 
to a wife. The result is that moicheia was a malleable term that could 
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be stretched to cover several different, yet intermittently overlapping 
circumstances. Whilst there is not as much evidence from Gortyn, 
moicheia there seems more straightforwardly to cover the narrower 
range of wife, daughter, and sister relationships. As adultery in the Near 
East was a much more narrowly defined offence, it has implications for 
comparing legislation on moicheia to legislation on adultery, which 
will become apparent in the subsequent sections.  
 
Punishments for Moicheia 
 
As has been seen in the examples of Eratosthenes and Epaenetus, a 
moichos caught in the act could be killed on the spot, though the 
aggrieved man would be wise to gather witnesses before doing so, and 
he could be subjected to a financial penalty. Euphiletus states at the end 
of his speech that the person who catches a moichos in the act could 
treat him as he pleased.590 A similar claim is found at Isaeus 8.44, 
whilst Xenophon claims that the moichos who enters the house of 
another can be caught and subjected to hubris.591 It is again in 
Euphiletus’ interests to present the laws on moicheia in a way that 
justifies his actions, and he cites no law in support of his statement, but 
the law mentioned in [Dem.] 59.66 may provide some context. This 
law allowed for someone seized as a moichos to bring a charge of 
unlawful imprisonment against his captor on the grounds that the 
                                               
590 Lys. 1.49. 
591 Xen. Mem. 2.1.5. 
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charge of moicheia was false. If he won the case, then he was 
considered innocent of the charge and immune to punishment, if he lost 
then he was turned over to his captor to do whatever he wished, as long 
as he did not use a knife. 
It is not clear exactly what is intended by the restriction of not using a 
knife. Taken literally, it would leave open enough alternatives to the 
captor as to render the restriction pointless, so it must be a signifier of 
something the captor could not do.592 Kapparis sees this as part of a 
broader restriction on killing a moichos. Outside of the circumstances 
permitted by the law on lawful homicide, which required any execution 
to be immediate, and having first caught the person in the act, Kapparis 
believes that a moichos could not be subject to the death penalty based 
on his reading of this law.593 Similarly, Cole thinks this restriction 
meant that the captor probably could not kill the moichos.594 Carey sees 
the restriction as signifying the captor has passed on his opportunities 
to kill or wound by agreeing to the payment, and thus cannot now inflict 
them.595 This does beg the question as to why the captor would not be 
forced to accept only a payment if his agreement to it means he has 
                                               
592 Paoli did see this as a minimal restriction on the captor and argued that he 
could inflict punishments on the moichos that included a slow and painful death 
by torture; Paoli (1950), 149. 
593 Kapparis sees the law of [Dem.] 59.66 as having general application in cases of 
moicheia, rather than just the specific instance of false imprisonment, and 
believes it to be a law of Solon introduced to allow a more lenient punishment 
than execution; Kapparis (1995), 116, and(1996), 65. Cohen goes further than 
Kapparis in his attempt to argue that moichoi were also kakourgoi, and suggests 
that the husband could not kill the moichos even when taken in the act; Cohen 
(1984), 158. 
594 Cole (1984), 104. 
595 Carey (1992), 119. 
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waived his rights to other punishments. Cohen discusses three 
possibilities meant by this restriction.596 The first is that the right to kill 
is restricted in the same manner as Kapparis proposes, and this was 
because the law recognised the unique set of circumstances a man 
found himself in at that moment when he discovered a moichos on top 
of a woman under his control. Once that moment had passed, the right 
to kill the moichos had also passed. The second is that there was no 
right at all to kill. If the man wanted the moichos to be killed, he had to 
take him to the Eleven to request his execution. The only punishment 
he could impose himself was a financial penalty. The third is that the 
phrase had no set meaning, and was ambiguous, free to allow litigants 
to argue as suits them best, and the particular group of dikastai on that 
day to decide how they wished to apply it.  
There is no evidence supporting the last of these hypotheses, which 
places too great an emphasis on the discretion of the dikastai, and it is 
noteworthy that Euphiletus does not support the legality of his act by 
claiming he did not use a knife to kill Eratosthenes. The second of 
Cohen’s hypotheses is dependent upon an argument made by him and 
several other scholars that moichoi were considered to be kakourgoi in 
Athenian law.597 The kakourgoi were certain classes of criminals who, 
                                               
596 Cohen (1991), 116-118. 
597 See Paoli (1950), 152; Hansen (1976), 36-48; Cohen (1984), 156-163, and 
(1991), 110-122; Cantarella (1991), 291-292; Todd (1993), 276-278. Cohen goes 
as far as to attempt a reconstruction of what he sees as the law on moicheia 
based on his belief that moichoi were kakourgoi, coupled with his belief that the 
law of [Dem.] 59.87 is missing a first section discussing the moichos; Cohen 
(1991), 121. Leaving aside the fact that the association of moichoi with kakourgoi 
has no evidence to support it, the law of [Dem.] 59.87 is simply the law on 
242 
 
if caught in the act, were subject to the apagoge procedure of summary 
arrest in which they were taken to the Eleven, who executed them if the 
confessed to the crime, and who were taken to a lawcourt for trial if 
they denied it.598 Only three classes of criminal are stated in any 
Athenian source as being kakourgoi, and moichoi are not among them. 
At Aesch. 1.90, moichoi are listed alongside one class of kakourgoi, 
the lopodutes, as types of criminals who are killed if caught in the act 
and tried if they are not. The similarity of this to the apagoge procedure 
is clear, and Aeschines does use the term kakourgountes in relation to 
them.599 However, there is nothing in the passage that would not be 
covered by the lawful homicide law in the case of moichoi, and as 
Harris points out, there is no mention of apagoge, and nor does 
kakourgountes carry the technical meaning of kakourgoi.600 It leaves 
the association of moichoi with kakourgoi as purely speculative, and 
coupled with the lawful homicide law and the killing of Eratosthenes, 
there is no evidence that a moichos caught in the act would have to be 
taken to the Eleven for execution.601  
                                               
women taken by a moichos found at Aesch. 1.183, and is not a comprehensive 
law on moicheia. See below for a discussion of [Dem.] 59.87.  
598 Ath.Pol. 52.1. 
599 Aesch. 1.189. 
600 Harris (2006), 291-293. 
601 See also Harrison, who regards the evidence as slight, and Scafuro who states 
the proposal is attractive but lacks clinching proof; Harrison (1968), 35 n.1; 
Scafuro (1997), 198-199. Gagarin also argues against the classification of killers 
as kakougoi based on Aesch. 1.90-91, which similarly applies to moichoi; Gagarin 
(1979), 317-321. Scafuro accepts Harris’ objections to the use of Aesch. 1-90-91, 
but argues that it does not contradict or disprove the hypothesis either; Scafuro 
(1997), 199 n.24. Conversely, Carey sees Harris’ objections as having conclusively 
settled the matter against moichoi being kakourgoi; Carey (1995), 411.  Kapparis 
agrees with Harris, citing Lys. 1.36 to demonstrate that moichoi were not subject 
to the same procedure as thieves; Kapparis (1999), 304-305. 
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Noting that the passage specifies the moichos is to be handed over in 
the lawcourt, Harris, who does not see a ban on killing a moichos, 
suggests that instead the restriction may have been designed to prevent 
pollution from bloodshed accruing to the lawcourt.602 This does raise 
the question as to why the law did not allow the captor to take the 
moichos out of the lawcourt if he wished to kill him, especially if in 
any other circumstance he could do so. Pollution from killings in the 
Classical Athenian imagination also varied depending on the 
circumstances of the killing, with lawful killings accruing no 
pollution.603 Harris cites Antiph. 5.11 to demonstrate the Athenian 
concern over pollution accrued from killing inside the lawcourt, albeit 
here the defendant is accused of homicide, and is regarded as 
potentially polluted from this unlawful killing.604 If the law allowed for 
the killing of a moichos even outside of the circumstances allowed for 
by Kapparis, then this would be a lawful killing, and so the expectation 
would be that it would accrue no pollution.  
As an alternative, Harris also suggests that the concern over using a 
knife may have related to castration, a practice noted by Herodotus as 
being the most unholy trade.605 Mutilation is a common feature of the 
Middle Assyrian Laws. MAL A 15 allows the husband to cut off his 
wife’s nose and castrate her lover, the husband of MAL A 4 is to cut 
off his wife’s ears and the nose and ears of his slaves if he wishes to 
                                               
602 Harris (2006), 289. 
603 See Dem. 9.44 and 20.158, where a lawful killing leaves the killer ‘katharos’, 
free of any pollution. 
604 Harris (2006), 289 n.22. 
605 Harris (2006), 289; Hdt. 8.105-106.  
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recover the goods passed by his wife to his slaves, and at MAL A 24, 
the husband is to mutilate his wife and cut off the ears of the woman 
whose home she stayed at when she withdrew from her husband’s 
house. Outside of Assyria, the adulterous Sumerian wife had an arrow 
bored through her nose, as does a Babylonian who brings a trial without 
good grounds.606 The oath-breaking Egyptian adulterer of P DeM 27 
was to have his nose and ears mutilated if he so much as spoke to the 
wife again.607 A treaty from the Anatolian city of Alalakh records hands 
being cut off as a punishment for harbouring a runaway slave.608 
Whether castration specifically or mutilation more generally, this form 
of punishment would seem to best fit the restriction on using a knife. It 
is attested in neighbouring societies, it would not need to be a 
punishment specifically restricted only in the lawcourts, it would fit the 
revulsion expressed by Herodotus over castration, and it is a type of 
punishment that would specifically require a bladed instrument to carry 
it out, so would neither leave very similar punishments open via a 
different method, such as killing by torture, nor require a euphemistic 
understanding of the term as per Kapparis.  
This still leaves the question open as to whether a moichos could be 
killed after a prosecution for moicheia, or only on the spot when caught 
in the act. Near Eastern legislation certainly allows for both 
                                               
606 CT 45 18:14-16; Greengus (1969-1970), 33-44. 
607 Mutilation of the nose is also a punishment mandated by Horemheb for the 
unlawful seizure of boats; Lorton (1986), 57. Workers at Deir el-Medina were 
mutilated for stealing from private tombs; Lorton (1977), 40. The penalty for 
perjury in the Legal Text of Mes included cutting off the ears and nose; Lorton 
(1977), 37-38. 
608 Márquez Rowe (2003), 715. 
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circumstances, but just because Kapparis is likely incorrect in his 
reading of [Dem.] 59.66, does not necessarily mean he is incorrect 
about when a moichos could be killed. The lack of either examples of 
moichoi killed following a prosecution, or of any legislation allowing 
a capital punishment for moicheia, makes it difficult to know for sure, 
and it does not have to be the case that allowing execution in some 
circumstances means allowing it in all.609 If a prosecution for moicheia 
did carry a capital sentence then it is likely that this would be found in 
the graphe moicheias, but as the details of this law do not survive then 
it is difficult to know whether it allowed for the death penalty. A graphe 
could carry a capital sentence if it was classed as an agon timetos, such 
as was the case with the graphe hubreos, but it did not have to.610 As 
the lawful homicide law did allow for the killing, the restriction on 
using a knife of [Dem.] 59.66 likely was intended to prohibit mutilation 
or castration rather than killing, and a graphe could carry the death 
penalty, there is no good reason to assume that the right to kill 
enshrined in the lawful homicide law and found throughout the Near 
East would not have extended to prosecution for moicheia. Some 
scholars note that even if the law allowed for it, it was not the accepted 
                                               
609 A comparison with Rome is again instructive. During the imperial period, 
killing an adulterer was allowed for in restricted circumstances, and the 
legislation only envisages the husband carrying out the killing on the spot; D. 
48.5.25 pr.-1; Paul Coll. 4.12.5. 
610 As Cole believes the restriction on using a knife meant a ban on killing, she 
thinks it would be unlikely the law would allow a greater punishment here; Cole 
(1984), 104. Harrison states without evidence that the penalty under this law 
was death; Harrison (1968), 35. Harris acknowledges that there is very little 
evidence but suggests that what little there is points towards the death penalty 
being allowed under this law. 
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practice in fourth century Athens to execute a moichos.611 As has been 
seen in the survey of Near Eastern evidence, it was also the case there 
that actual instances of executions for adultery are very rare, though 
there is no doubt that it was a legal right of the husband to execute the 
adulterer, whether on the spot or after a trial. 
As fines were a common feature of the Athenian legal system then it 
would be a safe assumption that the graphe moicheias would have 
allowed for one to be imposed. The example of Epaenetus and 
Stephanos also demonstrates that they could be imposed via self-help 
when the moichos had been caught in the act, and a fragment of 
Cratinus records an enormous fine for moicheia of three talents paid by 
Callias.612 In both of these cases, Athens was in line with the Near East. 
In Gortyn the situation was similar but with a local variation. Here, the 
captor must allow the relative of the moichos five days to a pay fine to 
secure his release.613 Only if this period elapsed without payment could 
the captor inflict a physical punishment on the moichos.614 No details 
are given as to what this punishment could entail, but the captor would 
                                               
611 For example, see Cohen (1991), 129-132; Kapparis (1995), 110; Cantarella 
(2005), 244. 
612 Fr. 81 Kassel-Austin. 
613 G.72.2.31-37. 
614 Based mainly on fragments from Plato Comicus and Alciphron, Kapparis 
concludes that a payment extracted from a moichos was seen as a dishonourable 
option for the captor; Kapparis (1995), 111, and (1996), 64. Euphiletus does 
present Eratosthenes as attempting to buy his way out of his deserved 
punishment, albeit it suits Euphiletus to say this. There is no sense in any Near 
Eastern legislation that a fine was seen as immoral, as the wronged party always 
had the option to take a payment in lieu of another punishment. Given that the 
captor must take a payment if offered within five days, coupled with the 
payments demanded by Stephanos and by Hephaistos that offset the diminished 
values of Phano and Aphrodite respectively, and the prevalence of financial 
penalties in the Athenian legal system there is no reason to think that a payment 
was not an entirely acceptable way of settling a case of moicheia in Athens. 
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again appear here to be given carte blanche, and there is no restriction 
of any kind mentioned on what they could do.615 If the moichos here 
wished to dispute the fine, then unlike in Athens where he could take 
the case to the lawcourts, the captor can swear an oath that he did take 
him in the act of moicheia.616 
An unusual punishment faced by the moichos is mentioned in 
Aristophanes’ Clouds, where, in the discussion between Just and 
Unjust, the former mentions the insertion of a radish into the anus, as 
well as the removal of bodily hair as punishments for the man who has 
been seized as a moichos.617 There is also a fragment of Plato Comicus 
from the play Phaon, with an allusion to a similar punishment, but with 
a spiny fish rather than a radish.618 This is a punishment which carries 
an obviously talionic element, as the moichos is penetrated in manner 
                                               
615 Aelian records the punishment for moicheia in Gortyn as a fine of fifty staters, 
loss of citizen rights, and the moichos was forced to wear a garland made of 
wool; Ael. VH 12.12. The fine prescribed in the law code varied depending upon 
the location, with a fifty stater fine if the moichos was caught somewhere other 
than the home of the husband, father, or brother, and there is no mention of the 
other two punishments; G.72.2.20-30. Further, Aelian records these as 
punishments inflicted after a conviction by the magistrates, whilst the law code 
only considers self-help. It may be the case that the surviving section of the code 
contains a part of the law on moicheia which was focused on self-help, and a 
separate law which does not survive other than via Aelian dealt which 
prosecution for moicheia, but given how much later Aelian was writing, 
significant caution should be exercised in accepting this passage as an accurate 
account of moicheia law in the Classical period. 
616 G.72.2.38-45. 
617 Aristoph. Clouds 1083. 
618 Plato Comicus fr.189 PCG. See Thompson (1947), 245-246, who interprets 
these lines as a cruel punishment for moicheia, and followed by Roy (1991), 75. 
See also Carey (1995), 53-55. Kapparis notes this passage does not mention 
moicheia, and he argues against this view on the basis of his reconstruction of a 
law on moicheia which he attributes to Solon. He notes that the physical effects 
of this punishment could be quite severe due to the spines on the fish, possibly 
even resulting in death, and that Solon’s law would only have allowed for 
humiliation. Conversely, he accepts that the radish was an actual punishment as 
it would only inflict humiliation; Kapparis (1996), 67-75.  
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which degrades and feminises him.619 However, given the references 
are so few and are found only in comic plays, there is debate in modern 
scholarship over whether this was a punishment that was ever actually 
carried out, or was simply a humorous trope.620 There are several 
references in Athenian sources, including lawcourt speeches, to carte 
blanche being given to the person to who catches a moichos in the act 
to treat him as he wishes, so in this respect the punishment would 
certainly be allowed for by the law, but none which specify this as a 
potential punishment.621 Given that, caution should be exercised as 
accepting this practice in Classical Athens as anything other than the 
product of the comedic stage. In Wealth, Aristophanes again mentions 
depilation as a punishment for moicheia, though there is no mention of 
a radish there.622 Whether the radish punishment ever occurred or not, 
its placement alongside depilation in Clouds suggests it was intended 
to humiliate the moichos, just similar punishments found in the Near 
East like LH 127, MAL A 18, and in the case of the Sumerian 
                                               
619 See Devereux (1970), 20; Dover (1978), 106; Carey (1993), 53-55. All three 
scholars accept the practice as genuine, in part due to this element. 
620 The prevailing opinion in modern scholarship is that moichoi were subjected 
to raphanidosis. Dover accepts that this was an actual punishment, and that the 
depilation referred to pubic hair singed off with ashes; Dover (1968) 227; 
followed by Cantarella (1976), 151; MacDowell (1978a). Harrison glosses over 
the reference by stating the moichos could be subject to bodily humiliations; 
Harrison (1968), 33. Carey suggests the reason the practice is heard of only in 
comedy is because standards of propriety in the lawcourts would not allow it to 
be mentioned; Carey (1993), 53-55. Cantarella and Forsdyke see the punishment 
as an informal self-help practice rather than a legally granted right; Cantarella 
(2005), 244; Forsdyke (2012), 147. Lanni states that the practice was condoned 
by the Athenians; Lanni (2016), 39. Against this, Cohen and Roy both argue that 
none of the passages represent an actual occurrence, and they are in fact a 
comic trope about punishing moichoi; Cohen (1985), 385-387; Roy (1991), 73-76.  
621 Isaeus 8.44; Lys. 1.49; Xen. Mem. 2.1.5. See also [Dem.] 59.66, where the 
restriction placed on using a knife would not exclude this punishment. 
622 Aristoph. Wealth 168. 
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adulteress.623 Given its existence as a punishment in the Near East, 
there is little reason to doubt that the removal of body hair would have 
been an actual punishment the Athenian moichos could be subjected to. 
The punishments for the moichos caught in the act in Athens and 
Gortyn were thus broadly similar to those which could be imposed on 
the Near Eastern adulterer. Self-help punishments were available, and 
these could include death, humiliation, and a fine. It seems likely that 
in Athens there was a restriction placed upon punishments involving 
mutilation, and in Gortyn there was a restriction placed upon when a 
physical punishment could be applied. There is no evidence for what 
would happen in Gortyn if the captor wished instead to pursue a 
prosecution, but in Athens the graphe moicheais would have at least 
allowed a fine, and probably execution also. Mutilation would likely 
still not be allowed, and most unusually, this case could be brought by 
someone other than the wronged party given its status as a public 
action. 
Whilst divorce was an option in the Near East, one surviving law states 
it to have been mandatory in Athens, and it possibly may also have 
been in Gortyn. The law at [Dem.] 59.87 is explicit in stating that the 
husband of a woman caught with a moichos must divorce her or be 
disenfranchised. This would be a significant departure from the 
discretion given the Near Eastern husband, and it has largely been 
assumed in modern scholarship to be an actual law in Classical 
                                               
623 See Greengus (1969-1970), 33-44; Lafont, S. (1999), 37-41; Neumann (2004), 
85-88. 
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Athens.624 However, this law is a forgery which is not original to the 
text, and an examination of the wording of the law within the context 
of what precedes it clearly demonstrates that it has been poorly 
reconstructed from Apollodorus’ speech. The law as Apollodorus 
describes it is one which prohibits any woman who has been caught 
with a moichos from attending public sacrifices. He states that the law 
allows any man who finds a woman taken by a moichos at a public 
sacrifice to do whatever they wish to her, as long as they stop short of 
killing her. This comprises the second part of the law found at 59.87.  
Immediately preceding this, Apollodorus gives his account of how 
Theogenes came to divorce Phano, and it is from this that the forger 
mistakenly includes in the reconstruction of the law a requirement 
placed upon the husband to divorce his wife if she is found with a 
moichos. Divorce is never mentioned by Apollodorus in his discussion 
of the law, and nor would it be relevant to it. Further, Theogenes does 
not divorce Phano because he discovered her with a moichos, but to 
prove to the Areopagus that he did not know she was not Stephanos’ 
daughter. A divorce requirement would also be unusual given that 
                                               
624 Forsdyke regards the requirement to divorce as being ‘clear and well known’, 
reflecting the unquestioning acceptance of this law as genuine amongst modern 
scholarship; Forsdyke (2012), 155. For examples, see Harrison (1968), 35; 
MacDowell (1978a), 125; Cohen (1991), 110; Foxhall (1991), 302; Carey (1992), 
129, and (1995), 414; Scafuro (1997), 202; and Gagarin and Perlman (2016), 349. 
A recent challenge to its authenticity has come from Canevaro, who notes that 
stichometric calculations show that the law could not have been part of the 
Urexemplar, and that it must either be a forgery or have been inserted by a 
conscientious editor who researched the original law. For many of the same 
reasons as discussed here, Canevaro sees it as more likely to be a forgery 
reconstructed from the text than the actual law; Canevaro (2013), 190-196. Lanni 
notes Canevaro’s discussion of the law without engaging with it, and she 
considers divorce a likely requirement without further discussion or justification; 
Lanni (2016), 40. 
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moicheia encompassed more than just a marital relationship. Even if it 
was a requirement in this particular instance, the wording of the law in 
this speech does not reflect that, but rather assumes that the woman 
must be a wife. 
Confirmation that this law is only a prohibition on entering public 
sacrifices with no mention of any requirement to divorce is found in 
two other lawcourt speeches. In Against Timarchus, Aeschines states 
that Solon drafted a law which prohibited a woman caught with a 
moichos from wearing fine clothing and jewellery, and from entering 
public sacrifices.625 If she broke these prohibitions she could be 
stripped of her adornments, and she can be beaten as long as she is not 
maimed or killed. The correspondence with the law discussed by 
Apollodorus is sufficiently close that they must both be referencing the 
same one, but nowhere does either man mention anything about a 
requirement placed on the husband to divorce the wife.  
Whilst this strongly suggests that the prohibition on entering public 
sacrifices was an Athenian law, it does not strictly rule out that the law 
also included additional elements not mentioned by either orator. 
Fortunately, Euphiletus helps to show that there was no requirement to 
divorce found in this or any other law. His defence is predicated on the 
                                               
625 Aesch. 1.183. The mention of adornments in Aeschines, which is absent from 
[Dem.] 59.87, further underlines that the latter is a later reconstruction based on 
the preceding parts of the speech. Aeschines is attempting to demonstrate the 
morality of the Athenians when he gives this law, whereas Apollodorus is only 
concerned with it as it relates to Phano. As it is in the context of public sacrifices 
that he can introduce the law, he has no need to mention the part on 
adornments. Consequently, it is not present in the speech and thus cannot be 
included by the forger.  
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fact that he caught Eratosthenes in the act of sexual intercourse with 
his wife, and so the killing was lawful, so his entire speech is 
constructed to demonstrate that he complied with every requirement to 
ensure that the killing was lawful. Given his circumstances, it would be 
a remarkable omission if he divorced his wife and failed to mention 
that in his speech, especially as it would have strongly supported his 
account, yet nowhere does he do so.626 In fact, Euphiletus casts the 
killing of Eratosthenes as a necessary act to guard his wife.627 
Euphiletus anticipates that his opponents will accuse him of entrapping 
Eratosthenes, and of killing him whilst he was at the hearth, and he 
addresses these arguments in his speech. Had he been required to 
divorce his wife and failed to do so, it would be an equally remarkable 
omission that he did not anticipate his opponents would use this fact 
against him, as even if he proved his defence, it would then leave him 
open to another severe punishment. 
The one aspect that a forger could not have constructed from the text is 
the punishment of disenfranchisement for a husband who did not 
divorce his unfaithful wife. This could mean that the forger was aware 
that this was the penalty and so inserted it, but when balanced against 
the fact that neither Apollodorus nor Aeschines make any mention of 
this part of the law, no other source mentions it, and Euphiletus would 
                                               
626 Although outside the comparative focus of this study, Roman law is instructive 
here as it did contain a provision requiring a husband to divorce an adulterous 
wife. In cases in which the husband had killed the adulterer, divorcing the wife 
immediately was a pre-requisite to any defence of lawful homicide; Macer 
D.28.5.25; Paul. Coll.4.3.5.  
627 Lys. 1.48. 
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almost certainly be in contravention of it, it is much more likely that 
this detail was added by the forger.628 What the law on moicheia at 
[Dem.] 59.87 should be is simply the law as both Apollodorus and 
Aeschines present it. It is only concerned with a woman who has been 
caught with a moichos, and the sanctions she faces if she enters public 
sacrifices or adorns herself.629 It makes no mention of husbands or 
wives, it makes no mention of a requirement to divorce, and nor is there 
absent any mention of sanctions on the moichos, as this law is not about 
the moichos.630 
In the Gortyn Law Code, the section on moicheia is followed 
immediately by a section on divorce. The juxtaposition of these has led 
                                               
628 Writing in the Roman Imperial period, Aelian records a similar loss of citizen 
rights as a punishment for moicheia in Gortyn, something which is not recorded 
in the moicheia laws which survive in the law code; Ael. VH 12.12. Carey sees the 
mention of loss of citizen rights as proof that the law must be genuine, as 
everything else can be reconstructed from the text; Carey (1992), 129. However, 
Canevaro points out both the issue with a law on moicheia phrased as if it were a 
law on adultery, and the silence of any other sources corroborating the law, and 
notes that there have been many cases of ingenuity on the part of a forger; 
Canevaro (2013), 195-196. 
629 The manner in which both Aeschines and Apollodorus present the reasoning 
for this law betrays a concern over the presence a woman caught with a moichos 
will have on the community. For Aeschines, wearing adornments or entering 
public sacrifices risks corrupting innocent women, whilst Apollodorus envisages 
the woman bringing a miasma which will negatively affect the sacrifices 
themselves. In this respect, she is much like the accused homicide, who cannot 
enter public spaces whilst awaiting trial due to the risk of pollution. As with the 
accused homicide, she becomes liable to a sanction when she enters them, but 
not if she stays away. Aesch. 1.187; [Dem.] 59.86. 
630 Much as with Cohen, Scafuro assumes that a portion of the law on moicheia 
has been recorded, instead of recognising it as a reconstruction from the text by 
a later forger. She places great emphasis on the use of the word helein by the 
forger to argue that the requirement to divorce came after the successful 
prosecution of the moichos, not after any self-help remedy was imposed by the 
husband. In support of her argument she cites the lack of any calls for 
disenfranchisement in the orators, even when aspersions of moicheia were being 
cast; Scafuro (1997), 202-205. As the requirement of this law to divorce is not 
genuine, then this both explains the absence of calls for disenfranchisement and 
renders moot any extrapolations from the wording used by the forger. 
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some scholars to conclude that divorce was expected in cases of 
moicheia.631 This meets the immediate objection that the section on 
moicheia is not a section on adultery, so could only apply in one 
specific instance. Nor does either section make any mention of divorce 
in the context of moicheia. A further objection can be found in the 
emphasis of the arrangement of these two sections next to each other. 
Overall, the surviving part of the law code, whilst dealing primarily 
with family law in general, is somewhat haphazard in its arrangement. 
Laws on giving gifts, on slaves, and on liabilities, are spread throughout 
rather than grouped together in a coherent or comprehensive manner. 
Once the ‘evidence’ of the forger of the law of [Dem.] 59.87 is rightly 
dismissed, along with the overemphasis on the arrangement of the laws 
at Gortyn on moicheia and divorce, then a clear picture emerges in both 
Athens and Gortyn that whilst a husband could certainly divorce a wife 
who had been taken by a moichos, there was no legal compunction 
upon him to do so. 
Whilst punishments for the moichos were largely the same as his Near 
Eastern counterpart, the same was not true for the woman. Death, 
mutilation, humiliation, and divorce with retention of dowry are all 
attested for an adulterous woman in the Near East. In Athens, however, 
the only sure punishment was the ban on attending sacrifices and 
adorning, with physical punishments only permitted if they 
transgressed this restriction, whilst in Gortyn there was no punishment 
                                               
631 Lacey (1968), 215; Bile (2012), 44, 51. 
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at all. The lawful homicide law did not allow for the killing of the 
woman the man was found on top of, and the illegal restraint law of 
[Dem.] 59.66 makes no mention of a punishment which could be 
inflicted on the woman. Whilst this latter law was concerned with 
whether the man was a moichos and thus could be punished as such, if 
the case against him was proven then it meant both parties were guilty 
of moicheia, and by Near Eastern law both would be liable to the same 
punishment. There was no requirement on the Athenian husband to 
divorce his wife, and if he did there is no indication that he could keep 
part of the dowry. All that is left is the graphe moicheias, which may 
have allowed for a case to be brought against the woman, but given the 
preceding, coupled with the lack of any sense that Phano or the wife of 
Euphiletus had committed an offence that left them liable to 
prosecution, and that there was a specific law covering women who 
had been caught with a moichos and this law only placed certain 
restrictions on them, then it seems likely that these were the only legal 
consequences for an Athenian woman caught with a moichos. In 
Gortyn, the legislation on moicheia makes no mention at all of a 
punishment for the woman, only one for the moichos. 
The evidence from Athens and Gortyn strongly suggests that in this 
respect, the Greek approach to moicheia in law had noticeable 
differences to the Near Eastern approach to adultery. Whilst both the 
Near Eastern adulterer and adulteress were each liable to broadly the 
same punishments, the punishment for the Greek moichos and the 
woman seized by him were not. Whilst the offence in the Near East 
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was one by the adulterous couple to the husband, the offence in Greece 
was simply by the moichos to the man under whose control the woman 
fell.632 In Gortyn this was the extent of it, whilst the Athenians betray 
a similar communal concern as found in their approach to an accused 
homicide, by treating the offence as one which could be prosecuted by 
anyone, not just the offended party, and by excluding the woman from 
public sacrifices, and from adorning herself.633  
Outside of Athens and Gortyn the evidence becomes much sparser. 
Euphiletus claims that moicheia is the only crime for which the same 
right of revenge is given all across Greece.634 However, the evidence 
from Gortyn demonstrates that he would not have been able to kill 
Eratosthenes on the spot had the crime taken place in there. Plutarch 
claims there was no moicheia in Sparta, though even if this were not 
obvious hyperbole, the story Plutarch himself tells of Timaea’s affair 
with Alkibiades would contradict it.635 He also records that in Cumae, 
a woman taken in moicheia was displayed on a stone in the agora, and 
then marched around the circuit of the city mounted on a donkey. The 
ritual recalls similar public humiliations in Mesopotamia, albeit 
                                               
632 Scafuro notes that there is only one extant use of the active form verb 
moicheuo to refer to a woman, and overwhelmingly it meant to commit moicheia 
with a woman, not moicheia committed by a woman; Sacfuro (1997), 197. 
Equally, there is only one use of the noun moicheutria, a female moichos, and 
this is found in the unusual circumstance of Plato’s Symposium, and the story 
told by Aristophanes in which he states that it is from the two halves of the 
androgynous person that the moichos and moichuetria are descended; Plato 
Sym. 191d-e.  
633 Euripides has Elektra claim that an unfaithful wife will be likely to continue to 
behave this way in future; Eur. El. 9.21-24. 
634 Lys. 1.2. 
635 Plut. Lyc. 15.9-10, Alc. 23.7-8. 
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without the extent of physical punishment those also entailed.636 A 
fragment of Aristotle similarly records that the people of Lepreum 
bound those seized committing moicheia and led them around the city 
for three days, whilst women were made to stand in the agora for 
eleven days in a translucent tunic.637 Writing much later, Aelian records 
a story that Zaleucus, the seventh century lawgiver of Epizephyrian 
Locri, passed a law requiring moichoi to be blinded as punishment, but 
after his own son was convicted of moicheia, he allowed himself to be 
blinded in one eye so his son would not be completely blind.638 
Assuming these are reliable accounts of punishments inflicted for 
moicheia in those poleis, it is difficult to know whether these were the 
only punishments available, or whether execution or a fine were also 
options.  
 
Oaths and Ordeals 
 
There were circumstances in Classical Athens in which a person’s 
statement about themselves would be considered true if he was 
prepared to support it with an oath. For example, those named for 
cavalry service could be exempted if they were prepared to swear under 
oath they either were not sufficiently fit to serve or that they lacked the 
                                               
636 See Greengus (1969-1970), 33-44; Lafont, S. (1999), 37-41; Neumann (2004), 
85-88. 
637 Aristot. fr. 611-642 (Ed. Rose). Forsdyke speculates based on a mention of a 
law by Demosthenes which allowed for certain offenders to be publicly displayed 
in stocks for five days, that something similar may have existed in Classical 
Athens for those taken in moicheia; Forsdyke (2012), 148-149. Whilst it cannot 
be ruled out, there is no evidence for it. 
638 Ael. Var. Hist. 13.24 
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means, and a witness could deny that a statement prepared by a litigant 
for them was true as long as it was done under oath.639 However, these 
oaths were not for circumstances in which a person accused of an 
offence could swear to their innocence and be automatically regarded 
as such. Litigants did swear oaths before trials, and there also are 
around forty oath-challenges recorded in Athenian lawcourt speeches, 
in which one of the litigants recounts a challenge made to swear an oath 
by one or other of the parties in arbitration on a point of fact that would 
be proven should their opponent accept.640 Of these, only two were 
accepted, and only one was actually carried out.641 This single instance 
of an oath-challenge being accepted and carried out only came about 
via deception. The sons of a woman named Plangon claimed that a man 
named Mantias was their father. Mantias did not believe them to be his 
sons, and Plangon proposed that in return for a payment to her, he 
should challenge her to take an oath at arbitration to confirm that he 
was their father, and she would refuse, thus settling arbitration in his 
favour. Instead, Plangon did swear the oath, and Mantias was forced to 
accept paternity of her sons.642  
                                               
639 Ath.Pol. 49.2; Aesch. 1.147. See Dem. 19.124-129, and Aesch. 2.94-95, for an 
account of the latter’s withdrawal from an embassy to Philip on the grounds of ill 
health, which Demosthenes claims was made under oath, and see also Rhodes 
(2007), 14-15.  
640 For example, see Dem. 29.26, 31.9, 50.31, 54.39; Lys. 32.13. The majority of 
these challenges were made by the person who would swear the oath if the 
challenge was accepted, though some were made to challenge the opponent to 
swear the oath. See also Gagarin (2007), 39-41. 
641 See Dem. 33.13-14 for the oath-challenge accepted by Apaturius, but which 
was not carried out. Dem. 39.3-4 and 40.8-11 for the account of Mantias’ 
agreement with Plangon that she should refuse an oath as to the paternity of her 
children, which she then went through with. 
642 It is noteworthy that the speaker here, Mantitheus, presents the oath as being 
decisive either way, whether it was sworn or not. A similar situation is suggested 
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The incident suggests that an oath-challenge could decisively settle a 
case at arbitration without need to send it to the courts, as long as both 
parties agreed to it and the terms of the oath covered the facts of the 
case. Consequently, Mirhady argues that the reason lawcourt speeches 
almost always mention oath-challenges which were not accepted is not 
because they rarely were, as the preponderance of the evidence would 
suggest, but because if they were there was no need to take the case to 
trial, and thus no need for a litigant to mention it.643 Against this, 
Gagarin sees the Plangon oath as arising from a unique set of 
circumstances, and without this deception, a situation would not 
normally occur in which both parties would agree to an oath that could 
settle the case.644 Gagarin separates oaths in Classical Athens into two 
types, ‘religious’ and ‘rhetorical’, and sees the latter as not technically 
being an oath, but rather an offer of an oath which by convention allows 
a litigant to call upon their opponent’s refusal to accept the oath as 
support of their own case.645 Gagarin is likely correct that litigants did 
not put themselves into a position where a case could be decided at 
                                               
in [Dem.] 52.15, wherein Apollodorus disputes an oath-challenge was made to 
his father in arbitration and was refused. The implication being that if this had 
happened then the refusal could have decided the case. However, other oath-
challenges made to the opponent do not appear to be decisive. In the example of 
the oath-challenge that was accepted but not carried out, this was on some of 
the charges that were brought by Parmeno against Apaturius. Although 
Apaturius did not go through with the oath and may have forfeited a deposit for 
not doing so, he was not automatically considered guilty of those charges. 
Instead, he issued a countersuit, and the two men agreed to arbitration instead, 
although this was not carried out either; Dem. 33.13-18. In the case of [Dem.] 
59.59, Phrastor refused an oath-challenge at arbitration, but no information is 
given as to whether this alone decided the case. See also Dem. 29.52, where a 
refused oath-challenge has no bearing on the case.  
643 Mirhady (1991), 78-83. 
644 Gagarin (2007), 40-47.  
645 Gagarin (2007), 46. 
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arbitration by an oath, and that Mantias would not normally have done 
it, though it is clear from Plangon’s oath that they did have legal force 
should a litigant accept.646 Whilst this would mean a woman accused 
of moicheia in Athens could potentially be regarded as innocent if an 
agreement was made for her to swear an oath at arbitration to that 
effect, there was nothing in Athenian law that would grant her the 
automatic right to do it if she was accused but had not been caught in 
the act.  
That the nature of Athenian litigation did not allow for the same 
procedure as found in the Near East did not, however, leave an 
Athenian wife more vulnerable than her Near Eastern counterpart. The 
reason for this lies in the punishments that were available to the 
husband, as the wide-ranging powers given to the Near Eastern 
husband were not given to the Athenian husband, and of particular note 
is the lack of any evidence suggesting that the Athenian husband could 
                                               
646 Gagarin sees ‘rhetorical’ oaths as ones which were not taken as seriously by 
the Athenians as ‘religious’ oaths, as the challenges were made with no 
expectation they would be accepted, nor were there any consequences for 
refusal. However, and as Gagarin notes, that both litigants swore ‘religious’ oaths 
before a trial did not mean the loser of the trial was considered to be a perjurer. 
Consequently, and given he makes the seriousness with which oaths were 
regarded a differentiating factor, he suggests that not even litigants oaths were 
taken seriously; Gagarin (2007), 46. The case of the Egyptian man twice caught 
for adultery and twice swearing oaths in court not to do it again suggests that the 
seriousness with which an oath was taken is misplaced as a differentiating factor, 
and that what differentiates these oaths is not whether one is ‘religious’ and 
taken seriously, whilst the other is ‘rhetorical’ and not taken seriously, but 
whether the oath is accepted. The oaths taken by the Egyptian were accepted by 
all parties involved. That he had violated his oath the first time did not impact on 
the second oath. Likewise, Mantias and Plangon had agreed to abide by the oath, 
and there is nothing to suggest that an oath of any sort would not be taken 
seriously in an Athenian trial if both parties accepted it. Gagarin does see that 
whether the oath was accepted was important but conflates this with an integral 
value judgement on the oath itself. 
261 
 
retain some or all of the dowry if he divorced his wife for moicheia. As 
has been seen, there is evidence for the Sumerian, Hittite, and Demotic 
Egyptian husband’s right to retain at least part of the dowry if they 
divorced their wife for adultery, and the likelihood is that this right was 
also found in neighbouring civilisations. The obligation to return the 
dowry was a powerful disincentive for a Near Eastern husband to 
exercise his right to divorce his wife, as to do so could place a severe 
financial burden on him. It meant a Near Eastern husband had an 
incentive to cite adultery if he wished to divorce his wife, as well as an 
incentive to fabricate a charge of adultery. The oath swearing 
procedure consequently afforded the Near Eastern wife some legal 
protection in this regard.  
As noted above, a dowry was not necessary to conclude a marriage in 
Classical Athens, but it was usually given, and here too the obligation 
to return it if a husband wished to divorce his wife was a powerful 
financial incentive against doing so.647 No evidence survives which 
demonstrates whether an Athenian husband could retain some of the 
dowry if he divorced his wife for a proven case of moicheia, nor that 
he had to return of all of it either. Phrastor did retain the dowry he 
received from Stephanos when he divorced Phano, but it is clear from 
the speech that he did so illegally, and that he only succeeded because 
                                               
647 For example, see Isaeus 3.28, where the speaker argues that Nicodemus 
would not have married his sister to Pyrrhus without at least a fictitious dowry, 
as without one it would be very easy for Pyrrhus to divorce her. See Isaeus 2.9 
for an example of a returned dowry due to divorce. If the husband failed to 
return the dowry then not only was he liable to a suit for its recovery, but also 
for an annual interest payment on top of it; [Dem.] 59.52. 
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he could threaten Stephanos with a suit for passing Phano off as an 
Athenian citizen, should Stephanos try and pursue a claim for the 
dowry. For Harrison, if the law did not allow retention of the dowry in 
even these circumstances, then it must also have been returnable in 
cases of moicheia too given the severity of Stephanos’ offence, though 
even if this goes too far, that not a single Classical Athenian source 
suggests that there were any circumstances in which part of the dowry 
could be retained due to divorce with fault on the wife’s part, means it 
is unlikely that it could be in cases of moicheia.648  
Foxhall has argued that the reason actual cases of moicheia are so rare 
in the Athenian sources is that husbands would not have wanted to risk 
ridicule by bringing the affair to public attention.649 She regards it as 
noteworthy that in the one sure example of moicheia that there is, 
Euphiletus is forced to choose between conviction as a homicide, or 
                                               
648 Harrison (1968), 55-56. See also Just (1989), 73; Sealey (1990), 29. Whilst it 
may in fact be the case that Phano was a citizen and was actually the daughter of 
Stephanos, and that Apollodorus is manipulating the circumstances of their 
divorce, it must be the case that Athenian law did not allow for retention of the 
dowry in these circumstances, else Apollodorus’ account would make no sense. 
Harrison suggests that this circumstance is worthier of retention of dowry than 
moicheia, as here the kurios has acted fraudulently, whereas in cases of moicheia 
he would be innocent. This would rely on an understanding of the dowry as 
being the property of the kurios, and not as belonging to the wife. Foxhall argues 
that the dowry was effectively the possession of the wife, though she too sees no 
circumstance under which the dowry could be legally retained in the event of 
divorce; Foxhall (1989), 34-37. Foxhall does suggest that, in reality, it may have 
been difficult to recover the dowry if the wife had been divorced for moicheia; 
Foxhall (1989), 42 n.104. Cole assumes that the dowry would have had to be 
returned in cases of moicheia; Cole (1984), 106. Schaps sees the law as being less 
important than what a speaker can argue in court, though this view places much 
too much weight on the discretion of the dikastai; Schaps (1979), 83. The lack of 
any mention of the dowry in the forgery of [Dem.] 59.87 is unhelpful in this 
regard given that the section on mandatory divorce is not a part of the actual 
law.  
649 Foxhall (1991), 303. 
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being publicly revealed as a cuckold. So only when the alternative is 
worse would a husband have been prepared to bring a case of moicheia 
into the courts. However, with free, no fault divorce available to a 
husband, then if he suspected his wife of moicheia and wished to be rid 
of her, he could do so without any recourse to the courts. This means 
that even if Foxhall is correct, and Classical Athenian husbands may 
have preferred to keep moicheia out of the courts because of the social 
stigma it could bring, there was in fact no incentive at all for a Classical 
Athenian husband to bring a case of moicheia to the courts. He could 
divorce his wife without needing to prove it, and proving it brought no 
material benefit.  
This means that it would be far simpler and more straightforward for a 
husband who suspected his wife of moicheia just to divorce her. For 
the wife’s part, as her husband was required to return the dowry then 
she did not find herself in the vulnerable position of her Near Eastern 
counterpart. She could not have her dowry retained, she was not liable 
to a capital sentence, to a physical punishment, or even a fine. The only 
consequence for her was her ability to attend public sacrifices and how 
she dressed. If her husband suspected her of committing moicheia, 
whether he had proof or not, all he could do was divorce her, unless he 
also wished to impose the punishment of Aesch. 1.183 and [Dem.] 
59.85-86.  
Whilst in Mesopotamia, a third-party could make an accusation of 
adultery against a wife without proof, forcing her to undergo an ordeal, 
in Classical Athens, third-party accusations of moicheia, regardless of 
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the degree of proof, would need to be brought to the courts via the 
graphe moicheias, rendering the need for any sort of oath or ordeal 
procedure moot. Much as with the husband, there would be very little 
to gain from doing this as any fine would be paid to the polis, the only 
sure punishment was the ban on attending public sacrifices and 
adorning, and there was the risk of the third-party having to pay a fine 
himself and losing the right to bring any further prosecutions of this 
type if he failed to receive at least one-fifth of the votes.  
That a husband whose wife committed moicheia could not retain any 
of the dowry also speaks against it being a requirement of Classical 
Athenian law that an adulterous wife must be divorced. Foxhall notes 
the onerous burden it could place on a husband to be forced to divorce 
his wife, though for her the requirement is proof that the maintaining 
of traditional gender stereotypes was more important than any 
individual burden the requirement placed on a husband. If that were the 
case, then it would be a simple thing to also legislate an allowance to 
retain part of the dowry. Not only is this found in the Near East and in 
Rome, but in a later Greek context too, Achilles Tatius presents an 
account of an accusation of moicheia made by an Ephesian husband in 
the Hellenistic period, in which he may keep all of the dowry if he 
proves his case.650 
Unlike in Athens, there were circumstances in Gortyn in which a 
litigant could swear an oath as to their version of events being correct 
                                               
650 Achilles Tatius 8.8.13. 
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and win their case. For example, a section of the law code covers claims 
by creditors on a deceased person’s estate, and it appears here as if a 
plaintiff can swear an accusatory oath in order to win his claim.651 In 
further contrast to Athens, cases of divorce in Gortyn do feature an 
element of fault. Here, if the husband is responsible for the divorce, 
then not only must he return the dowry, but must also pay the wife five 
staters.652 Conversely, there is no corresponding penalty placed upon 
the wife if she is at fault. If the husband accuses her of taking property 
belonging to him then she must return it along with a fine of five staters, 
but there is no fine to be paid if she is considered at fault. Further, if 
she is accused of taking her husband’s property then she can swear an 
oath to Artemis denying that the property is his.653 Swearing the oath 
means the property is then automatically regarded as being hers, and if 
it is taken from her it is to be returned along with a payment of five 
staters. The protections afforded the Gortynian wife go beyond even 
those provided to the Athenian wife. She must have her dowry 
returned, she is protected against any attempt to retain it, and she is not 
liable for any penalty if she is at fault, even in cases of moicheia. Whilst 
the oath-swearing procedure differs from the Near Eastern one in that 
                                               
651 G.72.9.24-40. 
652 G.2.45-3.1. Whether ‘dowry’ is an accurate term for the property a wife brings 
to a marriage in Gortyn is a matter of dispute. In line with his views on ownership 
in Gortyn, Gagarin sees this as simply the wife’s property, and not a dowry, and 
part of the wife’s inheritance. Conversely, Maffi argues that the woman never 
owns this inheritance, and that it functions much like an Athenian dowry. See 
Gagarin (2008b), 5-25; Gagarin (2012a), 57-67; Gagarin (2012b), 73-92; Maffi 
(2012), 91-111. For the purpose of this discussion, what is ultimately important is 
less whether the wife owned the property or not, but that she was entitled to 
take all of it if the marriage came to an end. 
653 G.72.3.1-16. A fuller account of the oath swearing procedure for this is found 
at G.72.11.46-55.  
266 
 
she does not affirm her innocence, it instead protects her should her 
husband wish to divorce her, and ultimately achieves a similar end. 
Much as in Athens, the lack of punishments available for the Gortynian 
husband to impose on his unfaithful wife also means there was little 
incentive for him to make an accusation without proof. 
Whereas Athens and Gortyn demonstrate a regional variation in their 
approach to oaths used to decide cases, with the Athenian court system 
leaving no place for them outside of an agreement between the litigants 
that was likely to have been rarely used, their similar approaches to the 
return of the wife’s dowry or property in the event of a divorce, coupled 
with the lack of any punishment the husband could subject his wife to 
in cases of moicheia, meant there was no need for any specific 
provision for the wife to undergo an ordeal of any kind if she was faced 
with a groundless accusation of moicheia. The evidence from Achilles 
Tatius, albeit later than the Classical period, gives pause in 
extrapolating a common Greek approach to dowries in cases of 
moicheia, but does point towards the broader Greek conception of 
moicheia as again accounting for a regional difference amongst the 
Greeks. The relative lack of punishment faced by the adulterous Greek 
wife because it was subsumed in the broader offence of moicheia made 
it less necessary to legislate for this occurrence. In instances where a 
woman who was not a wife was suspected of moicheia there was even 
less incentive for her kurios to make an accusation or bring a 
prosecution. Plutarch’s dubious account of Solon’s law on selling a 
daughter into slavery aside, there was no material benefit to be gained, 
267 
 
and if the kurios was likely to have to arrange a marriage for the woman 
it would even be counter-productive to make an accusation of 
moicheia. 
Gortyn did have a different oath procedure in cases of moicheia that 
impacted the moichos rather than the woman. If he was caught in the 
act, but claimed that he was entrapped, the captor could swear an oath 
that he did take the man in the act of moicheia.654 Presumably, if the 
captor does swear then the man is considered to be a moichos, whereas 
if he does not then he must release him.655 This stands in contrast with 
Epaenetus, who was able to bring a suit against Stephanos, and then 
settle the dispute in arbitration.  
 
Equal Punishment 
 
The principle of equal punishment was a central feature of Near Eastern 
adultery law. The offence of the adulterer to the husband was 
effectively measured by the extent to which the husband punished his 
wife, with collusion also a secondary concern. As has been discussed, 
punishments for a woman taken by a moichos were minimal in Athens 
and focused mainly on mitigating a perceived moral threat that her 
presence and attire could pose, whilst they were entirely absent in 
Gortyn. Consequently, there is nowhere found any requirement for 
equal punishment in either polis. That collusion could be a concern is 
demonstrated by Stephanos, Neaira, and Phano, and even if 
                                               
654 G.72.2.36-45. 
655 Gagarin (2010), 130. 
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Apollodorus’ account is exaggerated, or even outright fabricated, it at 
least demonstrates an awareness of the issue that collusion could cause. 
In the absence of punishment for the woman, entrapment was 
consequently much easier to carry out. In this respect, it is noteworthy 
that the Athenians had a law designed to mitigate against this. The fate 
of Eratosthenes demonstrates it was of little use if the moichos was 
slain on the spot but given that it was likely to have been the case that 
this was very rarely the punishment a moichos was subjected to, then 
the procedure employed by Epaenetus afforded an accused moichos 
some protection against entrapment. This would not have been 
necessary in Near Eastern adultery law due to the requirement of equal 
punishment. 
The absence of equal punishment coupled with the general lack of 
punishment faced by the woman underlines a fundamental difference 
between adultery in the Near East and moicheia in Greece, which likely 
stems from the broader conception of moicheia as an offence 
committed by a man who has sexual intercourse with any woman under 
the control of another man. Whilst adultery could easily be cast as a 
betrayal by the wife to her husband, it is much more difficult to 
conceive of sexual intercourse by a sister, daughter, or mother in the 
same way. This meant that moicheia was understood by the Greeks as 
an attack by the moichos on the head of the household, but not as an 
offence against him by the seduced woman. As moicheia subsumed 
adultery within it, then this extended to acts that elsewhere would be 
considered as the separate offence of adultery. The Greek wife was then 
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not subject to the same liabilities for committing adultery as the Near 
Eastern wife. She could not be physically punished, nor financially 
penalised by divorce with retention of dowry. Whilst she certainly 
could be divorced, this was a right granted to the husband regardless of 
whether the wife was at fault. As she was not conceived of as having 
committed an offence to her husband, then the punishment her lover 
was liable to was not linked to her own punishment, and Euphiletus 
could even cast the killing of a moichos he had caught with his wife as 
an act which protected both her and his household. Greek women 
certainly could be imagined as the active party in any sexual liaison, 
such as Helen in Trojan Women, or the many women whom Xenophon 
claims pursued Alkibiades; but even allowing for this, and even if 
adultery, was the primary way in which moicheia was considered a 
concern in Greece, this broad definition of the offence allowed for a 
completely different approach to punishing a wife than that found 
amongst their neighbours in the Near East.656 
 
Conclusion 
 
The topic of moicheia has been the source of much debate in modern 
scholarship. As the focus has usually been inward looking, then the 
points of debate have tended to be equally so. When the focus has been 
to compare moicheia to adultery in neighbouring societies, it has been 
to note the seeming difference between the two with respect to the 
                                               
656 Eur. Tro. 1049-1059; Xen. Mem. 1.2.24. 
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relationships which were covered by the respective offences. The 
noteworthy exception is Cohen, for a whom a comparative study was 
the starting point not for an examination of the differences, but for his 
argument that moicheia was in fact the same as adultery. Beyond this 
simple observation, the discussion has tended to focus inwardly on 
exactly what moicheia was, what its unifying feature was, whether it 
was simply adultery, or effectively adultery, how the laws on it 
evolved, and how moichoi were punished. For the Athenian woman 
taken by a moichos, the law given at [Dem.] 59.87 has usually been 
taken at face value, with the assumption that divorce was the mandated 
punishment, even if the punishment made little sense in the light of the 
broad conception of moicheia, and left open the question as to what 
happened to the daughter, sister, or mother taken by a moichos.  
Due to this inward focus, some important differences between 
moicheia in Greece and adultery in the Near East have been 
overlooked. Whereas adultery was seen as a most serious offence 
committed by both the adulterer and the wife against the husband, 
moicheia was seen as an offence committed by the moichos against the 
man under whose control the seduced woman fell. For the moichos, the 
offence was no less severe than that committed by the Near Eastern 
adulterer. Both offences were a capital one, even if in practice this may 
have only been applied in rare circumstances such as that of Euphiletus 
and Eratosthenes. A financial penalty was almost certainly available to 
the Near Eastern husband, whilst the account of Stephanos and 
Epaenetus demonstrates that it certainly was in Classical Athens, and 
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fixed penalty amounts were imposed in Gortyn, with a physical 
punishment only allowed for if the fine was not paid. Humiliation, at 
least in the form of depilation, and possibly in more painful ways, was 
also found in both. The comparison with the Near Eastern evidence 
helps to shed light on the restriction found in [Dem.] 59.66, where the 
moichos can be punished as his captor sees fit, but cannot have a knife 
used against him, which points to a difference in approach. Mutilation 
was a fairly common punishment in Near Eastern law codes, and 
examples of it can be found in the context of adultery. There is no sense 
it was allowed in Classical Athens, and the otherwise carte blanche that 
this law afforded the person who captured a moichos was likely 
intended not to prevent him from killing the moichos, but to prevent 
him from mutilating him.  
The situation for the wife was very different, however. Unlike her Near 
Eastern counterpart, she could not be killed, mutilated, or humiliated, 
and whilst she could be divorced, she could not have any of her dowry 
retained. The laws at Gortyn did not impose any penalty upon the wife 
should she be at fault for a divorce, even though they did impose a 
penalty for the husband if he was at fault. Despite the broad acceptance 
of its veracity amongst modern scholarship, the mandatory divorce law 
of [Dem.] 59.87 is a forgery. The only accurate reflection of a Classical 
Athenian law it offers is in the restriction placed upon a woman’s 
ability to attend a public sacrifice if she had been taken by a moichos. 
It is this restriction on what she can wear and where she can go which 
was the only legal punishment an Athenian woman faced, and it reflects 
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not an attempt to punish her directly for her offence, but to prevent that 
offence was from negatively affecting the community. As the woman 
in Classical Athens and in Gortyn faced little risk from a baseless 
accusation of moicheia, there was no need to afford her the same 
protections a Near Eastern wife was given from a baseless accusation 
of adultery. In the absence of evidence, a Near Eastern wife could 
undertake an ordeal, or swear an oath as to her innocence and be legally 
regarded as such. For the Athenian and Gortynian woman, there was 
simply no need. 
So stark was the difference between the liability of unfaithful wife in 
Greece and the Near East, that it enabled Euphiletus to claim his 
execution of Eratosthenes was a necessary act to protect his wife from 
a moichos. Had she been a Near Eastern wife, then her offence would 
have been the same as Eratosthenes’. She would have committed the 
same serious offence, and she would have been subjected to the same 
capital punishment. The culpability of the wife was of such importance, 
that the offence to the Near Eastern husband was measured by the 
extent to which he punished his wife. If he did not punish her at all, 
then she could have committed no offence against him. By extension, 
this meant that the adulterer could have himself committed no offence 
against the husband, and consequently he could not be punished. This 
was not the case in Athens or Gortyn, and that it was not speaks to a 
fundamental difference between the offences of adultery and moicheia. 
It is not simply the case that moicheia was a broader offence than 
adultery. It is better understood as a different offence than adultery. 
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One which is similar to it, and by its nature subsumes it, but is not it. 
Adultery was an attack on the rights of the husband by his wife and her 
lover. It attacked his right of exclusive sexual access, cast doubt on the 
paternity of his children, and it was betrayal of him by his wife of the 
utmost magnitude. Moicheia resists any attempt to find one single 
unifying element, but by casting it as an attack by the moichos upon the 
man under whose power the woman fell, whether kurieia or not, and 
not as an offence by the woman herself, then it was an attack on the 
household, and on the control exerted by a kurios over his household. 
It threatened the paternity of any children in the household, it impacted 
the value of the woman as a current or potential wife, but it did not 
directly impact the right of exclusive sexual access by the kurios, and 
it was not a betrayal on the part of the woman.  
Exactly why the Greek poleis did not follow their neighbours in 
separating out adultery from the seduction of an unmarried woman in 
their laws is not clear, but that they did not meant that they could not 
legislate separately for offences which were specifically adultery. It 
meant that they did not impose punishments that could only affect a 
wife, such as compulsory divorce or retention of dowry, they did not 
see the wife as being legally culpable, and they did not measure the 
extent to which the moichos had committed an offence by the extent to 
which the woman was punished. With the exception of mandatory 
divorce, which would have intruded upon the husband’s right to punish 
as he saw fit, these were all elements of Near Eastern adultery law. The 
secondary concern of collusion, which was adequately dealt with by 
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the requirement of equal punishment in Near Eastern law, could not be 
covered by moicheia law, and instead required specific provisions such 
as the false imprisonment law in Athens, and the oath-swearing 
procedure in Gortyn, neither of which carried any risk for the woman. 
The comparison made here between Near Eastern adultery laws and 
Greek moicheia laws serves to demonstrate the extent to which 
moicheia was a different offence than adultery. It shows that rather than 
understanding moicheia by understanding it as adultery, and then 
moving out from there to peripheral offences affecting different 
relationships, it should be approached from the other direction, and 
understood as an offence in its own right. One which by its nature 
covered offences that would have been dealt with in the Near East by 
adultery legislation, but in Greece had to be dealt with by moicheia 
legislation, and which meant that Greek law did not punish the 
adulterous wife in the same way as her Near Eastern neighbour. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The overarching purpose of the two case studies presented in this thesis 
has been to demonstrate the value of considering the Greeks and their 
legal history in the context of the wider region that they were a part of. 
Whilst each society deserves consideration on its own merits, the 
eastern neighbours of the Greeks are often studied as part of a 
homogenous whole, with the Greeks regarded as being apart, different, 
and worthy of study in isolation. Whilst great strides forward in 
considering the Greeks as part of a network of exchange have been 
made in other areas, much less work has been done in the field of legal 
history. In part, this is due to the practicalities of the subject matter, as 
influence cannot easily be detected simply by identifying similarities 
in the manner that it can be in fields such as art and literature. It is also 
the case that differences in legal approach between the Greeks and the 
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societies of the Near East have helped in maintaining a barrier, with the 
rule of law and autocratic rule seen as a demarcation point. Even if the 
distinction is sometimes blurrier than is imagined, there is no doubt that 
the Greeks of the Archaic and Classical period did develop political 
systems that were not based on autocratic rule, and their legal systems 
reflected that. However, the day-to-day regulating of relationships 
between members of the community presented largely the same issues 
whether a given person lived under autocratic rule or not.  
The case study on homicide pollution helps to demonstrate a continuity 
between the Greeks and their eastern neighbours as the Athenians 
regarded homicide as a private wrong, just as it was in the Near East. 
In contrast to modern homicide procedure, it was an offence that from 
a legal standpoint was left up to the relatives of the victim to prosecute. 
Whilst for the Athenians, a communal concern also intruded upon the 
process which included a bar on accepting compensatory payments, on 
an accused killer entering certain public spaces, and on the threat of 
pollution to help motivate the removal of a killer from the community, 
this case study helps to demonstrate that this concern was not uniquely 
Greek. Even though the context is different, and consequently the 
expression can vary, the Hebrew Bible displays the same communal 
concern, which meant that it too placed a bar on accepting 
compensatory payments, and it too used the threat of pollution to 
motivate the removal of a killer from the community.  
The identification of this communal concern undermines a de-
emphasising of the place of homicide pollution beliefs in Classical 
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Athens found in some scholarship, and by studying the Greeks in this 
broader context, homicide pollution is instead revealed as the point at 
which a traditionally private legal offence began to become a wider 
societal concern. Homicide pollution reflects the community’s desire 
for the next of kin to take action to remove a killer from its midst. It 
does not motivate the next of kin to take action because the legal 
structure of the community is too weak to do so itself, but because the 
traditional legal structure does not otherwise allow the community to 
intervene.  
In the case of moicheia, a genuine difference between Greek legal 
practice and that of the Near East is found. Even here, though, studying 
moicheia in the context of Near Eastern adultery law helps to illuminate 
the fact that the two are not the same offence. The comparison 
demonstrates that moicheia covers what would be dealt with as two 
separate offences in the Near East; adultery and the seduction of an 
unmarried woman. As assumptions are usually made that moicheia is 
primarily adultery with a somewhat wider application, to the extent that 
moicheia is sometimes even translated as ‘adultery’, then the law of 
[Dem.] 59.87 is often accepted uncritically. As adulterous wives are 
punished, then it is only natural that they are punished in Athens also. 
But these women have not committed adultery, and the lack of any 
requirement of equal punishment, a fundamental part of Near Eastern 
adultery law, helps to underline that the offence is not theirs, but 
belongs only to the moichos, and only the moichos is liable to 
punishment. It also means that a woman taken by a moichos does not 
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need the same protection from a baseless accusation of adultery that is 
granted to a Near Eastern wife.  
Further insights are also gained from the comparison. The relative lack 
of examples of a moichos being executed for the crime is also found in 
the Near East with regards to adultery. As there are many laws which 
state the Near Eastern adulterer could be liable for the death penalty, 
then equally there is no reason to assume that killing a moichos was not 
permissible under Athenian law. Mutilation was a punishment found in 
the Near East for a variety of offences, including adultery, which may 
shed light onto the reference to a ban on using a knife on a moichos 
found at [Dem.] 59.66. It was not a ban on killing the moichos, but the 
comparison suggests it was a ban on mutilating him. 
Whilst the stated goal of this thesis was to regard the Greeks as just one 
society within a wider region, it has been the case that by using the 
Near Eastern evidence as a point of comparison for the Greek that it 
has risked falling into the trap of replacing one way of privileging the 
Greeks with another. One in which the Greek participation in a wider 
Near Eastern network is acknowledged, but then the Near Eastern 
evidence is treated as a homogenous whole and used only to draw 
conclusions about the Greeks. This has not been the intention of these 
case studies, but it is rather a function of their aim to demonstrate the 
usefulness of studying Greek legal history in a wider context. Even 
though the focus of these case studies has been on advancing the 
understanding of Greek legal history, the observation that the Hebrew 
Bible helps to demonstrate that homicide pollution in Classical Athens 
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represents a communal concern in a specific set of circumstances is one 
which could equally be made in the other direction, whilst the example 
of Euphiletos helps to demonstrate that the lack of recorded instances 
of execution for adultery in the Near East does not mean that it did not 
happen. These two case studies should not prove to be the only two 
areas in which the understanding of both Greek and Near Eastern legal 
history can be enhanced by considering this wider context, and further 
study in other areas should hold the promise of further insights.  
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